

Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations
of the
United States
1930

(In Three Volumes)

Volume I



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PREFACE

Foreign Relations of the United States is a series of volumes of diplomatic correspondence published by the Department of State for each year beginning with 1861 (excepting 1869). The regular annual volumes have been supplemented by special volumes on particular subjects. For the period beginning with 1914 these extra volumes have included World War Supplements for the years 1914 to 1918 inclusive; volumes on Russia for the years 1918 and 1919; The Lansing Papers 1914-1920; Japan: 1931-1941; and the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, these last named volumes being still in the course of publication.

The compiling and editing of the *Foreign Relations* volumes is performed by the Research Section in the Division of Research and Publication in accordance with the principles set forth in an order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. This order, which is still in force, is given here in full:

The publication of diplomatic correspondence relating to matters which are still current often presents an insuperable obstacle to effective negotiation, but it is obvious that after the completion of the business in hand, as much of the correspondence as is practicable ought to be made public. This object is attained by the publication of *Foreign Relations* which presents, in a form economical, compact and easily accessible, the documentary history of the foreign relations of the United States. The editing of *Foreign Relations* must, therefore, be recognized as an important part of the duties of the Department of State.

The Chief of the Division of Publications [Division of Research and Publication] is charged with the preparation for this purpose, as soon as practicable after the close of each year, of the correspondence relating to all major policies and decisions of the Department in the matter of foreign relations, together with the events which contributed to the formulation of each decision or policy, and the facts incident to the application of it. It is expected that the material thus assembled, aside from the omission of trivial and inconsequential details, will be substantially complete as regards the files of the Department.

The development of the science of international law has become a matter of such weight and general concern that it is recommended that the Chief of the Division of Publications [Division of Research and Publication], with the help and counsel of the Solicitor [Legal Adviser], should give special attention to the publication of all important decisions made by the Department relating to international law, with a view to making available for general study and use the annual contributions of the Department to this important branch of jurisprudence. It is likewise believed that the Department may profitably inaugurate the practice of printing a record of treaty negotiations, and it is, therefore, suggested that such material be added, beginning with *Foreign Relations 1918* which is now in the process of editing.

Don. U.S. State Dept. - 3 vol. - Oct 45

When the documents on a given subject have been assembled in the Division of Publications [Division of Research and Publication], they should be submitted to the Solicitor [Legal Adviser] or to the Chief of the appropriate division which has had immediate supervision of the topic. The Solicitor [Legal Adviser], or the heads of these divisions, respectively, are charged with the duty of reviewing the material thus assembled and indicating any omissions which appear to be required. Omissions of the following kind are recognized as legitimate and necessary:

- (a) Matters which if published at the time would tend to embarrass negotiations or other business;
- (b) To condense the record and avoid needless details;
- (c) To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by other governments and by individuals;
- (d) To avoid needless offense to other nationalities or individuals by excising invidious comments not relevant or essential to the subject; and,
- (e) To suppress personal opinions presented in despatches and not adopted by the Department. To this there is one qualification, namely, that in major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the choices presented to the Department when the decision was made.

On the other hand, there must be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating the place in the text where the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing should be omitted with a view to concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of a policy.

Where a document refers to two or more subjects, provided there are no other objections, it should be printed in its entirety, and not divided for purposes of more exact classification in editing. Great care must be taken to avoid the mutilation of documents. On the other hand, when a foreign government, in giving permission to use a communication, requests the deletion of any part of it, it is usually preferable to publish the document in part rather than to omit it entirely. A similar principle may be applied with reference to documents originating with the American Government.

The Chief of the Division of Publications [Division of Research and Publication] is expected to initiate, through the appropriate channels, the correspondence necessary to secure from a foreign government permission to publish any document received from it and which it is desired to publish as a part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States. Without such permission, the document in question must not be used. The offices and divisions concerned in this process of editing may be expected to cooperate heartily with a view to the preparation of an adequate and honest record.

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MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONGRESS, DECEMBER 2, 1930

TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES :

I have the honor to comply with the requirement of the Constitution that I should lay before the Congress information as to the state of the Union, and recommend consideration of such measures as are necessary and expedient.

Substantial progress has been made during the year in national peace and security; the fundamental strength of the Nation's economic life is unimpaired; education and scientific discovery have made advances; our country is more alive to its problems of moral and spiritual welfare.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

During the past 12 months we have suffered with other Nations from economic depression.

The origins of this depression lie to some extent within our own borders through a speculative period which diverted capital and energy into speculation rather than constructive enterprise. Had overspeculation in securities been the only force operating, we should have seen recovery many months ago, as these particular dislocations have generally readjusted themselves.

Other deep-seated causes have been in action, however, chiefly the world-wide overproduction beyond even the demand of prosperous times for such important basic commodities as wheat, rubber, coffee, sugar, copper, silver, zinc, to some extent cotton, and other raw materials. The cumulative effects of demoralizing price falls of these important commodities in the process of adjustment of production to world consumption have produced financial crises in many countries and have diminished the buying power of these countries for imported goods to a degree which extended the difficulties farther afield by creating unemployment in all the industrial nations. The political agitation in Asia; revolutions in South America and political unrest in some European States; the methods of sale by Russia of her increasing agricultural exports to European markets; and our own drought—have all contributed to prolong and deepen the depression.

In the larger view the major forces of the depression now lie outside of the United States, and our cooperation has been retarded by

the unwarranted degree of fear and apprehension created by these outside forces.

The extent of the depression is indicated by the following approximate percentages of activity during the past three months as compared with the highly prosperous year of 1928:

Value of department-store sales	93% of 1928
Volume of manufacturing production	80% of 1928
Volume of mineral production	90% of 1928
Volume of factory employment	84% of 1928
Total of bank deposits	105% of 1928
Wholesale prices—all commodities	83% of 1928
Cost of living	94% of 1928

Various other indexes indicate total decrease of activity from 1928 of from 15 to 20 per cent.

There are many factors which give encouragement for the future. The fact that we are holding from 80 to 85 per cent of our normal activities and incomes; that our major financial and industrial institutions have come through the storm unimpaired; that price levels of major commodities have remained approximately stable for some time; that a number of industries are showing signs of increasing demand; that the world at large is readjusting itself to the situation; all reflect grounds for confidence. We should remember that these occasions have been met many times before, that they are but temporary, that our country is to-day stronger and richer in resources, in equipment, in skill, than ever in its history. We are in an extraordinary degree self-sustaining, we will overcome world influences and will lead the march of prosperity as we have always done hitherto.

Economic depression can not be cured by legislative action or executive pronouncement. Economic wounds must be healed by the action of the cells of the economic body—the producers and consumers themselves. Recovery can be expedited and its effects mitigated by cooperative action. That cooperation requires that every individual should sustain faith and courage; that each should maintain his self-reliance; that each and every one should search for method of improving his business or service; that the vast majority whose income is unimpaired should not hoard out of fear but should pursue their normal living and recreations; that each should seek to assist his neighbors who may be less fortunate; that each industry should assist its own employees; that each community and each State should assume its full responsibilities for organization of employment and relief of distress with that sturdiness and independence which built a great Nation.

State, and local, can join with the community in such programs and do its part. A year ago I, together with other officers of the Government, initiated extensive cooperative measures throughout the country.

The first of these measures was an agreement of leading employers to maintain the standards of wages and of labor leaders to use their influence against strife. In a large sense these undertakings have been adhered to and we have not witnessed the usual reductions of wages which have always heretofore marked depressions. The index of union wage scales shows them to be to-day fully up to the level of any of the previous three years. In consequence the buying power of the country has been much larger than would otherwise have been the case. Of equal importance the Nation has had unusual peace in industry and freedom from the public disorder which has characterized previous depressions.

The second direction of cooperation has been that our governments, National, State, and local, the industries and business so distribute employment as to give work to the maximum number of employees.

The third direction of cooperation has been to maintain and even extend construction work and betterments in anticipation of the future. It has been the universal experience in previous depressions that public works and private construction have fallen off rapidly with the general tide of depression. On this occasion, however, the increased authorization and generous appropriations by the Congress and the action of States and municipalities have resulted in the expansion of public construction to an amount even above that in the most prosperous years. In addition the cooperation of public utilities, railways, and other large organizations has been generously given in construction and betterment work in anticipation of future need. The Department of Commerce advises me that as a result, the volume of this type of construction work, which amounted to roughly \$6,300,000,000 in 1929, instead of decreasing will show a total of about \$7,000,000,000 for 1930. There has, of course, been a substantial decrease in the types of construction which could not be undertaken in advance of need.

The fourth direction of cooperation was the organization in such States and municipalities, as was deemed necessary, of committees to organize local employment, to provide for employment agencies, and to effect relief of distress.

The result of magnificent cooperation throughout the country has been that actual suffering has been kept to a minimum during the past 12 months, and our unemployment has been far less in proportion than in other large industrial countries. Some time ago it became evident that unemployment would continue over the winter and would necessarily be added to from seasonal causes and that the savings

a definite duty to see that no deserving person in our country suffers from hunger or cold. I therefore set up a more extensive organization to stimulate more intensive cooperation throughout the country. There has been a most gratifying degree of response, from governors, mayors, and other public officials, from welfare organizations, and from employers in concerns both large and small. The local communities through their voluntary agencies have assumed the duty of relieving individual distress and are being generously supported by the public.

The number of those wholly out of employment seeking for work was accurately determined by the census last April as about 2,500,000. The Department of Labor index of employment in the larger trades shows some decrease in employment since that time. The problem from a relief point of view is somewhat less than the published estimates of the number of unemployed would indicate. The intensive community and individual efforts in providing special employment outside the listed industries are not reflected in the statistical indexes and tend to reduce such published figures. Moreover, there is estimated to be a constant figure at all times of nearly 1,000,000 unemployed who are not without annual income but temporarily idle in the shift from one job to another. We have an average of about three breadwinners to each two families, so that every person unemployed does not represent a family without income. The view that the relief problems are less than the gross numbers would indicate is confirmed by the experience of several cities, which shows that the number of families in distress represents from 10 to 20 per cent of the number of the calculated unemployed. This is not said to minimize the very real problem which exists but to weigh its actual proportions.

As a contribution to the situation the Federal Government is engaged upon the greatest program of waterway, harbor, flood control, public building, highway, and airway improvement in all our history. This, together with loans to merchant shipbuilders, improvement of the Navy and in military aviation, and other construction work of the Government will exceed \$520,000,000 for this fiscal year. This compares with \$253,000,000 in the fiscal year 1928. The construction works already authorized and the continuation of policies in Government aid will require a continual expenditure upwards of half a billion dollars annually.

I favor still further temporary expansion of these activities in aid to unemployment during this winter. The Congress will, however, have presented to it numbers of projects, some of them under the guise of, rather than the reality of, their usefulness in the increase of employment during the depression. There are certain common-sense limitations upon any expansions of construction work. The

Government must not undertake works that are not of sound economic purpose and that have not been subject to searching technical investigation, and which have not been given adequate consideration by the Congress. The volume of construction work in the Government is already at the maximum limit warranted by financial prudence as a continuing policy. To increase taxation for purposes of construction work defeats its own purpose, as such taxes directly diminish employment in private industry. Again any kind of construction requires, after its authorization, a considerable time before labor can be employed in which to make engineering, architectural, and legal preparations. Our immediate problem is the increase of employment for the next six months, and new plans which do not produce such immediate result or which extend commitments beyond this period are not warranted.

The enlarged rivers and harbors, public building, and highway plans authorized by the Congress last session, however, offer an opportunity for assistance by the temporary acceleration of construction of these programs even faster than originally planned, especially if the technical requirements of the laws which entail great delays could be amended in such fashion as to speed up acquirements of land and the letting of contracts.

With view, however, to the possible need for acceleration, we, immediately upon receiving those authorities from the Congress five months ago, began the necessary technical work in preparation for such possible eventuality. I have canvassed the departments of the Government as to the maximum amount that can be properly added to our present expenditure to accelerate all construction during the next six months, and I feel warranted in asking the Congress for an appropriation of from \$100,000,000 to \$150,000,000 to provide such further employment in this emergency. In connection therewith we need some authority to make enlarged temporary advances of Federal-highway aid to the States.

I recommend that this appropriation be made distributable to the different departments upon recommendation of a committee of the Cabinet and approval by the President. Its application to works already authorized by the Congress assures its use in directions of economic importance and to public welfare. Such action will imply an expenditure upon construction of all kinds of over \$650,000,000 during the next twelve months.

greatly affected by wheat and cotton, which have participated in world-wide overproduction and have fallen to about 60 per cent of the average price of the year 1928. Excluding these commodities, the prices of all other agricultural products are about 84 per cent of those of 1928. The average wholesale prices of other primary goods, such as nonferrous metals, have fallen to 76 per cent of 1928.

The price levels of our major agricultural commodities are, in fact, higher than those in other principal producing countries, due to the combined result of the tariff and the operations of the Farm Board. For instance, wheat prices at Minneapolis are about 30 per cent higher than at Winnipeg, and at Chicago they are about 20 per cent higher than at Buenos Aires. Corn prices at Chicago are over twice as high as at Buenos Aires. Wool prices average more than 80 per cent higher in this country than abroad, and butter is 30 per cent higher in New York City than in Copenhagen.

Aside from the misfortune to agriculture of the world-wide depression we have had the most severe drought. It has affected particularly the States bordering on the Potomac, Ohio, and Lower Mississippi Rivers, with some areas in Montana, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. It has found its major expression in the shortage of pasturage and a shrinkage in the corn crop from an average of about 2,800,000,000 bushels to about 2,090,000,000 bushels.

On August 14 I called a conference of the governors of the most acutely affected States, and as a result of its conclusions I appointed a national committee comprising the heads of the important Federal agencies under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Agriculture. The governors in turn have appointed State committees representative of the farmers, bankers, business men, and the Red Cross, and subsidiary committees have been established in most of the acutely affected counties. Railway rates were reduced on feed and livestock in and out of the drought areas, and over 50,000 cars of such products have been transported under these reduced rates. The Red Cross established a preliminary fund of \$5,000,000 for distress relief purposes and established agencies for its administration in each county. Of this fund less than \$500,000 has been called for up to this time as the need will appear more largely during the winter. The Federal Farm Loan Board has extended its credit facilities, and the Federal Farm Board has given financial assistance to all affected cooperatives.

In order that the Government may meet its full obligation toward our countrymen in distress through no fault of their own, I recommend that an appropriation should be made to the Department of Agriculture to be loaned for the purpose of seed and feed for ani-

mals. Its application should as hitherto in such loans be limited to a gross amount to any one individual, and secured upon the crop.

The Red Cross can relieve the cases of individual distress by the sympathetic assistance of our people.

FINANCES OF THE GOVERNMENT

I shall submit the detailed financial position of the Government with recommendations in the usual Budget message. I will at this time, however, mention that the Budget estimates of receipts and expenditures for the current year were formulated by the Treasury and the Budget Bureau at a time when it was impossible to forecast the severity of the business depression and have been most seriously affected by it. At that time a surplus of about \$123,000,000 was estimated for this fiscal year and tax reduction which affected the fiscal year to the extent of \$75,000,000 was authorized by the Congress, thus reducing the estimated surplus to about \$48,000,000. Closely revised estimates now made by the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget of the tax, postal, and other receipts for the current fiscal year indicate a decrease of about \$430,000,000 from the estimate of a year ago, of which about \$75,000,000 is due to tax reduction, leaving about \$355,000,000 due to the depression. Moreover, legislation enacted by Congress subsequent to the submission of the Budget enlarging Federal construction work to expand employment and for increase in veterans' services and other items, have increased expenditures during the current fiscal year by about \$225,000,000.

Thus the decrease of \$430,000,000 in revenue and the increase of \$225,000,000 in expenditure adversely change the original Budget situation by about \$655,000,000. This large sum is offset by the original estimated surplus a year ago of about \$123,000,000, by the application of \$185,000,000 of interest payments upon the foreign debt to current expenditures, by arrangements of the Farm Board through repayments, etc., in consequence of which they reduced their net cash demands upon the Treasury by \$100,000,000 in this period, and by about \$67,000,000 economies and deferments brought about in the Government, thus reducing the practical effect of the change in the situation to an estimated deficit of about \$180,000,000 for the present fiscal year. I shall make suggestions for handling the present-year deficit in the Budget message, but I do not favor encroachment upon the statutory reduction of the public debt.

While it will be necessary in public interest to further increase expenditures during the current fiscal year in aid to unemployment by speeding up construction work and aid to the farmers affected by the drought, I can not emphasize too strongly the absolute necessity

to defer any other plans for increase of Government expenditures. The Budget for 1932 fiscal year indicates estimated expenditure of about \$4,054,000,000, including postal deficit. The receipts are estimated at about \$4,085,000,000 if the temporary tax reduction of last year be discontinued, leaving a surplus of only about \$30,000,000. Most rigid economy is therefore necessary to avoid increase in taxes.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

Our Army and Navy are being maintained at a high state of efficiency, under officers of high training and intelligence, supported by a devoted personnel of the rank and file. The London naval treaty has brought important economies in the conduct of the Navy. The Navy Department will lay before the committees of the Congress recommendations for a program of authorization of new construction which should be initiated in the fiscal year of 1932.

LEGISLATION

This is the last session of the Seventy-first Congress. During its previous sittings it has completed a very large amount of important legislation, notably: The establishment of the Federal Farm Board; fixing congressional reapportionment; revision of the tariff, including the flexible provisions and a reorganization of the Tariff Commission; reorganization of the Radio Commission; reorganization of the Federal Power Commission; expansion of Federal prisons; reorganization of parole and probation system in Federal prisons; expansion of veterans' hospitals; establishment of disability allowances to veterans; consolidation of veteran activities; consolidation and strengthening of prohibition enforcement activities in the Department of Justice; organization of a Narcotics Bureau; large expansion of rivers and harbors improvements; substantial increase in Federal highways; enlargement of public buildings construction program; and the ratification of the London naval treaty.

The Congress has before it legislation partially completed in the last sitting in respect to Muscle Shoals, bus regulation, relief of congestion in the courts, reorganization of border patrol in prevention of smuggling, law enforcement in the District of Columbia, and other subjects.

It is desirable that these measures should be completed.

The short session does not permit of extensive legislative programs, but there are a number of questions which, if time does not permit action, I recommend should be placed in consideration by the Congress, perhaps through committees cooperating in some instances with the Federal departments with view to preparation for subsequent action.

ELECTRICAL POWER

I have in a previous message recommended effective regulation of interstate electrical power. Such regulation should preserve the independence and responsibility of the States.

RAILWAYS

We have determined upon a national policy of consolidation of the railways as a necessity of more stable and more economically operated transportation. Further legislation is necessary to facilitate such consolidation. In the public interest we should strengthen the railways that they may meet our future needs.

ANTITRUST LAWS

I recommend that the Congress institute an inquiry into some aspects of the economic working of these laws. I do not favor repeal of the Sherman Act. The prevention of monopolies is of most vital public importance. Competition is not only the basis of protection to the consumer but is the incentive to progress. However, the interpretation of these laws by the courts, the changes in business, especially in the economic effects upon those enterprises closely related to the use of the natural resources of the country, make such an inquiry advisable. The producers of these materials assert that certain unfortunate results of wasteful and destructive use of these natural resources together with a destructive competition which impoverishes both operator and worker can not be remedied because of the prohibitive interpretation of the antitrust laws. The well-known condition of the bituminous coal industry is an illustration. The people have a vital interest in the conservation of their natural resources; in the prevention of wasteful practices; in conditions of destructive competition which may impoverish the producer and the wage earner; and they have an equal interest in maintaining adequate competition. I therefore suggest that an inquiry be directed especially to the effect of the workings of the antitrust laws in these particular fields to determine if these evils can be remedied without sacrifice of the fundamental purpose of these laws.

CAPITAL-GAINS TAX

It is urged by many thoughtful citizens that the peculiar economic effect of the income tax on so-called capital gains at the present rate is to enhance speculative inflation and likewise impede business recovery. I believe this to be the case and I recommend that a study be made of the economic effects of this tax and of its relation to the

There is need for revision of our immigration laws upon a more
ited and more selective basis, flexible to the needs of the country.
Under conditions of current unemployment it is obvious that per-
s coming to the United States seeking work would likely become
er a direct or indirect public charge. As a temporary measure
officers issuing visas to immigrants have been, in pursuance of
law, instructed to refuse visas to applicants likely to fall into this
s. As a result the visas issued have decreased from an average
about 24,000 per month prior to restrictions to a rate of about
0 during the last month. These are largely preferred persons
er the law. Visas from Mexico are about 250 per month com-
ed to about 4,000 previous to restrictions. The whole subject
quires exhaustive reconsideration.

DEPORTATION OF ALIEN CRIMINALS

urge the strengthening of our deportation laws so as to more fully
ourselves of criminal aliens. Furthermore, thousands of persons
e entered the country in violation of the immigration laws. The
y method of their entry indicates their objectionable character,
our law-abiding foreign-born residents suffer in consequence.
Recommend that the Congress provide methods of strengthening
Government to correct this abuse.

POST OFFICE

ue to deferment of Government building over many years, previous
ministrations had been compelled to enter upon types of leases for
ndary facilities in large cities, some of which were objectionable
representing too high a return upon the value of the property. To
vent the occasion for further uneconomic leasing I recommend
the Congress authorize the building by the Government of its
facilities.

VETERANS

he Nation has generously expanded its care for veterans. The
olidation of all veterans' activities into the Veterans' Adminis-
ion has produced substantial administrative economies. The con-
dation also brings emphasis to the inequalities in service and
wances. The whole subject is under study by the administrator,
I recommend it should also be examined by the committees of
Congress.

I urge further consideration by the Congress of the recommendations I made a year ago looking to the development through temporary Federal aid of adequate State and local services for the health of children and the further stamping out of communicable disease, particularly in the rural sections. The advance of scientific discovery, methods, and social thought imposes a new vision in these matters. The drain upon the Federal Treasury is comparatively small. The results both economic and moral are of the utmost importance.

GENERAL

It is my belief that after the passing of this depression, when we can examine it in retrospect, we shall need to consider a number of other questions as to what action may be taken by the Government to remove possible governmental influences which make for instability and to better organize mitigation of the effect of depression. It is as yet too soon to constructively formulate such measures.

There are many administrative subjects, such as departmental reorganization, extension of the civil service, readjustment of the postal rates, etc., which at some appropriate time require the attention of the Congress.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Our relations with foreign countries have been maintained upon a high basis of cordiality and good will.

During the past year the London naval pact was completed, approved by the Senate, and ratified by the governments concerned. By this treaty we have abolished competition in the building of warships, have established the basis of parity of the United States with the strongest of foreign powers, and have accomplished a substantial reduction in war vessels.

During the year there has been an extended political unrest in the world. Asia continues in disturbed condition, and revolutions have taken place in Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. Despite the jeopardy to our citizens and their property which naturally arises in such circumstances, we have, with the cooperation of the governments concerned, been able to meet all such instances without friction.

We have resumed normal relations with the new Governments of Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia immediately upon evidence that they were able to give protection to our citizens and their property, and that they recognized their international obligations.

A commission which was supported by the Congress has completed its investigation and reported upon our future policies in respect to Haiti and proved of high value in securing the acceptance of these policies. An election has been held and a new government established. We have replaced our high commissioner by a minister and have begun the gradual withdrawal of our activities with view to complete retirement at the expiration of the present treaty in 1935.

A number of arbitration and conciliation treaties have been completed or negotiated during the year, and will be presented for approval by the Senate.

I shall, in a special message, lay before the Senate the protocols covering the statutes of the World Court which have been revised to accord with the sense of previous Senate reservations.

HERBERT HOOVER

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 2, 1930.

GENERAL

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, JANUARY 21-APRIL 22, 1930

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930	[Note: Names of governments represented at the London Naval Conference; list of the American delegates and advisers.]	1
Jan. 19 (4)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Report of conversation with the British Prime Minister regarding proposed procedure of the Conference and attitude of the various delegations; opinion that the British delegation will co-operate fully.	2
Jan. 20 (8)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Information that friendly and satisfactory conferences have been had with the French and Italian delegations.	5
Jan. 23 (16)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Completion of conference organization at morning's plenary session; information that speeches of the delegations, except the French, were general in character.	6
Jan. 24 (18)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Decision of heads of delegations to hold daily meetings to discuss procedure for disposing of the various questions coming before the conference.	8
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Dec. 6 (58)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation on the Preparatory Commission (tel.)</i> Information that French-Italian discussions are adjourned while French Cabinet is being reconstituted. Conversation with Italian delegate, who brought the matter up to date, including statement in figures of Craigie's latest plan, and his attitude concerning it.	181
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Dec. 23 (424)	<i>From the Chargé in France (tel.)</i> Craigie's statement that it is difficult for the French to concentrate on negotiations because of political crisis. (Repeated to Brussels, Berne, and Rome.)	185
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1931 Jan. 1 (1)	<i>From the Ambassador in Belgium (tel.)</i> Doubt that it would be wise to proceed either to London or to Paris at the present time.	186

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1930 Oct. 16	<i>To the American Delegates to the Preparatory Commission</i> Designation of Hugh S. Gibson and Hugh R. Wilson as delegates, list of advisers and technical assistants, and general instructions.	187
Nov. 15 (23)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Request for advice on broad escape clause (text printed) which it is proposed to circulate in advance as a proposed "American amendment."	190
Nov. 17 (6)	<i>To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Approval of the text of escape clause with two possible changes (text printed).	191
Nov. 18 (26)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Desire to know what comment on the amendment the Department proposes to make to the press, in view of second suggested change.	191
Nov. 18 (7)	<i>To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Suggestion that, to avoid undue comment, the phraseology of the second suggestion might be made identical with that of London Naval Treaty, or that United States might refrain from making any proposal whatever regarding the escape clause.	192
Nov. 18 (27)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Inquiry regarding slight modification of Department's suggested wording.	192
Nov. 19 (8)	<i>To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Opinion that phraseology of London Naval Treaty should be used or that no American proposal regarding escape clause should be made.	193
Nov. 19 (29)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Decision that it would be better not to circulate an American escape clause at present but to let it come out in the course of the debates; further suggestions in regard to form of clause, with request for comments.	193
Nov. 20 (9)	<i>To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Enumeration of four alternative plans of action in regard to an escape clause, in the order of the Department's preference, and request that the Department be informed as to which plan is finally decided upon.	194
Nov. 21 (33)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Account of conversations with other delegates which have confirmed the opinion that the best course is the one indicated by the Department as first in the order of preference; draft of clause which it is planned to circulate the following day (text printed).	195
Nov. 22 (10)	<i>To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Approval of draft clause set forth in delegation's telegram No. 33, November 21.	197

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1930 Nov. 26 (39)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Discussion of texts drawn up by the special subcommittee dealing with chapter V of the convention relating to the Permanent Disarmament Commission; opinion that they meet U. S. views in most of the essentials; request for permission to express approval of texts at third reading and willingness to accept them as basis for discussions at the General Disarmament Conference.	197
Nov. 28 (45)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Report of rapid progress toward third reading; explanation that these texts should be regarded as constituting only a memorandum as a starting point for discussions in the final Conference.	199
Nov. 28 (13)	<i>To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Approval of texts as telegraphed, on the understanding that such approval does not prejudice Department's attitude at final Conference when figures are under discussion.	200
Dec. 1 (49)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Report of progress toward approval of final drafting and report.	200
Dec. 4 (54)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Fear that there will be an excessive amount of self-congratulation on results achieved by draft convention, with resultant disillusionment; information that in order to sound a note of warning as to realities a speech has been prepared which is being submitted for Department's approval.	200
Dec. 4 (55)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Text of speech referred to in telegram No. 54, December 4.	201
Dec. 5 (20)	<i>To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Approval of tenor and purpose of speech; suggestion that one quotation be omitted. (Footnote: Information that speech was altered as suggested by Department before being delivered December 9.)	203
Dec. 9 (60)	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.)</i> Information that Commission adjourned on the afternoon of December 9.	203

CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, HELD AT THE HAGUE, MARCH 13-APRIL 20, 1930, AND TEXT OF PROTOCOL RELATING TO MILITARY OBLIGATIONS IN CERTAIN CASES OF DOUBLE NATIONALITY.

1929 Oct. 15 (C. L. 271. 1929. V.)	<i>From the Secretary General of the League of Nations</i> Invitation to the first Codification Conference, which is to meet at The Hague on March 13, 1930, to consider the questions of: (1) nationality, (2) territorial waters, and (3) the responsibility of states for damages caused in their territory to the persons or property of foreigners.	204
Dec. 12	<i>To President Hoover</i> Recommendation that Congress be requested to give favorable consideration to the enclosed draft of a joint resolution providing for U. S. representation at the Conference.	206

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Feb. 27	<i>To the Chairman of the American Delegation and the Alternate Chairman</i> Information that according to present advice it is not expected that conventions will be signed; instructions not to sign a convention without prior cable authorization.	209
Mar. 1 (16)	<i>To the Minister in Switzerland (tel.)</i> Communication for the Secretary General of the League giving names of delegates and technical advisers (text printed).	209
Mar. 24 (37)	<i>From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> From Miller: Report that after a week of daily meetings the progress is limited and slow.	210
Mar. 31 (42)	<i>From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> From Miller: Statement that there is no possibility that Conference will adopt as a clause of a nationality convention the proposal of National Woman's Party that there be no distinction based on sex; suggested form of a resolution by the Conference (text printed) recommending the principle to the study of the Governments. (Footnote: Department's approval of form of resolution.)	210
Apr. 5 (46)	<i>From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> From Miller: Opinion that the proposed convention on nationality should not be signed because of certain features not acceptable to United States.	211
Apr. 6 (49)	<i>From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> From Miller: Information that nationality convention will be open for signature until December 31, 1930; opinion, however, that it is better to say at this Conference that United States will not sign.	213
Apr. 6 (50)	<i>From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> From Miller: Present belief that result of the Conference will be a set-back to the idea of codification of international law, as nationality agreement will be limited, and others, if reached at all, will also be limited. Opinion that discussions have been valuable, however.	213
Apr. 7 (25)	<i>To the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> For Miller: Instructions to inform Conference that delegation has recommended against signature of nationality convention even though signature is permitted until end of 1930.	214
Apr. 7 (53)	<i>From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> From Miller: Proposal to commission on territorial waters that the commission abandon idea of a signed convention and submit to the Governments for future consideration a report of commission's studies and deliberations; information that this plan will be followed.	214

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Apr. 8 (55)	<i>From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> From Miller: Various protocols adopted by commission on nationality (texts printed); recommendation that the protocols not be signed.	217
Apr. 9 (28)	<i>To the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> For Miller: Approval of recommendations in telegrams Nos. 54 and 55 of April 8.	218
Apr. 10 (60)	<i>From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> From Miller: Recommendation that U. S. delegation be given authorization to sign the Final Act of the Conference; explanation that it will contain nothing of a contractual nature.	219
Apr. 10 (30)	<i>To the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> For Miller: Telegram from chairman of Inter-American Commission of Women (text printed) stating that U. S. delegation is not fighting to prevent adoption of nationality convention based on sex discrimination and is supporting two articles based on inequality; request for information concerning the two articles mentioned.	220
Apr. 10 (32)	<i>To the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> For Miller: Information that feminine lobby is working for postponement of any convention on nationality; reiteration of view that none of these subjects is ready for world codification and that satisfactory conventions have not been expected; suggestion that view might be expressed that U. S. Government deems it unwise for the Conference to attempt to legislate on questions where there is real conflict of opinion.	220
Apr. 10 (33)	<i>To the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> For Miller: Authorization to sign Final Act provided it is merely a record and binds no one.	220
Apr. 11 (67)	<i>From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> From Miller: Texts of the articles referred to in telegram No. 30, April 10, and reasons for action taken; opinion that action of the Conference on nationality has not crystallized the views of other countries in opposition to U. S. policy but that, on the contrary, the discussions have shown world opinion to be in a state of flux with the trend toward U. S. policy.	221
Apr. 12 (73)	<i>From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)</i> From Miller: Report on last two sessions of the Conference, the last session being devoted to the signing of a nationality convention, three protocols, and the Final Act, of which the U. S. delegation signed only the Final Act.	223
Dec. 27 (112)	<i>To the Minister in Switzerland (tel.)</i> Instructions to proceed to Geneva to sign the protocol relating to military obligations in certain cases of double nationality (full powers being forwarded by mail).	223

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1937 Feb. 24	<i>Procès-Verbal</i> Text of <i>procès-verbal</i> regarding the deposit of the ten ratifications or accessions referred to in article 11 of the protocol relating to military obligations in certain cases of double nationality, signed at The Hague, April 12, 1930.	230

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

1930 May 22	<i>From the British Embassy</i> Information concerning proposed amendments to the Covenant of the League; inquiry as to whether the proposed new paragraph 7 bis in article 15 is likely to affect adversely the prospects of the U. S. Senate's accepting the Protocol of Accession of the United States to the Permanent Court of International Justice; and indication that in such event the British Government would be inclined to oppose the new paragraph.	232
May 27	<i>To the British Embassy</i> Advice that the new paragraph 7 bis would effect a fundamental change in the situation which existed at the time of the Senate reservation and at the time the protocol of accession of the United States to the Permanent Court of International Justice was signed.	233
May 27	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs</i> Conversation with the Counselor of the British Embassy in which the Counselor was informed that the statement <i>supra</i> was the Department's only observation concerning the new paragraph, since the United States did not wish to prevent the League from carrying out its wishes in the matter.	234

POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

1930 Mar. 5 (1336)	<i>From the Chargé in Switzerland</i> Request for instructions as to the attitude and duties of the Legation and the Consulate in respect to the Bank for International Settlements to be opened at Basel on April 1.	234
Apr. 29 (873)	<i>To the Chargé in Switzerland</i> Instructions as to the attitude of the Legation in regard to the new bank, with reference also to instructions being sent to the Consul at Basel.	235
Apr. 29	<i>To the Consul at Basel</i> Instructions with regard to the new Bank for International Settlements, with explanation that the Consul is charged with no special mission toward the Bank and that the United States is not a party to the international agreements pursuant to which it was founded.	235

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Feb. 8 (12)	<i>To the Chargé in Switzerland (tel.)</i> Note for the Secretary General (text printed) conveying U. S. Government's intention not to participate in Conference but to follow its action with sympathetic interest; instructions to inform Secretary General that Mr. Edwin C. Wilson is being associated with the Consulate at Geneva to follow the proceedings.	239
Feb. 8 (31)	<i>To the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> For Wilson: Instructions to proceed to Geneva for the duration of the Conference to assume charge of the political and economic work of the Consulate insofar as it relates to the Conference.	240
Feb. 28	<i>From the Consul at Geneva (tel.)</i> From Wilson: Report that the subject being discussed which is of principal interest to the United States is the question of the effect of multilateral economic agreements upon the most-favored-nation clause in bilateral treaties; summary of position of the question.	241
Mar. 25	<i>From the Consul at Geneva (tel.)</i> From Wilson: Description of three documents signed at final plenary session, March 24; information that a conference will be held in November to decide whether and when the commercial convention is to come into force.	242
Oct. 9 (1692 L. N. 1824)	<i>From the Chargé in Switzerland</i> Transmittal of a letter from the Deputy Secretary General of the League stating that a second Conference of Concerted Economic Action is to meet at Geneva November 17, and offering facilities to a U. S. representative or observer.	243
Oct. 14 (98)	<i>To the Minister in Switzerland (tel.)</i> Instructions to advise Secretary General that the American Consul at Geneva will be instructed to follow the proceedings.	244
Nov. 18	<i>From the Consul at Geneva (tel.)</i> Convening of the Second Conference; report that the date for ratifications of the commercial convention of March 24 will probably be extended and the fixing of the time for its coming into force will probably be postponed until the January meeting.	244
Nov. 28	<i>From the Consul at Geneva (tel.)</i> Information that Conference, which ended November 28, is considered to have been a failure as far as negotiations with a view to ameliorating present tariff conditions are concerned; summary of results of Conference.	245

CRITICISM OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN AMERICAN TARIFF LEGISLATION

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1930 Apr. 11	<i>To Senator Reed Smoot</i> Provisos in the pending tariff bill which are inconsistent with the most-favored-nation treaties of the United States; suggested provisions for reconciling the bill with U. S. treaty obligations.	246
May 6	<i>From the Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum by the Chief of the Treaty Division (text printed) enumerating provisos of bill which violate treaty obligations, and suggesting a means of avoiding such violation. Declaration that the memorandum is correct but that the Department has done all it can in the matter.	247
May 12	<i>From the German Embassy</i> Expression of grave concern felt by German industries over the effect the new tariff bill will have on their trade.	248
July 3 (676)	<i>From the Ambassador in France</i> Letter from the French Minister of Commerce, July 2, concerning unfortunate repercussions on French opinion of U. S. actions, particularly concerning laces, and Ambassador's reply of July 3 (texts printed); opinion that it is important that consideration be given to the matter if a possible tariff war is to be prevented.	249

REPRESENTATIONS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS REGARDING SENATE BILLS
FOR THE DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIEN SEAMEN

1930 Jan. 23	<i>From the British Embassy</i> Representations against Senate bill 1941 which is identical with Senate bill 717 of the 70th Congress; opinion that it would conflict with well-established international practice and would discriminate against foreign vessels trading in U. S. ports.	252
Apr. 1	<i>From the Canadian Legation</i> Expression of concern in regard to possible passage of Senate bill 1941 and House bill 7763.	253
Apr. 8 (1280)	<i>From the Netherlands Legation</i> Request that Legation's note verbale of January 17, 1928, be considered applicable to the bill (S. 202) providing for the deportation of certain alien seamen, which was ordered reported favorably from the Senate Committee on Immigration on April 7, 1930.	254
Apr. 15	<i>From the German Embassy</i> Statement that the apprehension expressed by the German Government on January 21, 1928, with regard to Senate bill 717 also applies to bills S. 202, S. 1941, and H. R. 7763.	255

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LOAD LINES, HELD AT LONDON,
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1929 Dec. 21 (664)	<i>From the British Ambassador</i> Information that a committee had been appointed 2½ years before to review work previously done on load lines, to consider certain special problems, etc.; inquiry whether, in the opinion of the U. S. Government, the report of the committee would form a suitable basis for international discussion.	255
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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LOAD LINES HELD AT LONDON, MAY 20—
JULY 5, 1930—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Feb. 7	<i>To the British Ambassador</i> Opinion that an international meeting to discuss load lines would be desirable and that the committee's report would properly form the basis for discussion.	256
Feb. 7 (63)	<i>From the British Ambassador</i> Invitation to the conference looking to the conclusion of a convention on load lines, to be convened in London, May 20, 1930.	257
Apr. 29	<i>To the American Delegation</i> Instructions to U. S. delegates, including plenary powers to negotiate, conclude, and sign a convention on load lines.	258
May 8	<i>To the British Ambassador</i> Formal acceptance of invitation; list of names of delegates and technical advisers.	260
May 8 (357)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain</i> Information as to action taken, and instructions to follow proceedings of Conference with care since the Department is not represented on the delegation.	261
July 5	<i>International Load Line Convention and Final Protocol</i> Text of convention and protocol signed by the United States and 29 other countries.	261
July 5	<i>Final Act of the Load Line Conference</i> Text of the Final Act signed by the United States and 29 other countries.	273

DISINCLINATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO ACT TO SECURE RATIFICATION OF
DRAFT CONVENTION ON OIL POLLUTION OF NAVIGABLE WATERS

1929 Aug. 22	<i>From the British Embassy</i> British Government's interest in the adoption of the oil pollution convention prepared as a result of the conference at Washington in 1926; inquiry whether the U. S. Government, if officially approached, would be willing to exert its good offices on behalf of the draft convention.	275
1930 May 23	<i>From the British Ambassador</i> Request for reply to Embassy's <i>aide-mémoire</i> of August 22, 1929.	277
June 7	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs</i> Request for authorization to explain orally to an officer of the British Embassy that the U. S. Government is not at present disposed to make any move in the matter. (Footnote: Information that the request is marked "O. K." by the Under Secretary of State.)	277
June 12	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs</i> Conversation with the Second Secretary of the British Embassy in which it was explained that those especially interested thought that it would be well for the United States first to regulate the matter in its own waters by domestic legislation and then to revert to discussion of an international agreement.	278

GENERAL

COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SEVERAL OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN
RECONNAISSANCE SURVEYS FOR AN INTER-AMERICAN HIGHWAY

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 July 1 (31)	<i>To the Minister in Panama</i> Notification of the departure for Cristobal of the members of the Technical Committee on Inter-American Highway Reconnaissance Surveys; information that Panama has not requested U. S. cooperation in the surveys; and instructions to bring the matter to the attention of the appropriate officials in order that such cooperation may be made available if the Panaman Government so desires. Formal instructions for delivery to the members of the Committee (text printed). (Footnote: Information that instructions in regard to the same matter were sent on July 22 and 23 to American diplomatic missions in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua.)	279
July 11 (46)	<i>From the Minister in Panama (tel.)</i> Report that the Panaman Government is taking steps to request cooperation of the Technical Commission and has offered the Commission office quarters in the National Palace; request for instructions as to acceptance.	286
July 12 (33)	<i>To the Minister in Panama</i> Advice that the Department perceives no objection to the Commission's acceptance of the office quarters.	286
July 16 (49)	<i>To the Minister in Panama (tel.)</i> Receipt of formal notification of Panama's desire for U. S. cooperation in the survey; instructions to present the members of the Commission to the appropriate authorities for that purpose.	287
July 21 (119)	<i>From the Minister in Panama</i> Official presentation of members of the Commission and expression of appreciation for office quarters made available.	288
Aug. 27 (133)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua</i> Nicaraguan desire for survey to begin there as soon as engineers find it convenient, and expression of gratitude for U. S. cooperation.	289
Sept. 2 (83)	<i>From the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Honduran acceptance of the cooperation of the U. S. engineers.	289
Oct. 1 (40)	<i>To the Minister in Honduras</i> Instructions to ascertain whether it will be agreeable to Honduras to have the surveys begun there as soon as the engineers are able to proceed to that country.	289
Oct. 7 (2834)	<i>From the Chargé in Mexico</i> Note from Foreign Office declining U. S. offer, stating that the National Commission of Roads will do the work in Mexico, and naming the places where the Inter-American Highway will cross the Mexican frontier.	290
Oct. 10 (69)	<i>From the Minister in Panama (tel.)</i> Request for verification of press reports that Honduras has requested cooperation; Committee's desire for Honduras to be informed that engineers can begin about November 1.	291

**COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SEVERAL OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN
RECONNAISSANCE SURVEYS FOR AN INTER-AMERICAN HIGHWAY—Continued**

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930		
Oct. 10 (195)	<i>From the Minister in Guatemala</i> Guatemalan pleasure in receiving U. S. cooperation if it occasions no expense.	291
Oct. 11 (61)	<i>To the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Request for reply to instruction No. 40, October 1, in view of engineers' availability to begin survey in Honduras November 1.	292
Oct. 11 (68)	<i>To the Minister in Panama (tel.)</i> Advice that Honduras has requested cooperation but that no reply has been received as to time.	292
Oct. 11 (227)	<i>From the Minister in Panama</i> Desire of Technical Committee to continue its survey into Costa Rica from Panama; request for information as to attitude of Costa Rica and also of Salvador.	292
Oct. 19 (102)	<i>From the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Honduran willingness for the engineers to come about November 1.	293
Oct. 21 (74)	<i>To the Minister in Panama</i> Notification of Honduran agreement to November 1st date; instructions to ask if Committee has mailed first quarterly report to Department; and information that Costa Rican Government has not as yet requested cooperation.	293
Oct. 28 (248)	<i>From the Minister in Panama</i> Report that the Costa Rican Minister in Panama has recommended to his Government that the cooperation of the U. S. engineers be requested at an early date.	294
Nov. 20 (274)	<i>From the Chargé in Panama</i> Memorandum by the chairman of the Technical Committee (text printed) of a conversation with the Costa Rican Minister in Panama in regard to the proposed survey work.	294
Dec. 27 (132)	<i>To the Minister in El Salvador</i> Instructions concerning cooperation needed from El Salvador even though that section of the Highway has already been located and partially or completely constructed.	296

CONVENTION ON THE REGULATION OF AUTOMOTIVE TRAFFIC, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 6, 1930

1930		
Oct. 6	<i>Convention on the Regulation of Automotive Traffic</i> Text of convention signed at the Pan American Union in Washington. (Footnote: Principal objections on the part of U. S. Government to this convention, which was never submitted to the Senate.)	297
Dec. 1	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation to the Pan American Conference on the Regulation of Automotive Traffic</i> Report on the Conference under the headings of: (1) antecedents of the convention, (2) the Conference at Washington, and (3) the Inter-American Highway.	302

GENERAL

THE CHACO DISPUTE BETWEEN BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY

ACCEPTANCE BY BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY OF THE URUGUAYAN FORMULA FOR CARRYING
OUT THE TERMS OF THE CONCILIATION AGREEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 12, 1929

Date and number	Subject	Page
1929		
Dec. 12 (957)	<i>From the Chargé in Uruguay</i> Report on negotiations being carried on in Montevideo between the Bolivian and Paraguayan Ministers and the Uruguayan Foreign Minister regarding the manner of exchanging Forts Vanguardia and Boquerón; Foreign Minister's statement concerning the Uruguayan proposal for conciliation (text printed); and information that the Bolivian Minister has stated that his Government would accept the proposal, but that the Paraguayan Minister has declined to comment.	309
1930		
Jan. 3 (2)	<i>From the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Bolivian intention of breaking off negotiations in view of Paraguayan refusal to accept Uruguayan proposal; Foreign Minister's plan to request Bolivia to postpone action and to urge Paraguay to cooperate in preventing break-down of negotiations; and Foreign Minister's hope that U. S. Government will make similar representations to Paraguay.	311
Jan. 6 (5)	<i>To the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Information that Legation at Asunción has been instructed to express hope that Paraguay will find it possible to accept Uruguayan proposal.	311
Jan. 8 (3)	<i>From the Minister in Paraguay (tel.)</i> Foreign Office note (passages printed) setting forth Paraguay's objections to the Uruguayan proposal.	312
Jan. 9 (6)	<i>To the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Instructions to cable the text of the Uruguayan proposal as made to Paraguay.	313
Jan. 10 (5)	<i>From the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Text of the Uruguayan proposal to Paraguay.	313
Jan. 13 (6)	<i>From the Minister in Paraguay (tel.)</i> Report that Uruguayan mission favors acceptance of proposal offered by Paraguay, and that a new arbitration agreement is now being drafted.	314
Jan. 30 (5)	<i>To the Minister in Paraguay (tel.)</i> Information that Paraguayan Chargé has presented reasons why his Government could not agree to Uruguayan formula; U. S. hope that Paraguayan Government will see its way clear to accept the Uruguayan proposal.	314
Feb. 11 (7)	<i>To the Minister in Paraguay (tel.)</i> Request for opinion as to whether there is a likelihood that Paraguay will accept Uruguayan proposal.	315
Feb. 13 (7)	<i>From the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Foreign Minister's efforts to work out formula satisfactory to Paraguay.	315

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Feb. 14 (10)	<i>To the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Instructions to tell the Foreign Minister that the United States has been urging Paraguay to accept Uruguay's proposal and has suggested to other neutral countries that they do likewise.	316
Feb. 15 (22)	<i>From the Minister in Paraguay (tel.)</i> Conversations with the Foreign Minister, who states confidentially that Uruguay has accepted new formula mentioned in telegram No. 6, January 13, but desires to add a declaration to which the Foreign Minister is at present inclined to object. (Repeated to La Paz and Montevideo.)	316
Feb. 18 (8)	<i>From the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Attitude of the Foreign Minister that action in exchanging forts could not be more simultaneous than that provided for in Uruguayan proposal.	318
Mar. 6 (11)	<i>To the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Understanding that the Foreign Minister of Paraguay has suggested that a protocol be signed at Montevideo which does not set forth in detail the procedure for the execution of the obligations; opinion that this would put the matter back into the hands of Uruguay and give tacit consent for that country to proceed on the basis of its own formula.	318
Mar. 10 (10)	<i>From the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Foreign Minister's opinion that article 5 of the conciliation agreement did not give Uruguay full liberty of action in carrying out the protocol, and his intention to propose that Bolivian and Paraguayan representatives make a declaration that they interpret article 5 as permitting Uruguay the necessary liberty of action.	320
Mar. 10 (11)	<i>From the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Foreign Minister's decision to propose that Bolivian and Paraguayan Ministers sign a protocol to the effect that in accordance with article 5 they grant the Uruguayan Government authorization to give ample instructions for the fulfillment of the Washington protocol.	321
Mar. 14 (12)	<i>From the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Advice from Foreign Minister that Paraguay has accepted his proposal and that a favorable reply is expected from Bolivia; protocol which he has proposed that they sign (text printed).	321
Mar. 22 (13)	<i>From the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Information that the Bolivian Minister has been authorized to sign protocol, amending it to fix May 1 instead of April 10 as date for renewal of diplomatic relations.	322
Mar. 27 (17)	<i>From the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Report that, because of the slight changes in wording, Paraguayan Minister transmitted amended text to his Government nine days ago; and that Uruguayan Foreign Minister declares that unless Paraguay accepts, Uruguay will make no further efforts in the matter.	322
Mar. 28 (15)	<i>*To the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Department's hope that Uruguay will revert to original suggestion if Paraguay does not accept the modified formula.	323

THE CHACO DISPUTE BETWEEN BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY—Continued

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1930 Mar. 29 (20)	<i>From the Chargé in Uruguay (tel.)</i> Information that Paraguay has accepted Uruguayan protocol with Bolivian amendment in the form set forth.	323
Apr. 10 (1018)	<i>From the Chargé in Uruguay</i> Report of final negotiations; protocol of April 4, signed on behalf of Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay (text printed).	324
July 24 (51)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Notification that the final act in accordance with the Washington agreement was signed July 23 and that Forts Boquerón and Vanguardia were returned in the presence of Uruguayan officers.	327

ACCEPTANCE BY BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY OF THE PROPOSAL OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS TO INSTITUTE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS IN WASHINGTON FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE BASIC QUESTION

1930 Jan. 6 (2)	<i>To the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Agreement of five neutral Governments to present to Bolivia on January 9 the note proposing that the basic question outstanding between Bolivia and Paraguay be settled by direct negotiations between their representatives in Washington or, failing that, by the good offices of a commission appointed by the five neutral Governments; instructions to proceed in accordance with agreement; and information that Mexican modification of note was accepted by all the neutral Governments.	327
Jan. 14 (2)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Information that note has been presented but probably will not be considered seriously by President Siles due to internal political situation; opinion that President will endeavor to remain in office instead of calling elections, and that Paraguayan delay in effecting the Washington conciliation agreement will be utilized to make the appearance of a national danger.	328
Jan. 21 (11)	<i>From the Minister in Paraguay (tel.)</i> Foreign Minister's intention to notify the League of Nations of the recent Bolivian movement toward war.	329
Jan. 22 (14)	<i>From the Chargé in Peru (tel.)</i> Conversation between the American Ambassador in Argentina and the President of Peru in which the latter stated his views regarding the role of the United States in Latin American affairs and stressed his opinion that the United States should take the Chaco dispute in hand and address the two Governments very firmly.	329
Jan. 22 (7)	<i>To the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Instructions, unless it appears inadvisable, to express U. S. Government's hope that reports regarding imminent Bolivian attack on Paraguay are unfounded.	330
Jan. 24 (3)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Report on military action of January 16; opinion that attack was provoked by Bolivia to create national emergency which would justify the President in postponing elections.	330

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Jan. 24 (10)	<i>From the Chargé in Switzerland (tel.)</i> Message from Acting President of the Council of the League of Nations to Bolivia, Paraguay, and members of Council (text printed) expressing hope that no incident will compromise success of pacific procedure.	331
Jan. 25 (9)	<i>To the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Instructions to make representations regarding the recent hostilities and the possibility of the acceptance of one of the suggestions made by the neutral Governments in their note of January 9.	332
Jan. 27 (4)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Report of representations made and of Foreign Minister's statement that he had not studied note of neutral Governments because he was awaiting results of the Uruguayan representations relative to completion of the conciliation agreement.	333
Jan. 28 (11)	<i>To the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Explanation that there is no connection between the Uruguayan proposal for the exchange of Forts Vanguardia and Boquerón and the neutral Governments' suggestion for a settlement of the fundamental question; instructions to call this to the attention of the Foreign Minister.	334
Feb. 1 (8)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Report that, in spite of his statements and promises, President Siles has not yet considered the neutral note of January 9.	334
Feb. 8	<i>From the Brazilian Ambassador</i> Explanation of Brazil's unostensible role in the Bolivian-Paraguayan controversy, and expression of wishes for the success of U. S. diplomacy.	335
Feb. 13 (12)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Manifesto issued by the Nationalist Party (text printed) expressing belief that the President's term of office should be extended; opinion that the President will continue to delay consideration of neutral note, since the national crisis provides the principal reason for his continuance in office.	336
Feb. 19	<i>To the Brazilian Ambassador</i> Expression of appreciation for the friendly interest of Brazilian Government.	337
Feb. 25 (13)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Report that a special Cabinet meeting has been called to draft answer to neutral note but has been postponed; information that manifesto concerning continuance of President's term has now been formalized and that only the President's consent is needed.	337
Feb. 27 (15)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Bolivia's acceptance of the neutral Governments' proposal for conversations between the diplomatic representatives of Bolivia and Paraguay at Washington.	338
Feb. 27 (16)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Reply of the Bolivian Government, February 25 (text printed), to the neutral Governments' note of January 9.	338

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THE CHACO DISPUTE BETWEEN BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Mar. 5 (16)	<i>To the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Instructions to call on the President and express U. S. gratification at Bolivian decision.	342
Mar. 8 (18)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> President's readiness to start direct negotiations at Washington as soon as conciliation agreement is fulfilled.	343
Aug. 19 (67)	<i>From the Minister in Paraguay (tel.)</i> Information from Bolivian representative in Paraguay that Bolivian junta does not favor beginning of conversations in Washington until after installation of civil government, but that it will yield if United States desires that they begin without delay.	343
Sept. 12 (70)	<i>From the Minister in Paraguay (tel.)</i> Foreign Minister's desire for Department's opinion as to best time for opening conversations at Washington.	343
Sept. 13 (22)	<i>To the Minister in Paraguay (tel.)</i> Indication that any time agreeable to Paraguay and Bolivia will be satisfactory to U. S. Government, as the conciliation agreement has now been fulfilled.	344

BOUNDARY DISPUTES

GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS

1930 Apr. 25 (47)	<i>To the Minister in Guatemala (tel.)</i> Advice that boundary conference [held at Washington, January 20–July 16, 1930] is making advances but is hampered by unyielding attitude taken by both delegations under instructions from their Governments. Description of a boundary line thought to be acceptable to Honduras; and instructions to bring it to the attention of the Guatemalan Government and, if it is rejected, to endeavor to have delegation given as much latitude as possible to arrive at a solution.	344
Apr. 28 (56)	<i>From the Minister in Guatemala (tel.)</i> Report that President and Foreign Minister have rejected the line mentioned and maintain that the delegation has full powers.	345
May 21 (24)	<i>To the Chargé in Honduras (tel.)</i> Information concerning progress of conference, and instructions to take up with Honduran Government the desirability of giving its delegation ample authority to negotiate a settlement.	346
May 22 (29)	<i>From the Chargé in Honduras (tel.)</i> Telegram from the President to the delegation in Washington (text printed) confirming powers to discuss boundary question in all its aspects.	347

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BOUNDARY DISPUTES—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 June 4 (34)	<i>From the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Indication by the President of what he would and would not be willing to concede; Foreign Minister's proposal that the Department suggest a line. (Footnote: Information that discussions to reach an agreement on a boundary line continued until June 12, when the chairman announced that on June 13 the conference would pass to a discussion of a possible treaty of arbitration to end the boundary question.)	348
June 17 (46)	<i>From the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Willingness of Honduran Government to accept Department's suggestion that the Arbitral Commission be composed of one delegate proposed by Honduras and one by Guatemala, presided over by the Chief Justice of the United States.	348
June 19 (29)	<i>To the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Advice that suggestion as to composition of Arbitral Commission was not made by Department, and explanation of how it came to be agreed upon; also that difference of opinion between the two delegations concerns the competency of the Central American Tribunal established by treaty of 1923.	349
June 25 (51)	<i>From the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Notification that the Honduran delegation has informed the President that it has accepted Department's proposal that the competency of the Central American Tribunal be submitted to a special tribunal.	350
July 7 (151)	<i>To the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> Communication for the Chief Justice of the United States (text printed) inquiring as to his willingness to be the third and presiding member of a special tribunal to determine the competency of the Central American Tribunal; explanation that in the event the special tribunal decides that the Central American Tribunal is competent, it will constitute itself the Central American tribunal to determine the question at issue.	351
July 11 (214)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> Telegram from the Chief Justice accepting designation (text printed).	352
July 19	<i>Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State</i> Treaty of arbitration between Guatemala and Honduras, signed at Washington, July 16, and supplementary convention (texts printed).	352
	[Note: Exchange of ratifications October 15, 1931; appointment of Chief Justice of the United States to form and preside over Arbitral Tribunal.]	361

BOUNDARY DISPUTES—Continued

HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 May 21 (1)	<i>To the Minister in Honduras</i> Understanding that procedure now contemplated for adjusting boundary dispute embraces the signature of a protocol of agreement based upon the 1906 award of the King of Spain and providing for a commission of engineers composed of one Honduran, one Nicaraguan, and one American who is to act as president; advice that Department is prepared to authorize U. S. Ministers in both countries to collaborate in preparing protocol; general outline of protocol (text printed) to be submitted if and when it seems propitious. (Footnote: The same, <i>mutatis mutandis</i> , to the Minister in Nicaragua.)	361
June 13 (70)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> President Moncada's conviction that the creation of a boundary commission is the best way of solving frontier difficulties, including banditry; concurrence in President's view, and opinion that negotiations should be reopened promptly.	363
June 14 (111)	<i>From the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> President Colindres' statement that he would be pleased if negotiations were reopened and a boundary commission created as soon as possible.	364
June 19 (71)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Report that President has instructed Foreign Minister to draft protocol; desire for authorization to proceed with offer of collaboration.	365
June 19 (54)	<i>To the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Instructions to proceed with offer of collaboration. (Similar instructions sent to Tegucigalpa.)	365
June 25 (74)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> President's indication that he would welcome Department's assistance in preparing draft protocol. Telegram sent to Minister in Honduras (text printed) stating intention of submitting Department's outline of protocol as soon as Minister in Honduras is prepared to take similar action.	365
June 27 (53)	<i>From the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Telegram sent to Minister in Nicaragua (text printed) reporting Honduran acceptance of U. S. offer of assistance, and Minister's intention of submitting Department's outline.	366
July 2 (80)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Notification that Department's outline of draft protocol was submitted to Nicaraguan Government this date. (Repeated to Tegucigalpa.)	366
July 3 (57)	<i>From the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Notification that the Department's outline of draft protocol was submitted to Honduran Government on July 2. (Repeated to Managua.)	366
July 7 (58)	<i>From the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Note from the Foreign Minister, July 5 (excerpt printed), accepting the Department's outline of the protocol and inquiring as to place at which it is to be signed.	367

BOUNDARY DISPUTES—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 July 8 (34)	<i>To the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Advice that the selection of the place at which the protocol is to be signed is a matter for agreement between Honduras and Nicaragua. (Similar telegram sent to Managua.)	367
July 9 (83)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Information that Nicaragua will probably propose the addition of a provision to protect property rights in transferred territory. (Repeated to Tegucigalpa.)	367
July 14 (88)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Telegram sent to Tegucigalpa (text printed) explaining that some of President's advisers think that Nicaragua is making all the concessions, and requesting advice as to any concessions which Honduras claims to be making.	368
July 14 (60)	<i>From the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Telegram sent to Managua (text printed) stating that Honduras does not object to the additional provision which Nicaragua will suggest, and inquiring whether Nicaragua would accept an invitation from Honduras to sign the protocol at Tegucigalpa.	368
July 31 (95)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Telegram sent to Tegucigalpa (text printed) setting forth changes and additions desired by Nicaragua in the draft protocol, and inquiring as to their acceptability to Honduras.	369
July 31 (96)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> President Moncada's desire that the protocol be signed in Managua. (Repeated to Tegucigalpa.)	370
Aug. 1 (69)	<i>From the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Intention, if Department does not object, to submit to Honduran Government for approval the changes and additions desired by Nicaragua.	371
Aug. 4 (39)	<i>To the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Authorization to submit changes to Honduran Government.	371
Aug. 18 (76)	<i>From the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Information that Foreign Minister has submitted a counterproposal which has been sent to the Minister in Nicaragua; statement of points upon which there is likely to be greatest disagreement.	371
Aug. 20 (86)	<i>To the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Authorization to present Honduran counterproposal to Nicaraguan Government. (Repeated to Minister in Honduras.)	372
Sept. 16 (115)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Telegram sent to Tegucigalpa (text printed) stating that Nicaragua accepts the Honduran counterproposal with the omission of article 5, and pointing out that opposition in Nicaragua would be lessened if protocol were signed in Managua.	372

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BOUNDARY DISPUTES—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Sept. 18 (87)	<i>From the Minister in Honduras (tel.)</i> Telegram sent to Managua (text printed) conveying information that Honduras agrees to omission of article 5 and signature of the protocol in Managua.	373
Sept. 25 (120)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Telegram sent to Tegucigalpa (text printed) setting forth Government's desire to postpone signature of protocol until after November elections in order to avoid its becoming involved in party politics.	373
Nov. 21 (157)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Report of conversation with the Foreign Minister concerning the President's desire for definite assurance of cooperation of Honduras in suppression of banditry before signing the boundary protocol. (Repeated to Tegucigalpa.)	374
Nov. 22 (158)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Information from Minister in Honduras that Honduran forces on the border have been increased and that vigorous pursuit of bandits in Honduras can be expected.	375
Nov. 29 (163)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Opinion of the Foreign Minister that the boundary protocol will be signed before the end of the year.	375
Dec. 5 (135)	<i>To the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Instructions to express to the President the Department's hope that he may see his way clear to have the protocol signed at an early date.	376
Dec. 6 (167)	<i>From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Notification that Nicaragua is prepared to sign the protocol in Managua at the end of December.	376
Dec. 8 (136)	<i>To the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform the President that the Department is gratified at his decision and is notifying the Minister in Honduras in order that appropriate action may be taken. (Footnote: Information that the protocol was signed at Managua, January 21, 1931.)	377

ARGENTINA
REVOLUTION IN ARGENTINA

1930 June 26 (899)	<i>From the Chargé in Argentina</i> Factors in the current situation which may produce an upset in government.	378
Aug. 29 (111)	<i>From the Ambassador in Argentina (tel.)</i> Report that the <i>coup d'état</i> in Peru has made a strong impression in Argentina and may have been used in an attempt to persuade the President that his life is in danger and that his only safeguard is to resign.	379

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Sept. 5 (120)	<i>From the Ambassador in Argentina (tel.)</i> Information that the President has delegated his authority to the Vice President and that martial law is expected to be declared shortly.	379
Sept. 7 (124)	<i>From the Ambassador in Argentina (tel.)</i> Account of the coup whereby General Uriburu emerged as head of a provisional government pledged to remain in power only until elections can be held; opinion that the provisional government is composed of honest patriots and that its action had the approval of the majority of the population; and recommendation that the U. S. Government be prepared to recognize this government at an early date.	379
Sept. 8 (125)	<i>From the Ambassador in Argentina (tel.)</i> Further indications of popular approval of the actions of the provisional government, and renewal of recommendation for an early U. S. recognition.	381
Sept. 9 (126)	<i>From the Ambassador in Argentina (tel.)</i> Receipt of note signed by new Foreign Minister giving official notice of coup and its purposes.	381
Sept. 11 (100)	<i>To the Ambassador in Argentina (tel.)</i> Information that there appears to be no possibility of immediate recognition; also that a proposal has been made that Great Britain and the United States discuss the matter.	382
Sept. 11 (286)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> Report of Foreign Office press statement that France will await action of the United States.	382
Sept. 11 (129)	<i>From the Ambassador in Argentina (tel.)</i> Information that several governments are prepared to extend recognition but are disposed to await U. S. action; opinion that the United States would gain by extending recognition first without waiting for British action.	382
Sept. 13 (131)	<i>From the Ambassador in Argentina (tel.)</i> Report that Chile has recognized the provisional government and that Norway only awaits U. S. action to do likewise.	384
Sept. 13 (101)	<i>To the Ambassador in Argentina (tel.)</i> Request for information concerning control of provisional government over provinces, and its relations with other political parties.	384
Sept. 14 (132)	<i>From the Ambassador in Argentina (tel.)</i> Description of provisional government's relations with provinces and with other parties, all of which attest to the popularity of the movement.	384
Sept. 15	<i>From the Assistant Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State</i> Conversation with the British Ambassador, who stated that his Government intends to recognize both Peru and Argentina on September 17, and expressed his hope that the U. S. Government would do likewise at the same time; opinion that it would be unwise not to do so.	385

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Sept. 16	<i>From the Assistant Secretary of State to the Secretary of State</i> Two telephone conversations: (1) with the British Ambassador, who was informed that the U. S. Government is considering the matter of recognition; (2) with the Counselor of the British Embassy, who stated that Great Britain is postponing action until September 18.	386
Sept. 16 (134)	<i>From the Ambassador in Argentina (tel.)</i> Notification that Germany and Paraguay have recognized the new government.	386
Sept. 16 (104)	<i>To the Ambassador in Argentina (tel.)</i> Instructions incident to recognition September 18; information that similar action will be taken as to Bolivia and Peru.	386
Sept. 16 (114)	<i>From the Minister in Colombia (tel.)</i> Information that Colombia will recognize Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru on September 18.	387
Sept. 17	<i>Press Release Issued by the Department of State</i> Statement by the Secretary of State concerning U. S. policy in connection with the recognition of Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru on September 18.	387
Sept. 17 (136)	<i>From the Ambassador in Argentina (tel.)</i> Plans to comply with Department's instructions as of September 18; report that Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the Vatican have extended recognition.	389
Sept. 18 (362)	<i>From the Chargé in Cuba</i> Cuban intention to recognize Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru when the United States does.	390
Sept. 20 (57)	<i>From the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Report that Brazil is entering into friendly relations with Argentina and Bolivia. (Footnote: Information that Brazil recognized Peru on September 20.)	390

AUSTRIA

CONSENT TO SUBORDINATION OF THE AUSTRIAN RELIEF LOAN TO A PROPOSED NEW AUSTRIAN LOAN

1930 Mar. 12	<i>From the Consul at Geneva (tel.)</i> From Wilson, American unofficial representative on the Reparation Commission: Request for instructions as to whether the Department desires the Reparation Commission to take action indicated in article 6 of the draft agreement for Austrian debt settlement or to take no action in view of imminent ratification of Hague agreement of January 20, 1930; draft decision to be taken by Reparation Commission (text printed) submitted for approval in case Department desires that such action be taken.	391
Mar. 15	<i>To the Consul at Geneva (tel.)</i> For Wilson: Instruction that since draft agreement was submitted to Congress, it is desirable that Reparation Commission take decision; approval of suggested draft decision.	392

CONSENT TO SUBORDINATION OF THE AUSTRIAN RELIEF LOAN TO A PROPOSED
NEW AUSTRIAN LOAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Mar. 29 (92)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> Reparation 302: Report that the Reparation Commission has: (1) approved the plan for the repayment of Austrian relief bonds, and (2) adopted the draft decision set forth in Mr. Wilson's tele- gram of March 12.	393
Mar. 31 (47/R)	<i>From the Austrian Minister</i> Résumé of situation, and request that U. S. Government now consent to the release from prior charge in favor of relief bonds, of certain revenues to cover service of the new investment loan; information that similar request is being submitted to Sir Frederic Leith-Ross, chairman of the Relief Bonds Committee, which represents the other Governments holding relief bonds.	393
Apr. 15 (93)	<i>To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Instructions: (1) to ascertain what reply Sir Frederic Leith- Ross is making to Austrian request, (2) to obtain a direct state- ment from Government to which accredited regarding action taken with respect to subordinating its lien, and (3) to repeat the foregoing as Department's instruction to representatives at Copenhagen, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Oslo, Stockholm, and Berne, substituting for (1) a statement of information received from Leith-Ross.	395
Apr. 17 (69)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Letter addressed by Leith-Ross to the Austrian Minister in London, April 16 (text printed), approving the specific securities proposed, and indicating that the release of these securities is subject to the coming into force of the Hague agreements of January 20, and to a similar release by the United States.	396
Apr. 19 (60/R)	<i>From the Austrian Minister</i> Advice that Austria has now complied with all the provisions of Public Resolution 81 whereby Congress authorized the settle- ment of Austria's indebtedness to the United States; request that a time and place be set for the exchange of signatures of such an agreement.	397
Apr. 26 (13)	<i>From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)</i> Note from the Foreign Minister (excerpt printed) stating that Sweden had approved Leith-Ross' letter of April 16 to the Austrian Minister in London.	398
May 2 (88)	<i>From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)</i> Foreign Office note, May 1 (excerpt printed), stating that the Leith-Ross letter embodied the intentions of the British Govern- ment.	398
May 2 (126)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> Statement from the French Government that Leith-Ross' letter expresses the conditions to which it has subordinated its adhesion to the emission of the new loan.	399
May 2 (35)	<i>From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.)</i> Swiss statement, May 1 (excerpt printed), confirming the declarations of Leith-Ross' letter.	399
May 6 (8)	<i>From the Minister in Norway (tel.)</i> Information that Norway has agreed to subordinate the lien in question on the conditions set forth in Leith-Ross' letter.	400

1930 May 15 (25)	<i>From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)</i> Note from Foreign Minister, May 14, stating that Denmark, by the declaration made in Leith-Ross' letter, has renounced its liens upon certain Austrian revenues on the conditions that the Hague agreement of January 20 shall come into force, and that a similar renunciation is made by the United States.	400
May 19 (25)	<i>To the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)</i> Inquiry as to whether Danish note states that Denmark has renounced its lien on all revenues mentioned in Leith-Ross' letter or only on customs and tobacco revenues.	400
May 22 (26)	<i>From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)</i> Information that Danish note of May 14 mentioned only customs and tobacco revenues but that a further note of May 20 includes all revenues mentioned in Leith-Ross' letter.	401
May 22 (75/R)	<i>From the Austrian Minister</i> Explanation that the London relief agreement of June 15, 1928, provides that Austria must obtain the consent of the relief-creditor governments prior to settling the so-called Forfait debts; request for U. S. consent to the settlement of these debts; and information that an identical request has been submitted to the Relief Committee.	401
May 23 (170)	<i>To the Ambassador in France</i> Information that the French statement is not directly responsive to the Department's inquiry; instructions to endeavor to obtain a statement that Leith-Ross' letter is approved by the French Government and was made pursuant to its authority.	402
May 26 (37)	<i>From the Chargé in Italy (tel.)</i> Statement from Foreign Office (excerpt printed) giving Italian concurrence in declarations made by Leith-Ross and stating conditions of assent.	402
May 29 (43)	<i>To the Chargé in Italy (tel.)</i> Inquiry concerning the meaning of a phrase in the Italian statement.	403
June 3 (41)	<i>From the Chargé in Italy (tel.)</i> Explanation of Italian intention in the phrase to which Department referred.	403
June 20	<i>From the Netherlands Minister</i> Information that the Netherlands has given its assent to the suspension of its lien upon certain Austrian Revenues.	404
June 21 (50)	<i>From the Chargé in Italy (tel.)</i> <i>Note verbale</i> from the Foreign Office, June 20 (text printed), explaining that by its former communication the Italian Government had intended to act unconditionally with regard to the letter by Leith-Ross and the request of the U. S. Embassy.	404
June 21	<i>From the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy in France</i> Statement that Leith-Ross acted as the representative of the Relief Credits Committee and that his letter had the approval of the French Government.	405

CONSENT TO SUBORDINATION OF THE AUSTRIAN RELIEF LOAN TO A PROPOSED
NEW AUSTRIAN LOAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 June 26 (195)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> Reparation 312: Information that, in order to comply with U. S. Treasury requirements, the Austrian section of the Reparation Commission is meeting and will probably recommend that the Commission adopt a decision to the effect that as of the date of the coming into force of the Hague agreement of January 20 the first charge on Austrian assets created by article 197 of the Treaty of St. Germain shall cease to have effect.	406
June 27 (199)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> Reparation 313: Notification that on June 26 the Reparation Commission sent a letter to the Austrian Minister at Paris in the sense indicated in telegram of that date and that the letter will be approved by the Commission retroactively on June 28.	406
June 27	<i>To the Austrian Minister</i> Statement that the U. S. Government offers no objection to the settlement by Austria of the so-called Forfait debts.	406
June 28 (202)	<i>From the Ambassador in France (tel.)</i> Reparation 314: Report that Reparation Commission has approved letter of June 26; receipt of certified copy of procès-verbal of deposit of ratification of the Hague agreement of January 20.	407
June 30	<i>From the Austrian Legation</i> Note from Leith-Ross (text printed) giving notice of ratification of the Hague agreement of January 20 by the contracting parties; request for U. S. declaration of release of the necessary securities.	407
July 2	<i>From the Secretary of the Treasury</i> Declaration of release of lien for the payment of Austrian relief bonds held by the United States (issued by authority of Public Resolution 81).	408

TREATY AND EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRIA
FOR EXTRADITION AND COMMUTATION OF DEATH PENALTY, SIGNED JANUARY 31,
1930

1930 Jan. 31	<i>Treaty Between the United States of America and Austria</i> Text of treaty and exchange of notes signed at Vienna.	408
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BOLIVIA
REVOLUTION IN BOLIVIA

1930 May 29 (31)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Information that President Siles resigned May 28, turning over the Executive power to the Cabinet, and that elections for a constituent assembly to revise the Constitution have been called for June 29.	415
May 29 (32)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Note from the Foreign Minister, May 28 (text printed), giving official notice of the action taken; request for instructions regarding the question of recognition of the new government.	415

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 May 31 (33)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Brazilian Minister's statement that his Government will maintain cordial relations with the provisional government but will not recognize its constitutionality or negotiate with it, and his expression of hope that the United States will take the same attitude.	417
June 2 (20)	<i>To the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Explanation that the Department does not desire to raise any question regarding recognition of the new regime; instructions to continue normal diplomatic relations but not to take part in any joint action of diplomatic corps; authorization to inform the Brazilian Minister.	418
June 3 (34)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Information that all the diplomatic corps received practically the same instructions as in Department's No. 20; signs of dissension in the Cabinet and of dissatisfaction in some parts of the country.	418
June 18 (35)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Report that there have been several demonstrations in favor of Siles and smaller ones against him, that there is much communist activity, and that the Army has gained two more Cabinet posts.	418
June 22 (37)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Information that an attempt against the government, including plans for Siles' assassination, was frustrated June 21.	419
June 25 (41)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Information that Oruro has been taken by revolutionists, that federal troops there refused to take any action, and that an early movement against the government in La Paz is expected.	419
June 30	<i>Press Release Issued by the Department of State</i> Résumé of several communications from the Chargé in Bolivia, including information regarding a military junta which will govern the country for the present.	420
July 1 (51)	<i>From the Ambassador in Chile (tel.)</i> Advice that Siles will arrive in Arica July 2, and that the Chilean Minister in Bolivia has been instructed to express good will to the junta but that recognition for the present is not contemplated.	422
July 2 (47)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Report that the junta remains well in control of the situation, and that the Legation has not been approached regarding recognition.	422
July 9 (48)	<i>From the Charge in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Advice that the junta hopes that recognition will come "spontaneously."	423
Aug. 22 (505)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia</i> Information that the junta has announced elections for January 4, 5, and 6, 1931; description of the steps taken to secure a more popular and representative vote; and report that the three parties have committed themselves to a coalition ticket headed by Dr. Salamanca for President.	424

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Aug. 23	<i>Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs</i> Conversation with the Bolivian Minister, who called to inform the Department of the coalition ticket.	426
Aug. 30 (57)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Report that the junta in Bolivia is negotiating with the junta in Peru for mutual recognition.	426
Sept. 9 (25)	<i>From the Minister in Ecuador (tel.)</i> Information that Ecuador has decided to give full recognition to the present Government of Bolivia.	427
Sept. 10 (59)	<i>From the Minister in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Desire to leave La Paz for the present because of the embarrassment created by the frequent raising of the question of U. S. recognition of the junta. (Footnote: Information that the Minister had been assigned June 4, 1930, but had not yet presented his credentials.)	427
Sept. 11 (60)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Notification that Chile recognized the Bolivian Government on September 10.	427
Sept. 16 (38)	<i>To the Minister in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform Bolivian Government on September 18 of readiness to present letters of credence and enter into full diplomatic relations.	428
Undated [Rec'd Sept. 18] (63)	<i>From the Chargé in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Report that instructions given in telegram No. 38 have been carried out and that arrangements are being made for the Minister to present his letters of credence.	428

DISINCLINATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO APPOINT OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON AMERICAN BANKERS COMMISSION TO DEAL WITH BOLIVIAN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

1930 Oct. 13 (70)	<i>From the Minister in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Information that Government is planning to invite a commission of U. S. bankers to visit Bolivia for the purpose of recommending steps toward avoidance of financial collapse; suggestion that bankers be notified.	429
Oct. 18 (71)	<i>From the Minister in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Receipt of a memorandum representing views of the Government as to practical remedies for the threatening financial crisis; Foreign Minister's request that invitation be transmitted to the bankers and that the Department be asked what its attitude would be toward the appointment of an official representative on the commission.	429
Oct. 20 (45)	<i>To the Minister in Bolivia (tel.)</i> Information that U. S. Government does not desire to have a representative on the proposed commission, but will transmit project to bankers and will be glad to cooperate informally.	430

BRAZIL
REVOLUTION IN BRAZIL

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930		
Oct. 4 (62)	<i>From the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Report that revolutions have broken out in Pernambuco, Minas Geraes, and Rio Grande do Sul.	432
Oct. 7 (73)	<i>From the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Report that the revolutionists have not made much progress and that São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Bahia are quiet.	432
Oct. 9 (78)	<i>From the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Suggestion that the Department consider the question of having U. S. Naval vessels in the vicinity of Pernambuco, since it seems probable that a serious engagement will take place there which will endanger American lives.	433
Oct. 9 (57)	<i>To the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Explanation that the Department would be loath to send warships to Brazil; instructions as to various steps to be taken in attempting to assure safety of U. S. citizens.	434
Oct. 10 (83)	<i>From the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Report that the Department's instructions have been transmitted to the U. S. Consuls at Pernambuco and Bahia and that the Foreign Minister has given assurances that the Federal Government will give attention to foreigners insofar as possible.	434
Oct. 11 (60)	<i>To the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Press statement issued by the Department (text printed) announcing that the U. S. S. <i>Pensacola</i> is being ordered to Guantanamo and will proceed to Brazil in case necessity arises to evacuate Americans whose lives might be in danger.	435
Oct. 12 (88)	<i>From the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Advice that the press notice contained in Department's No. 60 of October 11 is giving concern to the Brazilian Government; suggestion that it would be appreciated if the Department would state to the press that Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo are quiet and that there is no danger to U. S. lives and property in those cities.	435
Oct. 14 (96)	<i>From the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Report that the Government has closed the port of Recife and has requested that U. S. merchant vessels not call there; information that the Consul at Recife is concerned over the food supply of the city; and request for instructions.	436
Oct. 15 (97)	<i>From the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Notification that several other ports have been temporarily closed by the Government to keep revolutionists from receiving munitions.	436
Oct. 15 (64)	<i>To the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Telegram sent to Consul at Pernambuco, October 14 (text printed), stating that the Department will not take steps to have U. S. ships call there if Brazilian authorities refuse to give them clearance for that port.	437
Oct. 17 (66)	<i>To the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Secretary's statement to the press October 15 (text printed) giving notice that friendly relations with Brazil continue and that the Government of Brazil has a perfect right to buy munitions in the United States.	437

BRAZIL
REVOLUTION IN BRAZIL—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Oct. 17 (67)	<i>To the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Advice that the <i>Pensacola</i> will proceed down the coast of Brazil stopping at Pará, Pernambuco, and Bahia, and that the commander has been ordered to do nothing but get in touch with U. S. Consuls, make inquiries, and take off Americans if necessary. Advice that the Consuls at Pará, Pernambuco, and Bahia have been informed.	437
Oct. 17 (105)	<i>From the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Information that, in accordance with the contract between the two countries, the members of the American Naval Mission in Brazil are taking no part in the current operations.	438
Oct. 17	<i>From the Consul at Porto Alegre (tel.)</i> Intention of the revolutionary government to suppress certain lighthouses. Report that U. S. lives and property are being respected and protected unusually well; request that Department issue statement to this effect in order to counteract statement to the contrary being attributed to the Consul.	438
Oct. 18	<i>From the Consul at Bahia (tel.)</i> Report of tense situation and reasons why the arrival of the <i>Pensacola</i> will be glad news.	439
Oct. 18 (107)	<i>From the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Inquiry as to whether the Brazilian Government should be informed in the usual manner that the <i>Pensacola</i> will call at Pará, Pernambuco, and Bahia.	439
Oct. 18	<i>From the Consul General at São Paulo (tel.)</i> Report of recent defeat which has left Government forces on the defensive; further report on military situation.	439
Oct. 18	<i>From the Consul at Bahia (tel.)</i> Report that apparently revolutionists have invaded State of Bahia and that there are rumors of their early arrival in the city.	440
Oct. 18 (109)	<i>From the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Recommendation that the <i>Pensacola</i> proceed directly to Bahia in view of reports from there; information that the President has been urged by certain of his supporters to come to an agreement with the revolutionists but that he has refused.	440
Oct. 20 (69)	<i>To the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform Brazilian Government in the usual manner of the visit of the <i>Pensacola</i> .	441
Oct. 20 (70)	<i>To the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Approval of course of action outlined in telegram No. 105 of October 17.	441
Oct. 20 (71)	<i>To the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Information that, in reply to a request for instructions, the Consul at Pernambuco has been told to inform the local <i>de facto</i> government of the visit of the <i>Pensacola</i> but to omit official calls on the revolutionary authorities.	441
Oct. 20	<i>To the Consul at Porto Alegre (tel.)</i> Advice that on October 18 the Secretary made the statement to the press requested in the Consul's telegram of October 17.	441

BRAZIL
REVOLUTION IN BRAZIL—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Oct. 21	<i>From the Consul at Porto Alegre (tel.)</i> Favorable arrangements made by revolutionary authorities for payment of all requisitions of U. S. property.	442
Oct. 21 (115)	<i>From the Chargé in Brazil (tel.)</i> Information that the German Consul at Bahia has reported the arrival of the British cruiser <i>Delhi</i> and that the German Minister has requested the <i>Karlsruhe</i> to stop at Bahia and has instructed it to get in touch with the <i>Pensacola</i> .	442
Oct. 22 (72)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Notification that at the request of the Brazilian Government the President has issued a proclamation prohibiting the export of arms and munitions of war to Brazil except under license of the Secretary.	442
Oct. 23	<i>Press Release Issued by the Department of State</i> Statement by the Secretary that the placing of the embargo is merely the usual action taken in accordance with general principles of international law and is not the expression of any personal bias.	443
Oct. 23	<i>From the Consul at Bahia (tel.)</i> Report of rumor that Algoinhas has been captured; report that the British cruiser is at Bahia, that the German cruiser is outside, but that there is no news of the <i>Pensacola</i> .	444
Oct. 24 (122)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Information that Federal Government is losing control of the forts and barracks in Rio de Janeiro.	444
Oct. 24 (124)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Information that a military junta has taken over the government; advice that the Embassy has declined asylum to many applicants and will shelter no refugees.	444
Oct. 25	<i>From the Consul at Bahia (tel.)</i> Arrival of the <i>Pensacola</i> October 24, 5 p. m.	445
Oct. 27 (131)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Communication from the junta, October 26 (text printed), giving notice of the deposition of President Washington Luis, the organization of the junta, and its intention to recognize all national obligations.	445
Oct. 28	<i>From the Consul at Porto Alegre (tel.)</i> Advice that all lighthouses began to function again on October 27.	445
Oct. 31	<i>From the Consul at Porto Alegre (tel.)</i> Information that the entrance to the port of Rio Grande, which had been obstructed by the revolutionists, has been officially reopened under compulsory pilotage.	446
Nov. 4 (139)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Report that the British Ambassador has inquired whether the Department is considering the question of recognizing the provisional government; comments on the situation.	446

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Nov. 5 (141)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Receipt of note dated November 3 from the Foreign Ministry stating that the junta has delivered the administration of the country to Dr. Vargas as chief of the provisional government, and requesting U. S. recognition of the new government; request for instructions.	446
Nov. 5 (130)	<i>From the Ambassador in Cuba (tel.)</i> President Machado's indication that Cuba desires to follow U. S. policy regarding recognition of new government in Brazil.	447
Nov. 5 (78)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Request for an appraisal of the present situation and for full and frank views and recommendations concerning recognition.	447
Nov. 5 (222)	<i>From the Ambassador in Peru</i> Report that the Peruvian junta accorded recognition to the Brazilian junta on November 1.	448
Nov. 6 (143)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Report of recognition by Chile, Portugal, and Uruguay, and of intention of Italy and Ecuador to do likewise.	449
Nov. 6 (79)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Advice from the British Ambassador that he is being instructed to say that the change in government will not cause any change in diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Brazil.	449
Nov. 7 (144)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Appraisal of situation as requested in Department's No. 78 of November 5; conclusion that if by November 15 the situation is unaltered and is likely to remain so, recognition might be advantageous.	450
Nov. 7 (81)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Comments on views expressed in Ambassador's No. 144 and inquiry as to whether Ambassador would be willing to advise that the <i>de facto</i> control of the present government is sufficiently complete for prompt recognition.	450
Undated [Rec'd Nov. 8]	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Opinion that provisional government fully controls the country and is supported by the people and that it is not necessary to postpone recognition until after November 15.	451
Nov. 8 (82)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Instructions to state that the U. S. Government will be happy to continue with the new Government the same friendly relations as with its predecessors. Instruction to advise British, Colombian, and Cuban colleagues at once.	451
Nov. 8 (62)	<i>To the Minister in Colombia (tel.)</i> Notification of recognition of Brazilian Government. (Footnote: The same, <i>mutatis mutandis</i> , on the same date to the Ambassador in Cuba.)	452

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Nov. 8 (83)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform the Foreign Minister that the United States is continuing the embargo under which the export of arms is prohibited except to the Government of Brazil, at the same time making clear that this action was not partisan in intent, but was required under the convention of February 20, 1928, which is now in force between the two countries. (Footnote: Information that the embargo was lifted on March 2, 1931, at the request of the Brazilian Embassy.)	452
Nov. 8 (132)	<i>From the Minister in Colombia (tel.)</i> Colombian recognition of Brazilian Government, November 8.	453
Nov. 8 (145)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Report that instructions in Department's No. 82 of November 8 have been carried out in full.	453
Nov. 10 (146)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Information that Argentina, England, France, and the Vatican also extended recognition on November 8.	453
Nov. 11 (147)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Statement that action has been taken on Department's No. 83 of November 8.	453

TERMINATION OF CONTRACT FOR AMERICAN NAVAL MISSION TO BRAZIL, SIGNED
JULY 6, 1926

1930 Oct. 21 (72)	<i>From the Brazilian Ambassador</i> Request that the United States renew the contract of the U. S. Naval Mission to Brazil for four more years.	454
Nov. 4 (140)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Desire of the provisional government that the U. S. Mission continue to operate after the end of the present contract, November 6, until the provisional government has had an opportunity to decide whether it wishes to renew the contract.	455
Nov. 5 (77)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Résumé of previous negotiations and conversations regarding the Naval Mission; statement that the United States is perfectly willing to have the Mission carry on until the provisional government has had an opportunity to reach a decision in the matter.	455
Nov. 14/ (151)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Foreign Minister's expression of his appreciation of the U. S. Government's courtesy in allowing the Mission to remain until a decision can be made.	457
Nov. 18 (153)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Information that the Brazilian Government cannot renew the contract of the Naval Mission for financial reasons.	457
Nov. 20 (90)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Instructions to ascertain the views of Brazilian authorities and chief of Naval Mission and also to submit personal recommendations with regard to time necessary for closing official and personal business of Mission.	457

**TERMINATION OF CONTRACT FOR AMERICAN NAVAL MISSION TO BRAZIL, SIGNED
JULY 6, 1926—Continued**

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Nov. 25 (155)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Suggestion of January 31, 1931, as date for termination of Mission's services.	458
Nov. 26 (91)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Approval of January 31 date.	458
Dec. 1 (158)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Desire that State and Navy Departments concur in recommendations made in despatch No. 3466, <i>infra</i> .	458
Dec. 1 (3466)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil</i> Recommendation that the office of Naval Attaché be restored to the Embassy and that Lieutenant Commander Blandy be designated as Attaché.	459
Dec. 3 (94)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Disposition of the Departments concerned to comply with recommendations in No. 3466; desire, however, to await formal notification of Brazil's disposition with reference to the Naval Mission.	460
Dec. 5 (3475)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil</i> Exchange of notes with the Foreign Minister, December 2-4 (texts printed), establishing formal provisions for the termination of the services of the U. S. Naval Mission on January 31, 1931.	460
Dec. 5 (162)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Belief that announcement of Lieutenant Commander Blandy's appointment as Naval Attaché will have beneficial effect in Brazil.	463
Dec. 6 (95)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Advice by the Navy Department that Lieutenant Commander Blandy will be detailed to the Embassy February 1; instructions to inquire of Brazilian Government whether designation is agreeable.	463
Dec. 15 (167)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Report that Brazilian Government is agreeable to designation of Lieutenant Commander Blandy.	463
Dec. 15 (100)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Notification that Lieutenant Commander Blandy has been designated as Naval Attaché upon termination of Naval Mission; request that Foreign Office be informed.	463

**GOOD OFFICES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL CITY
BANK IN SECURING REMISSION OF FINE IMPOSED UPON ITS SÃO PAULO BRANCH**

1930 Feb. 27 (6)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Information that the Brazilian Government intends to fine the São Paulo Branch of the National City Bank \$3,000,000 for alleged illegal actions of their exchange man at São Paulo; instructions to report on situation and, unless objections are perceived, to present to authorities the Bank's request for delay of notification of the fine.	464
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BRAZIL

GOOD OFFICES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL CITY BANK IN SECURING REMISSION OF FINE IMPOSED UPON ITS SÃO PAULO BRANCH—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Feb. 28 (5)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Verification of Department's facts; and intention to use influence with Foreign Office to obtain postponement.	465
Feb. 28 (7)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Telegrams from Bank representatives, February 27 (texts printed), emphasizing need for action by Department, and reporting that Bank has been notified officially that it has 15 days to make deposit and defense.	465
Mar. 3 (8)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Instructions to investigate reported new order prohibiting the giving of guarantees instead of making a cash deposit, and to use good offices in the matter.	466
Mar. 4 (7)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Report that even informal diplomatic intervention would not be well received until the fine is deposited, after which it may be possible to obtain modification of the amount.	466
Mar. 5 (9)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Inquiry whether telegram No. 7, March 4, means that it is not possible to put up a bond instead of depositing securities or cash.	466
Mar. 6 (8)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Advice that matter of filing bond is yet under consideration.	467
Mar. 10 (11)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Desire of the Bank that efforts now be concentrated on obtaining permission for them to put up a guarantee rather than cash.	467
Mar. 11 (12)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Reasons why the Department considers that the fine has created a serious situation; reiteration of instructions to endeavor to obtain great reduction in amount with opportunity for Bank to file bond.	467
Mar. 11 (13)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Proposed method which the Bank requests be presented to the Brazilian Government for effecting payment of fine.	468
Mar. 12 (10)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Advice that the Foreign Minister understands the international feature of case and deplores precipitous action of bank examiner; request for friendly message which can be transmitted to the Foreign Minister.	469
Mar. 13 (14)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Instructions for the desired friendly message for the Foreign Minister.	470
Mar. 13 (11)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Foreign Minister's assertion that U. S. good offices have succeeded in modifying attitude of Brazilian Government.	471
Apr. 1 (17)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Information that Bank reports that no progress is being made and feels that an informal inquiry by Ambassador would expedite matters.	471

BRAZIL

GOOD OFFICES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL CITY BANK IN SECURING REMISSION OF FINE IMPOSED UPON ITS SÃO PAULO BRANCH—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Apr. 2 (14)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Assurance that Embassy is supporting the matter actively; opinion that it will be better if Bank does not press for immediate action.	471
Apr. 11 (20)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Instructions, if no objection is perceived, to assist Bank official in obtaining interview with President.	472
June 3 (39)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Report from Bank that papers regarding fine have been before the President for a month; authorization to make inquiry desired by Bank.	472
June 11 (33)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Action taken to promote rapid solution; suggestion that the Secretary discuss matter with Dr. Valle, Foreign Office official visiting in the United States.	472
June 14 (42)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Intention of Mr. Valle to cable Rio de Janeiro regarding the situation.	473
July 11 (41)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Advice from the President on July 10 that he had given orders to effect the cancelation of the entire fine.	473
July 24 (44)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Ministerial order canceling fine (extract printed).	473
July 24 (45)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil (tel.)</i> Text of further provisions of the Ministerial order to the effect that the Bank shall be fined for an infringement of the stamp tax and that there shall be an investigation of an irregularity of functional procedure on the part of the broker of public funds.	474
July 25	<i>From the National City Bank of New York (tel.)</i> Expression of appreciation for cooperation given.	474

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL GRANTING RELIEF FROM DOUBLE INCOME TAX ON SHIPPING PROFITS

1929 Mar. 5 (1419)	<i>From the American Ambassador in Brazil to the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> Request that vessels operated by the United States Shipping Board be exempt from payment of Brazilian income tax, since U. S. revenue laws seem to meet the requirements of Brazil's Executive Decree No. 5,623 of December 29, 1928.	475
May 31 (NC/56)	<i>From the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Brazil</i> Letter from the Brazilian Finance Minister, May 29 (text printed), explaining that it will be sufficient for the Foreign Ministry to inform the Finance Ministry that the necessary law exists; information that the required action has been taken.	476

BRAZIL

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL GRANTING RELIEF
FROM DOUBLE INCOME TAX ON SHIPPING PROFITS—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1929 Sept. 17 (1467)	<i>From the American Chargé in Brazil to the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> Request for information concerning certain points in regard to the exemption of U. S. navigation companies from Brazilian income tax.	477
1930 Mar. 11 (NC/15)	<i>From the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Brazil</i> Information requested in the Chargé's note No. 1467 of September 17, 1929—including statement that no income tax has been collected from U. S. vessels since December 29, 1928.	478
Aug. 21 (1526)	<i>From the American Ambassador in Brazil to the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs</i> Advice that as of January 1, 1929, Brazilian ships are not subject to U. S. income tax.	478
Sept. 1 (NC/72)	<i>From the Director of Commercial and Consular Affairs in the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Brazil</i> Expression of appreciation of Ambassador's note No. 1526, of August 21.	479

REPRESENTATIONS AGAINST BRAZILIAN POLICY OF REQUIRING BRAZILIANS OF
DUAL NATIONALITY TO USE BRAZILIAN PASSPORTS ON LEAVING BRAZIL

1930 Apr. 1 (462)	<i>From the Consul General at Rio de Janeiro</i> Notice published by the British Consuls General at Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (text printed) to the effect that Brazilian officials will no longer visa the British passports of persons of dual British and Brazilian nationality and that such persons will have to enter and leave Brazil on Brazilian passports. Opinion that this precedent may affect U. S. citizens.	479
Apr. 11 (471)	<i>From the Consul General at Rio de Janeiro</i> Report that a case has arisen in which the Brazilian authorities refused to visa the U. S. passport of a U. S. citizen with dual nationality, and that the matter was taken up with the police, who ordered that the U. S. passport be visaed.	480
June 12	<i>To the Consul at Bahia</i> Transmittal of despatches Nos. 462 and 471 from the Consul General at Rio de Janeiro and instruction to follow a procedure similar to that mentioned in No. 471 should similar cases arise. (Footnote: The same, <i>mutatis mutandis</i> , to the Consuls at Pará, Pernambuco, Porto Alegre, Santos, and São Paulo.)	481
June 12 (1541)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil</i> Transmittal of despatches Nos. 462 and 471 from the Consul General at Rio de Janeiro and instructions to take up the matter with the Brazilian Government.	482

BRAZIL

REPRESENTATIONS AGAINST BRAZILIAN POLICY OF REQUIRING BRAZILIANS OF DUAL NATIONALITY TO USE BRAZILIAN PASSPORTS ON LEAVING BRAZIL—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 July 23 (3387)	<i>From the Ambassador in Brazil</i> Information that the Foreign Office has instructed the Brazilian Ambassador to confer with the Department concerning the status of children born in Brazil of U. S. citizens; recommendation that, pending the solution of this matter, cases be referred to the Embassy instead of the police.	482
Aug. 30 (1562)	<i>To the Ambassador in Brazil</i> Advice that U. S. Consuls in Brazil are being instructed to take up such cases with the Embassy in the future.	483
Aug. 25 (58)	<i>From the Brazilian Ambassador</i> Explanation of the viewpoint of Brazil concerning passports issued to persons of dual nationality; belief that proper directions may be issued for the adjustment of the interests of bearers of American passports who are also citizens of Brazil. (Footnote: Information that a memorandum of the Solicitor's office, dated October 10, stated that in view of the outbreak of revolution in Brazil it was an inopportune time to take up the matter again.)	484
Sept. 3 (3414)	<i>From the Chargé in Brazil</i> Information that it has been possible to secure police visas on the U. S. passports of several persons with dual nationality, but that it has been impossible to obtain action in the case of several minors.	485

BULGARIA

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MINISTER IN BULGARIA TO REFRAIN FROM ASSOCIATING WITH HIS COLLEAGUES IN GIVING ADVICE TO THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT

1930 June 13 (11)	<i>To the Minister in Bulgaria</i> Instructions to refrain from associating with the British, French, and Italian representatives in giving friendly advice to Bulgaria concerning domestic affairs or relations with other European governments.	486
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CANADA

PROPOSED CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA TO AMEND THE CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF SMUGGLING, SIGNED JUNE 6, 1924

1930 Mar. 22 (1343)	<i>From the Chargé in Canada</i> Canadian note (text printed) with regard to measures under consideration for further control of smuggling operations, explaining that a bill has been introduced into the House of Commons to amend the Export Act as regards liquor, and suggesting the conclusion of a treaty with United States to amend the convention of June 6, 1924.	488
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PROPOSED CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA TO AMEND
THE CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF SMUGGLING, SIGNED JUNE 6,
1924—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Apr. 1 (40)	<i>To the Chargé in Canada (tel.)</i> Note for the Canadian Government (text printed) expressing U. S. readiness to conclude a treaty amending the treaty of June 6, 1924, and stating that the U. S. Government hopes to submit a draft within a few days.	490
Apr. 4 (52)	<i>From the Chargé in Canada (tel.)</i> Information that Canadian Government is also preparing a draft treaty.	490
Apr. 10 (58)	<i>From the Chargé in Canada (tel.)</i> Report that Canadian draft will be ready about April 16; Canadian inquiry whether it would be convenient to have signature take place at Ottawa.	491
Apr. 16 (819)	<i>To the Chargé in Canada</i> Draft of convention (text printed), and information that full powers will be forwarded later.	491
May 22 (1428)	<i>From the Chargé in Canada</i> Canadian counterproposals and counterdraft of convention (texts printed).	494
June 4 (1443)	<i>From the Chargé in Canada</i> Report that the bill to amend the Export Act has now become law.	500
Sept. 17 (19)	<i>To the Minister in Canada</i> Proposed changes in language of certain articles in Canadian draft.	500
Oct. 6 (61)	<i>From the Minister in Canada</i> Conversation with the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, who stated that no reply could be made to U. S. suggestions until the Government had an opportunity to give further study to the whole matter.	502
Oct. 25 (86)	<i>From the Minister in Canada</i> Receipt of a note from the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to the effect that U. S. suggestions are receiving careful consideration and that Canadian views will be expressed at an early date.	503

CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE
FRASER RIVER SOCKEYE SALMON FISHERIES, SIGNED MAY 26, 1930

1930 May 29	<i>To President Hoover</i> Presentation to the President for transmittal to the Senate of a convention in substitution for the one sent to the Senate by the President on April 18, 1929, and returned to the President by the Senate by Resolution of December 13, 1929; explanation of points of difference.	504
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CANADA

CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE FRASER RIVER SOCKEYE SALMON FISHERIES, SIGNED MAY 26, 1930— Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 May 26	<i>Convention Between the United States of America and Canada</i> Text of convention signed at Washington.	505
	[Note: Text of protocol of exchange of ratifications, signed at Washington July 28, 1937.]	512

CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE HALIBUT FISHERY OF THE NORTHERN PACIFIC OCEAN AND BERING SEA, SIGNED MAY 9, 1930

1930 Mar. 6 (793)	<i>To the Chargé in Canada</i> Proposals for the revision of the Canadian draft of the halibut convention; instructions to present them to the Canadian Government along with a copy of the revised draft convention.	513
Apr. 17 (1380)	<i>From the Chargé in Canada</i> Canadian note, April 16 (text printed), stating that Canada is prepared to accept the U. S. draft with two minor changes.	517
May 7 (70)	<i>From the Chargé in Canada (tel.)</i> Slight change desired by Canadian Government; request for instructions.	518
May 8 (55)	<i>To the Chargé in Canada (tel.)</i> Advice that proposed change is acceptable; instructions to notify Department immediately of date and hour of signature, in order that statement may be given to press.	518
May 9	<i>Convention Between the United States of America and Canada</i> Text of convention signed at Ottawa.	518

PROJECT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY BY JOINT ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

1929 Mar. 1 (33)	<i>From the Canadian Minister</i> Information that the Canadian Government has invited the Governments of the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec to take part in a conference on the problem of the St. Lawrence development.	522
Apr. 15	<i>From the Minister in Canada</i> Information that the Minister is still urging the appointment of commissioners with a view to the formulation of a convention for the St. Lawrence project. Conversation with the Prime Minister, who said that the conference with the Premiers of Quebec and Ontario would take place in May, and intimated that after the conference he would be in a position to agree to the appointment of the commissioners; request for approval of line of action.	523
Apr. 19	<i>To the Minister in Canada</i> Approval of line of action.	524

CANADA

PROJECT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY BY JOINT ACTION
OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1929 Sept. 23 (1138)	<i>From the Minister in Canada</i> Report that the conference with the Premiers will probably be postponed until November and that the Canadian Government has inquired whether the United States would allow Canada to improve the channel from Lake Ontario to Prescott on both sides with the understanding that the United States will reimburse Canada at some future date; suggestion that the Department might say that it prefers to have the benefit of the judgment of the commission before undertaking any piecemeal improvements.	524
Oct. 25 (104)	<i>To the Minister in Canada (tel.)</i> Instructions to suggest to the Prime Minister that the commissioners be appointed, and to say to him that if the commissioners recommend the immediate improvement of the section proposed by Canada, the President will recommend to Congress that an appropriation be voted to carry out the works in U. S. waters.	527
Nov. 15 (222)	<i>From the Minister in Canada (tel.)</i> Informal conversation with the Minister of Public Works, in which the latter stated that if the United States could not agree to the reimbursement plan, Canada would certainly be permitted to do the improvement without reimbursement; request for instructions before taking the matter up formally with the Prime Minister.	529
Nov. 25 (230)	<i>From the Minister in Canada (tel.)</i> Presentation to Prime Minister of substance of Department's No. 104, October 25; Prime Minister's statement that he is arranging for the conference of Premiers in December, and his opinion, with regard to the appointment of commissioners, that it might be better to have the work done by the International Joint Commission.	530
Dec. 3 (233)	<i>From the Minister in Canada (tel.)</i> Information from Prime Minister that conference of Premiers cannot be held before January.	530
1930 June 28 (130)	<i>From the Canadian Chargé</i> Transmittal of report on the international rapids section of the St. Lawrence by the Canadian members of the Joint Board of Engineers and the engineers representing Ontario; statement that the Canadian members of the Joint Board of Engineers are prepared to participate in further consideration of the engineering problems of this section.	531
July 9	<i>To the Canadian Chargé</i> Suggestion that the Canadian Government indicate a date on which it would be convenient for the Joint Board of Engineers to convene.	531
Aug. 26 (1)	<i>To the Minister in Canada</i> Note for the Secretary of State for External Affairs (text printed) inquiring whether Canada is now in a position to appoint commissioners to discuss the St. Lawrence seaway and formulate an appropriate treaty.	532
Sept. 11 (31)	<i>From the Minister in Canada</i> Note from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Septem-	532

CANADA

AVIATION RADIO CONFERENCE BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, HELD AT NEW YORK, APRIL 10-11, 1930

Date and number	Subject	Page
1930 Mar. 29 (38)	<i>To the Chargé in Canada (tel.)</i> Information that Federal Radio Commission suggests that a conference regarding aviation radio communication be held at New York between Canadian and U. S. representatives on or before April 10; instructions to ascertain whether Canada will agree to proposed conference.	533
Apr. 5 (53)	<i>From the Chargé in Canada (tel.)</i> Notification that Canada has agreed to proposed conference.	534
Apr. 15	<i>From the Chairman of the American Delegation</i> Names of U. S. and Canadian delegates, and report on the conference.	534
Undated	<i>Minutes of Informal Canadian-United States Conference</i> Text of minutes of the two meetings of the conference on aviation radio held at U. S. Customs House, New York City, April 10 and 11.	535
June 19 (71)	<i>From the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs to the American Chargé in Canada</i> Information that Canada is prepared to accept the recommendations of the conference.	541
Aug. 18 (804)	<i>From the American Chargé in Canada to the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs</i> Advice that the U. S. Federal Radio Commission has adopted the recommendations of the conference.	542

CHILE

CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHILE FOR PREVENTION OF SMUGGLING OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS, SIGNED MAY 27, 1930

1930 Feb. 17 (12)	<i>From the Chilean Ambassador</i> Inquiry as to whether the U. S. Government is disposed to sign with Chile a convention for the prevention of smuggling of intoxicating liquors which will permit Chilean vessels carrying such liquors to call at U. S. ports.	543
May 23	<i>To the Chilean Ambassador</i> Advice that the United States will be glad to conclude such a treaty with Chile; submittal of draft treaty for consideration.	543
May 26 (40)	<i>From the Chilean Ambassador</i> Receipt of instructions to sign the proposed treaty.	544
May 27	<i>Convention Between the United States of America and Chile</i> Text of convention signed at Washington.	545

GENERAL

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, JANUARY 21-APRIL 22, 1930¹

[The Governments represented at the Conference were the United States of America, France, Great Britain and the states of the British Empire which were separate members of the League of Nations (Australia, Canada, India, the Irish Free State, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa), Italy, and Japan.

Following is the list of the American Delegates and Advisers:

DELEGATES

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State.
Charles G. Dawes, Ambassador to Great Britain.
Charles Francis Adams, Secretary of the Navy.
Joseph T. Robinson, United States Senator.
David A. Reed, United States Senator.
Hugh S. Gibson, Ambassador to Belgium.
Dwight W. Morrow, Ambassador to Mexico.

ADVISERS

Admiral William V. Pratt.
Hugh R. Wilson, Minister to Switzerland.
Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones (retired).
Arthur Wilson Page.
J. Theodore Marriner, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, Department of State.
Ray Atherton, Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain.
George A. Gordon, Counselor of Embassy in France.
George Rublee.
Lieut. Col. Charles Burnett.]

¹For the antecedents of the Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, pp. 112 ff.

The acts of the Conference and other relevant data are printed in Department of State Conference Series No. 6, *Proceedings of the London Naval Conference of 1930 and Supplementary Documents* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1931); a similar text, in both English and French, was issued by the British Foreign Office under the title *Documents of the London Naval Conference, 1930* (London, 1930). Further pertinent material is contained in Department of State Conference Series No. 3, *London Naval Conference, Speeches and Press Statements by Members of the American Delegation, January 20-April 29, 1930* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1930).

500.A15a3/621 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, January 19, 1930—11 a. m.

[Received 3 p. m.²]

4. For the President and the Acting Secretary of State. My telegram No. 1, January 18, 1 p. m.^{2a} Yesterday afternoon I had a conversation of about three and one-half hours with Prime Minister MacDonald. Of this time we spent two hours quite alone. The Prime Minister's son was present for half an hour and Marriner and Craigie³ joined us for the last three-quarters of an hour. As a result of the Parliamentary session the Prime Minister appeared tired. He said to me that he had never known any day whether or not before the day's session was over he might not find himself out of office.

He agreed with me that if the heads of the delegations were allowed to constitute a steering committee that would be the best system, but that the fact that Tardieu⁴ wanted to bring Briand⁵ with him to the first meeting to discuss the subject somewhat complicated this. Furthermore, it appears likely that should Tardieu be wanted back in France, Briand might be agreed upon as the head of the delegation. The matter has been left in abeyance until other delegations are heard from, although I said I would be quite willing to come alone even if France brought two.

The Japanese, the Prime Minister said, had been very stiff in demanding a 10-10-7 ratio. Admiral Takarabe⁶ was very firm indeed, although he felt that Wakatsuki¹ appeared somewhat more conciliatory. I told him that if a treaty which started out with a condition precedent of such a ratio for Japan were submitted to the American Senate, I felt that there was no possibility of its being accepted. I pointed out that Japan would be more reluctant to allow any treaty to be made without them which might make it possible for Great Britain and the United States to build against them fully two to one, and I also mentioned the financial difficulties of building in Japan at the present time. The Prime Minister agreed with me absolutely on the necessity for remaining stiff against this preliminary demand by Japan for 10-10-7. After Marriner and Craigie

² Telegram in three sections.

^{2a} Not printed

had joined us, somewhat later, we reverted to the question of possible face-saving clauses for the satisfaction of Japanese public opinion. The question of Japan's financial necessities was again stressed by us, and we agreed that unless the battleship program were coupled with a simultaneous agreement on auxiliary vessels we would not consent to its alteration.

The French, the Prime Minister said, had been acting very badly in the whole matter, but they had become somewhat more conciliatory since his rather stiff answer to their last note. He said that with reference to the proposed Mediterranean Pact⁸ what France desired was a guarantee, which he could not give of course, nor would he be willing to enter into a treaty which would not embrace all the powers of the Mediterranean, including Yugoslavia and Spain. The Spanish Ambassador had told him, he said, that after the Conference had got under way, Spain could not be brought into it. I told him that if the French were satisfied with a consultative treaty I had a feeling that they might not stand out for an absolute guarantee. Then the Prime Minister told me that in the strictest confidence he would show me a draft which he had made on this subject and which was precisely in the form of the Pacific treaty between the four powers.⁹ I told him that I felt that the first article of that treaty as he adapted it might be just the ladder that the French would need to come down on.

After this we discussed the points causing the irritation of the French against the British: (1) the attitude of Snowden at The Hague;¹⁰ (2) the suspicion resulting from the visit to America of the Prime Minister;¹¹ and (3) the about-face on the trained reserve question made by Cecil.¹²

Tardieu, I pointed out, had won a victory at The Hague, and as he felt reassured respecting the visit to Washington, the other items would be less troublesome. MacDonald also told me that he was prepared to concede the position on trained reserves, and that, in talking to Marriner, Craigie had supplemented this information by saying that this was a concession which they would not wish to make too early in the proceedings and at any rate certainly not before the Conference had opened.

⁸ See the French memorandum of December 20, 1920, *Foreign Relations*, 1920, vol. I, p. 299.

⁹ Treaty signed at Washington, December 13, 1921, *ibid.*, 1922, vol. I, p. 33.

¹⁰ Philip Snowden, Chancellor of the Exchequer and head of the British representation at the international conference held at The Hague, August 6 to 31, 1929. See Great Britain, Cmd. 3392, Misc. No. 5, (1929): *Protocol With Annexes Approved at the Plenary Session of the Hague Conference, August 31, 1929*; also Cmd. 3417, Misc. No. 7 (1929): *International Agreement on the Evacuation of the Rhineland Territory*.

¹¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

¹² Viscount Cecil of Chelwood. See League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 78, "Records of the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Minutes of the Third Committee (Reduction of Armaments)," p. 72.

His discussion of Italy's position he opened by saying that Italy was worse than France, and, as I expressed some surprise, he depicted Italy's economic restlessness and her strong desire for colonies now in the possession of France. In the matter of French and Italian naval building, I told him that I felt, of course, quite disinterested except insofar as it might have reference to the British.

Before we began discussing the possibility of making economies in battleships, Craigie and Marriner had joined us.

The first economy suggestion was that replacements be postponed.

The second was that the units be reduced in size.

The third was that the number of units be reduced.

MacDonald said that while I was at sea he said almost exactly the same thing in a press statement and that, therefore, my statement of the case was almost telepathic. I had already seen an excerpt from it, I said, which stated that he would consent to a full holiday extending until 1936.

Then I offered him congratulations on the advances in this position from that which he had adopted while in Washington. He said that both politically and financially he regretted to have to do this but that this was a point on which he felt he must yield, although he was really worried by the industrial aspect of the matter. I have told him that I desired to warn him that probably we would not be able to go along with Great Britain regarding the question of reduction in size of ships, particularly during the period of transition, and that it was our opinion that not much economy would result from it. The question of the reduction we felt should be by numbers; he said that the British Admiralty, in his opinion and Craigie's, would agree to a reduction in numbers, and he further pointed out that he had been told by the Japanese that if numbers were reduced they would expect an addition to their ratio. It might be dangerous, I pointed out, to reduce the difference in strength existing between battleship fleets and other war vessels, especially with regard to the three main naval powers, and in this matter he said that he felt that there was a practical identity of interests between the United States and Great Britain.

The conversation was most friendly in its whole tone, and I feel that from the British delegation we will have a full measure of cooperation.

STIMSON

8. The following summarizes the situation up to the present.

The element of the situation which is most important is that on the voyage over and here the American delegation has developed into a loyal, harmonious unit which is working together as one man. MacDonald, on the other hand, has to divide authority with his Dominions who insist upon representation in the meetings of committee chairmen. The Dominion representatives, however, are individually friendly and amenable and the smooth working of the Conference will not, in my opinion, be obstructed by them.

At my country house yesterday I had a very friendly and satisfactory conference with the delegation from Italy, and after that Morrow and I had a satisfactory conference with Tardieu and Briand. Tardieu is apparently sincerely desirous of agreement and has definitely abandoned the position that this Conference cannot be final but must be contingent on general disarmament by the League of Nations. Tardieu at the preliminary meeting for organization of the delegation chairmen proved himself to be practical minded and made suggestions in the direction of informality and simplicity in the future working of the Conference. In comparison with the attitude of the French in previous conferences these suggestions were novel.

I believe that MacDonald will cooperate with me in respect to the Japanese demands, although I have had no further conference with the Japanese. A favorable outlook for an agreement resulting from the Conference has in general been confirmed by events since my arrival in England, as it is evident that MacDonald will remain in office on his opponents' sufferance until the Conference has been concluded. One of the most important factors, in my opinion, at present is to convince the British public and the Conservatives that our parity demand is genuine and that we will insist upon it; in case I find it necessary to make some emphatic statement to this effect I hope you will bear this necessity in mind. I also trust that no public statement will be made by the President bearing on the details of negotiations unless I am given opportunity for comment and ample notice as of course any statement that is made by him must be made good while the Prime Minister can, without being taken too seriously here, give utterance to pious hopes and aspirations. This applies among other things to battleship [*sic*] abolition.

STIMSON

^{1a} Telegram in two sections.

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, January 23, 1930—6 p. m.

[Received 7:20 p. m.¹⁴]

16. For the President and the Acting Secretary of State. Tardieu, Briand, MacDonald, Henderson,¹⁵ and Morrow dined with me on Tuesday evening. The French had as their interpreter Paul Mantoux.¹⁶ The British Prime Minister said he considered it desirable to know what matters were to be discussed at the plenary session today and in the meantime what progress we could make. He was turning over in his mind whether it would not be desirable that the respective delegations hold separate meetings, as for example, between Japan and the United States, between Japan and Great Britain, between Great Britain and the United States, or between France and Italy.

France, Tardieu stated, favored both reduction and limitation of armament but felt that further limitation was the pathway to reduction. It was felt by Henderson that disappointment would result if reduction could not be achieved and that a bolder policy of reduction should be aimed for by the Conference at the outset. This was agreed to in not quite such strong terms by MacDonald. It was suggested by Tardieu that if we should use the present programs of the various Governments as a basis, making it clear that the Conference would result in a reduction in the programs as distinguished from reduction of existing navies, this would be a beginning of reduction of armament. The question of ratios and its consequent concomitant of prestige arose later in the evening. It appeared, I said, that because minds were fixed on prestige, programs were apt to be large. It was pointed out by me that possibly this desire might be satisfied in either one of two ways, by raising the ratios or by a change in the nature of the contract. The dangers inherent in the first method were then pointed out by me, that is, that reduction on the one hand would be prevented by it and antagonisms on the other aroused by it.

The method which I had discussed with the President was then suggested by me, that is, to avoid all implications of contractual inferiority by merely setting out programs which could not be departed from without a notice say of one year and without giving sufficient reason therefor, thus releasing the other signatories from

¹⁴ Telegram in two sections.

¹⁵ Arthur Henderson, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and member of the British delegation.

¹⁶ Former head of the Political Department, Secretariat of the League of Nations.

their corresponding programs. The French seemed to consider this suggestion as helpful and I am informed that Tardieu privately said he considered their difficulties might be solved by my proposed second method. I was informed by Hankey¹⁷ on the following day that he was urging this method upon the Prime Minister as for a long time he had been convinced that it would be the ultimate solution.

I conferred yesterday with the Prime Minister concerning agenda of today's plenary session and informed him that I did not propose to set out a long and detailed argumentation for the maintenance of a large navy and that I hoped that he and the other nations would do likewise as it did not seem wise to me to dig in behind any set statement of needs and the reasons why they should be adopted. This was not agreed to altogether by him as I believe the political effect of some patriotic statement of Britain's dependence on the sea was valued by him at this time. Mr. Wakatsuki, upon whom I subsequently called, agreed to the limitation of his statement to generalities. This was done by him. The statement of the Italians was likewise based on the point of view that no reduction could be too great and that naval needs were relative. It was still apparently considered politically necessary by the French that a detailed statement be made by them.

There was no friction in this morning's plenary session; the election of Sir Maurice Hankey as Secretary General and a decision that in case of absence of the Prime Minister the chair should be taken by the heads of the other delegations in the English alphabetical order completed the organization of the Conference. The policy suggested in the paragraph above was followed in the speeches. A very long exposé of French coast line area and commerce was read by Tardieu, who frequently stressed the point that these items for France were only exceeded by similar statistics for Great Britain, the United States and Japan. During most of Tardieu's speech his manner was restrained and almost perfunctory, giving the impression that the effect at home was the essential object of his speech. He stated, however, in the last paragraph that any idea of absolute needs was necessarily modified by relative considerations such as a condition of naval agreement and security. The speech of the Italian delegate was moderate and conciliatory, only stating in principle that equality with the navy of the largest European continental power was the Italian need.

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, January 24, 1930—6 p. m.

[Received January 24—4:29 p. m.]

18. For the President and the Acting Secretary of State. At MacDonald's invitation we had a two hours' conference on Thursday with the heads of the delegations. The only one of the Dominions represented was Australia, the others having been persuaded by MacDonald to eliminate themselves. Procedure was discussed at length with quite favorable results. Speed in providing methods for sorting out and reporting upon all possible questions before the Conference was particularly urged by MacDonald and Tardieu. An agreement resulted that the heads of delegations should meet every day, beginning Monday, in order that they might discuss the various questions before the Conference and examine how the various questions should preliminarily be disposed of for investigation and report, that is, either by reference to subcommittees of various kinds or by the sessions of the chiefs of delegations themselves. The informal meetings between the separate delegations now in progress will not be interfered with by these meetings. We have received today tentative agenda of subjects to be thus considered and will receive these each day for revision in advance of the following day's meeting and no subject which is objected to by any chief delegate will be taken up. Conferences have been held today between some of us and the Italians and the Japanese. Yesterday and today we have also been in almost continuous session, as a delegation, making good progress on our own positions as regards various questions.

We feel in view of this week's experience that our delegation is absolutely harmonious and particularly well prepared in advance of any other delegation here. Figure studies which have been of much use to us are apparently lacking even to the British.

STIMSON

The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State

Tokyo, January 25, 1930—9 a. m.
 [Received January 25—6:48 a. m.]

11. Repeat to London.¹⁸

1. The only public explanations of the Japanese position with respect to cruisers are based upon formulae representing the strength of opposing sides in the great sea battles of the past, for example, the comparative strengths of the Japanese-Russian fleets in the battle of the Straits of Tsushima, or, of the British and German fleets at the battle of Jutland, and attempt to adduce from the figures the principle that a superior fleet could not be assured of victory unless it had a preponderant relative strength of 10-7, and, conversely, that fleet weaker than its enemy by any proportion less than 7-10 would be certain to meet defeat. It is the opinion of our own Naval Attaché as well as that of other Naval Attachés in Tokyo that this is rubbish.

2. [Paraphrase.] It is undoubtedly only in connection with war with the United States that the 10-7 ratio is considered. The Japanese naval experts believe that the United States in such an event would not permit the development of a war of exhaustion but as soon as possible would seek a final conclusion. This belief is based on the reason that the United States would have to bring over an effective military force; that the use of the best part of the American merchant marine would be required for the transportation of a large army across the Pacific; that the capture of American carrying trade by British and other foreign merchant marines and the loss of the United States foreign marketing would result from the diversion for a long period of time of a large proportion of American merchant vessels. It is consequently believed that as soon as possible the American Navy would try to come to grips with the Japanese Navy.

3. The great distance between Pearl Harbor and Japan, it is believed, would prevent the American battle fleet from effectively carrying on offensive operations against Japan from Pearl Harbor. The American battle fleet, therefore, would immediately upon the outbreak of war proceed to Manila in order that they might operate against Japan from that base which is close enough to permit the freest use of cruisers and submarines as well as of capital ships. The Caroline and Marshall Islands, through which the American battle fleet would have to pass, are mandates of Japan. Excellent places for concealment of submarines are afforded by these islands. For attacks upon the American battle fleet the Japanese would here undoubtedly exploit

¹⁸ Transmitted to the American delegation as Department's telegram No. 19,

the use of the large submarine contingent upon which they insist. The Japanese realize only a portion of the battle fleet could be destroyed by their submarines, but they appear to have confidence in their ability to destroy enough ships to reduce the preponderance of the American battle fleet, thus making it possible for the Japanese fleet to meet the American fleet on terms which would be more or less equal.

4. There is naturally no public discussion of the above but undoubtedly the demand for a 10-7 ratio would largely disappear if Japan could be made to understand that we have no plans in regard to China which might conceivably lead to war. [End paraphrase.]

CASTLE

500.A15a3/649 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, January 28, 1930—3 p. m.

[Received January 28—12:55 p. m.]

22. Three and a half hours were wasted in yesterday morning's meeting of the heads of the five delegations by debate between the French and Italians concerning whether the items proposed by one or the other should precede each other on the informal agenda concerning the disposal of which a consultation was to be held between the heads of delegations. The alphabet, it was finally agreed, should decide this question and the Italian proposition should be preceded by the French proposition so labeled. In the meanwhile progress in the study and consideration of a more detailed plan is being made by the American delegation.

The heads of delegations at their meeting this morning determined to hold a plenary session of the Conference at 10 o'clock on Thursday, the 30th, in order that they might discuss the appointment of a committee on which should be represented not more than two delegates from each of the five countries. This committee would report to the Conference and its duty would be to consider the methods of limitation, i. e. (1) global, (2) by categories, and (3) by categories with a transfer possibility.

A statement will be made by the Italian delegate to the effect that decisions on any of these methods cannot be accepted by Italy until there is a more exact determination of the question of ratio and tonnage level but that the committee will not be opposed by Italy. The general principle and the parliamentary question involved in

described will be discussed in the plenary session. The plenary session's real object is to prevent the press from getting too restless over the lack of open meetings and to allow time necessary to continue informal discussions between delegates which are now showing real progress and going at full speed.

Admission will be granted to a limited number of press representatives and the arrangements for this are now being elaborated between the press officers of the various delegations and the British press office.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/661 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

TOKYO, January 31, 1930—1 p. m.

[Received January 31—9:35 a. m.]

14. Telegram to be repeated to London.¹⁹

Evidently acting under instructions, Hanihara ²⁰ last night spoke to me of the impression which prevails in Japan that the plans of the American Navy are based on the possibility of war with Japan in order to force acceptance of our ideas in regard to China. Japan realized, he said, that a war with the United States would be the worst possible disaster and that therefore Japan even from a selfish point of view could never think of it, but that unfortunately on account of the belief above expressed there was extreme nervousness here.

This fear would never be understood in the United States, I said, and I could conceive of no circumstances in which the United States would go to war with Japan over China, that our aims approximated the Japanese as both countries wanted only a China which was substantially and politically sound. I was assured by him that this impression which he said prevailed was not the belief of his Government but that popular opinion had to be taken into account and that popular opinion felt that this possibility of war over some Chinese question was the basis for our opposition to a slightly larger ratio for Japan. Dooman ²¹ was told very much the same thing by Vice Minister Yoshida who stated that if I could make some authoritative statement contradicting the idea it might be most helpful. I had already planned to say in my speech at the dinner of the America-Japan Society that we have at present no quarrel on the subject of China and that I foresee none in the future but merely closer cooperation in forwarding our

¹⁹ Transmitted to the American delegation as Department's telegram No. 39, January 31, 9 a. m.

²⁰ Masanao Hanihara, former Japanese Ambassador in the United States.

²¹ Eugene H. Dooman, First Secretary of Embassy in Japan.

common aim to help China to achieve political and economic stability. There has been, as you know, a radical change in the Japanese policy toward China and it is now clearly recognized that friendly assistance must be the basis for their relations. The above suspicion of our purpose, in my mind, is certainly the principal reason that a higher ratio in large cruisers is insisted upon by the Japanese.

CASTLE

500.A15a3/661 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Castle)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1930—5 p. m.

25. Your No. 14, January 31, 1 p. m.

1. The question you present involves problems both of facilitating the work of the Naval Conference and of the continuous conduct of relations with the Far Eastern countries. Mindful of the difficulties which arose in consequence of statements in the Lansing-Ishii notes²³ and in the Anglo-Japanese Treaties of Alliance²⁴ the Department feels that utmost care should be taken with regard to both substance and phraseology in any attempt to explain policy of the United States in relations with Japan in terms of American and Japanese policy in relation to China.

Careful consideration should be given to the effect not only in Japan but elsewhere of any statement which may be made. For example, it is likely that the statement "closer cooperation in forwarding our common aim to help China to achieve economic and political stability" would be misunderstood in China and would be susceptible to interpretations disadvantageous to us.

One might safely say, instead, that it is the desire of this Government, and we are assured and confident that it is also the desire of Japan, to see China achieve economic and political stability. In brief, we believe that it is not necessary to characterize or define our policy or aims with regard to China in terms of Japan's policy or aims, and that it is desirable to avoid putting the two in the same brackets. The suggestion is offered that you emphasize the point that the China policy of this Government is completely defined in the Washington treaties of 1922, particularly the Nine-Power Pact relating to prin-

²³ For Lansing-Ishii agreement of November 2, 1917, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, p. 264; for cancelation of the agreement, see *ibid.*, 1922, vol. II, p. 591.

²⁴ For Anglo-Japanese alliance, see treaty of January 30, 1902, *Foreign Relations*, 1902, p. 514; treaty of August 12, 1905, *ibid.*, 1905, p. 488; and treaty of July 13, 1911, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. civ, p. 173.

ciples,²⁵ and in the Kellogg Peace Pact,²⁶ agreements which commit the United States and Japan to each other and to countries which are parties to these agreements and which are regarded in the United States as conclusive evidence that no country signatory to them has any aims regarding China likely to lead to armed conflict with any other.

2. Any statement regarding American naval plans should avoid mention, if possible, of any particular country. It would be safe to state officially at any time or place that the foreign policy of the United States rests on principles which preclude any thought on the part of either the American Government or the people of resorting to war as an instrument of policy.

3. We are repeating this telegram to London today.²⁷ It is assumed that if the Secretary wishes to alter or to add to the suggestions made herein, you will in due course receive a further instruction.

COTTON

500.A15a3/865 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

LONDON, February 4, 1930—7 p. m.

[Received 9:23 p. m.^{27a}]

35. [Paraphrase.] For the President. The American delegation, after prolonged consultation with Japanese and British delegations, unanimously favors submitting to Great Britain and Japan the following tentative suggestions which are to be considered not as a collection of separate offers but as a whole. While Admiral Jones approves the balance of the program, he still is convinced that 21 cruisers are essential. The entire plan is cordially endorsed by Admiral Pratt, and all seven American delegates are now united in believing that the 21 cruiser program could be insisted on only with great danger to the Conference's success.

Your criticisms at the earliest possible moment will be appreciated. We have not submitted these written detailed suggestions either to the British or the Japanese, but we are encouraged by their statements in our conferences to believe that a plan along these general lines may be approved by them. The utmost secrecy should be maintained for the present as to the detailed proposal, of which the following will be the substance: [End paraphrase.]

²⁵ Treaty signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. I, p. 276.

²⁶ Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, *ibid.*, 1928, vol. I, p. 153.

<i>Total tons</i>		<i>Type</i>
180,000	18	10,000 tons carrying guns of 8-inch caliber
70,500	10	Existing <i>Omahas</i>
76,500	..	New cruisers carrying guns not exceeding 6-inch caliber
327,000	..	Total

(a) The United States shall have the option of the following:

150,000	15	10,000 ton cruisers carrying guns of 8-inch caliber
70,500	10	Existing <i>Omahas</i>
118,500	..	New cruisers carrying guns not exceeding 6-inch caliber
339,000	..	Total

FOR GREAT BRITAIN

110,000	11	10,000 [ton] cruisers now completed carrying 8-inch guns
20,000	2	10,000 ton cruisers now building carrying 8-inch guns
16,800	2	8,400 ton cruisers now building carrying 8-inch guns
91,000	14	New cruisers mounting 6-inch guns
101,200	21	Existing cruisers mounting 6-inch guns
339,000	50	Total

(a) Great Britain may retain four cruisers of *Hawkins* class carrying 7.5-inch guns until replacement by 6-inch cruisers. To be replaced by 1934-5.

(b) Great Britain shall have the option of the following:

176,800	18	10,000 ton (or smaller) cruisers carrying guns of 8-inch caliber
75,000	..	New cruisers carrying guns of 6-inch caliber
75,200	..	Existing cruisers carrying guns of 6-inch caliber
327,000	..	Total

FOR JAPAN

28,400	4	7,100 ton cruisers carrying 8-inch guns
40,000	4	10,000 ton cruisers now completed carrying 8-inch guns
40,000	4	10,000 ton cruisers now building carrying 8-inch guns
81,455	17	Cruisers carrying guns not exceeding 6-inch caliber
8,800	..	Existing or new cruisers carrying guns not exceeding 6 inches
198,655	..	Total

Replacements

1. No cruiser may be replaced until it shall have reached a life of 20 years from date of completion, unless it shall have been lost through an accident.

2. Tonnages are given in Washington standard tons.

3. Old tonnage may be retained over the age limit if not replaced, but the same right of replacement is not lost by delay in scrapping after reaching the age limit.

DESTROYERS

Total tonnage of destroyers and destroyer leaders shall be:

For United States, 200,000; for Great Britain 200,000; for Japan 120,000.

1. Existing destroyers and leaders may be retained and vessels building may be completed up to the above total allowed tonnages.

2. Existing vessels shall not be scrapped except to comply with the allowed tonnage until the vessel has reached an age limit of 16 years.

3. Old tonnage may be retained over the age limit if not replaced, but the right of replacement is not lost by delay in scrapping after reaching the age limit.

4. No new vessels shall be laid down prior to 31 December, 1936, except to replace vessels reaching the age limit or lost through accident.

5. Maximum unit displacements shall be limited as may be agreed upon in conference. We suggest 1,850 tons for United States, Great Britain, and Japan, and 3,000 tons for France and Italy.

SUBMARINES (If retained)

Total tonnage of submarines shall be:

For the United States	60,000.
For Great Britain	60,000.
For Japan	40,000.

1. Existing submarines may be retained and vessels building may be completed up to the above total allowed tonnages.

2. Existing vessels shall not be scrapped except to comply with the allowed tonnage until the vessel has reached an age limit of 13 years.

3. No new vessels shall be laid down prior to 31st December, 1936, except to replace vessels reaching the age limit or lost through accident.

4. Submarine tonnages are given in Geneva standard tons, surface condition.

5. Maximum unit displacement shall be limited as may be agreed upon in conference.

6. Old tonnage may be retained over the age limit if not replaced but the right of replacement is not lost by delay in scrapping after reaching the age limit.

7. Submarines to be limited to the same rules of international law as surface craft, in operations against merchant ships.

BATTLESHIPS

1. The replacement tables of the Washington Treaty²⁸ are modified as follows to comply with these principles:

(a) Immediate scrapping of old ships down to a total of 15-15-9.

(b) No new ships to be laid down prior to 31 December, 1936 except as provided below in paragraph 4.

(c) Each nation may retain two old battleships for training purposes or for use as targets provided these vessels shall be rendered incapable of further war-like service as prescribed in the Washington Treaty.

2. Tonnages are in Washington standard tons. Three thousand standard tons have been added to each of the *Idaho*, *Mississippi* and *New Mexico* to allow for future modernization.

3. Should any provision be made for replacements of battleships, each nation may retain old tonnage if not replaced, and the right of replacement of that tonnage is not lost by such postponement.

4. In order to realize now the parity of battleship tonnage which was ultimately contemplated by the Washington Treaty by balancing the *Rodney* and *Nelson*, the United States may lay down one 35,000 ton battleship in 1933, complete it in 1936, and on completion scrap the *Wyoming*. If the United States shall exercise this option, then a similar option as to replacing one capital ship shall be granted to Japan.

5. "Modernizing" existing ships includes increase in gun elevation.

6. The foregoing principles will result in a schedule substantially as follows:

FOR UNITED STATES

	<i>Standard</i>
Scrap <i>Florida</i>	21,900
<i>Utah</i>	22,000
<i>Arkansas</i>	26,100
Total	70,000
2. Total tons now on hand, 532,400.	
Scrap in 1930-31, 70,000.	
Remaining first of January 1936, 462,400.	
Scrap <i>Wyoming</i> in 1936, 26,000, leaving 436,400.	
One new ship 35,000. Total 471,400.	

FOR GREAT BRITAIN

	<i>Standard</i>
Scrap <i>Iron Duke</i>	26,250
<i>Marlborough</i>	26,250
<i>Emperor of India</i>	26,250
<i>Benbow</i>	26,250
<i>Tiger</i>	23,900
Total	133,900
Total tons now on hand, 606,450.	
Scrap [in] 1930-31, 133,900.	
Remaining until 31st December 1936, 472,550.	

FOR JAPAN

Standard

1. Scrap *Kongo* 26,330
 2. Total tons now on hand, 292,400.
- Scrap in 1930-31, 26,330.
 Remaining until 31st December 1936, 266,070.

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

The minimum limitation of 10,000 tons shall be stricken from the definition of aircraft carriers in the Washington Treaty, so that all such vessels shall be charged against the permitted tonnage.

EXEMPT CLASS

(a) That all naval surface combatant vessels of less than 500 tons standard displacement be exempt.

(b) That all naval surface combatant vessels of 500 to 3,000 tons individual standard displacement should be exempt from limitation, provided they have none of the following characteristics:

- (1) Mount a gun greater than 5-inch caliber.
- (2) Mount more than two guns above 3-inch caliber.
- (3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes.
- (4) Are designed for a speed greater than 16.5 knots.

(c) That all naval vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time of peace under Government control for fighting purposes, which are employed in fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way other than as fighting ships, should be exempt from limitation provided they have none of the following characteristics:

- (1) Mount a gun greater than 6-inch caliber.
- (2) Mount more than four guns above 3-inch caliber.
- (3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes.
- (4) Are designed for a speed greater than 16.5 knots.
- (5) Are armored.
- (6) Are designed or fitted to launch mines.
- (7) Are fitted to receive planes on board from the air.
- (8) Mount more than one aeroplane—launching apparatus on the center line; or two, one on each broadside.

(d) Certain existing vessels of special type to be exempted by mutual agreement.

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1930—10 a. m.

55. The suggestions contained in your telegram No. 35, February 4, have been considered and are heartily approved by the President.

COTTON

500.A15a3/867: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, February 5, 1930—5 p. m.

[Received February 5—1:55 p. m.]

36. At the request of the Secretary of the Navy, and if the President sees no objection, please communicate to Acting Secretary of the Navy Jahncke, for discussion with the President only, the substance of our telegram No. 35, February 4. Thereupon see Senators Swanson and Hale²⁹ at the request of Senators Robinson and Reed, and communicate to them the substance of our proposal with messages as follows:³⁰

“For Senator Swanson from Robinson:

Please keep this strictly confidential except for Senator Hale. All delegates agree that American proposal best possible, and that insistence on 21 cruisers would make Japanese demands for 8-inch gun vessels so large that Australia and New Zealand would insist on building such vessels independently of British Navy. I am thoroughly satisfied with the methods of working out this proposal with the negotiations incident to it, and of the value of the proposal to the interest of the United States.

For Senator Hale from Reed:

Kindly regard this as strictly confidential except for Senator Swanson.

After conversations with British and Japanese our delegation is unanimous that we have outlined the best proposal that can be made. Japanese insistence of basing their figures on American 8-inch-gun cruiser tonnage will bring about cruiser building by Australia and New Zealand, consequently parity could only be obtained with Great Britain alone and not with British Empire. You will see that in other directions we would receive many compensating advantages.”

STIMSON

²⁹ The ranking minority member and the chairman, respectively, of the Naval Affairs Committee of the Senate.

³⁰ Quoted passage not paraphrased.

LONDON, February 6, 1930—5 p. m.
[Received February 6—1:05 p. m.]

39. Delegation's No. 36, February 5, 5 p. m. If you have delivered yesterday's message please communicate the following message from Senator Robinson to Senator Swanson:

You will have noted that the American proposal is based on your suggestion that options be given so that Great Britain and the United States may, if they so desire, exactly duplicate each other's cruiser fleets, ship for ship, ton for ton, and gun for gun. The whole delegation joins me in thanking you for this suggestion which has contributed much to the possibility of solution of this problem.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/670 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

LONDON, February 6, 1930—7 p. m.
[Received February 6—3:20 p. m.³¹]

41. Having learned this afternoon that garbled reports of our plan were in the hands of hostile newspapers, in order to place the advantages of the American proposal in the public eye as soon as possible and to prevent all leaks which would concern themselves only with its alleged disadvantages, I have decided, after consultation with the Prime Minister and Mr. Wakatsuki, to issue the attached statement to the press tonight for release for tomorrow (Friday) morning's papers.

At the opening of the Conference the United States delegation made no statement of its position or the needs of its country beyond the historical fact of the agreement in principle for parity between Great Britain and the United States. We are now in a position where we can go further. Following discussions among ourselves and negotiations with the British and Japanese which have clarified the limits of possible agreement, our delegation has made suggestions as follows:

First, with Great Britain immediate parity in every class of ship in the Navy. The gross tonnage of these two fleets is substantially 1,200,000 tons apiece. The negotiations last summer between President Hoover and Prime Minister MacDonald³² practically reduced

³¹ Telegram in five sections.

³² See *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

the discussions of parity between them to the comparatively insignificant difference in their respective cruiser class tonnage of 24,000 tons. We propose to settle this difference as follows: Of the larger cruisers armed with 8-inch guns, Great Britain will have 15 and the United States 18, an advantage to the latter of 30,000 tons. In this case our advantage in large cruisers will be compensated to Great Britain by a lesser tonnage on our side in smaller cruisers of 12,000 tons, but under the arrangements stated below this can be equalized at our option.

Of the smaller cruisers armed with 6-inch guns, Great Britain will have an initial advantage; but, in order to insure exact equality of tonnage, the United States makes the suggestion that each country will have the option of duplicating exactly the cruiser fleet of the other. Thus Great Britain would have the option, by reducing its number of small cruisers, to increase its large cruisers from 15 to 18 so as to give it a total tonnage of 327,000 tons, the exact amount of tonnage which the United States now asks. On the other hand, the United States would have the option, by reducing its large cruisers from 18 to 15, to increase the number of its small cruisers so as to give it a total cruiser tonnage of 339,000 tons, the exact amount of tonnage which the British now ask.

In battleships we suggest by reduction in number on both sides to equalize our two fleets in 1931 instead of in 1942. At present the British battleship fleet contains two more vessels than ours. In destroyers and aircraft carriers we suggest equality in tonnage, and in submarines the lowest tonnage possible.

As is well known we will gladly agree to a total abolition of submarines if it is possible to obtain the consent of all five powers to such a proposition, and in any event we suggest that the operations of submarines be limited to the same rules of international law as surface craft in operation against merchant ships so that they cannot attack without providing for the safety of the passengers and crew.

Second, our suggestion to the Japanese would produce an over-all relation satisfactory to us and, we hope, to them. In conformity with our relations in the past it is not based upon the same ratio in every class of ships.

We have not made proposals to the French and Italians whose problems are not so directly related to ours that we feel it appropriate at this time to make suggestions to them. A settlement of the Italian and French problem is essential, of course, to the agreement contemplated.

The United States delegates do not feel at liberty to discuss any further details in figures, and it is obvious that the announcement of hypothetical figures by others is calculated only to provoke argument.

Our delegation is in agreement on every item of our program and we are in the most hopeful spirit that in cooperation with the other delegations the primary purpose of the Conference, namely, the termination and prevention of competitions in naval armament and such reductions as are found consistent with national security, may be accomplished.

This is all that we deem it helpful to state until our suggestions have been considered by the delegations to whom they have been presented.

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, February 7, 1930—10 a. m.

[Received February 7—7:10 a. m.]

42. Except for figures contained in statement transmitted in telegram No. 41, February 6, 7 p. m., none will be given out here. It is desired that none be given out in Washington, as to do so would embarrass Japanese negotiations. The statement was very well received by the British press. What is Senator Swanson's reaction?

STIMSON

500.A15a3/671 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1930—2 p. m.

67. Your No. 42, February 7, 10 a. m. No figures have been given out here; and although it is quite clear that your statement had the President's approval, there has been no specific statement made that he approved it. We do not want to give the impression that you are operating under instructions from here. Your concrete proposal has been sent to Castle. Your statement was widely carried in the press here, but it is too early to appraise reaction. It is favorable, as far as we have it. Swanson was very much pleased, I think, and, while he has made no public statement and says that he is going to withhold judgment, I feel certain that his judgment is favorable. Senator Hale has made no public statement, but he does not like it.

My own personal feeling is that the form and matter of your proposal are going to be approved, and that there is not going to be any opposition except that which comes from a small group who would never agree to anything anyway. What makes the most impression is the unanimity of action of your delegation; I think that there will be a very general impression that you have done a good job, and that if you did not ask for more it was for the reason that you are exercising sound judgment on the spot. There is to a rather remarkable degree a willingness to trust the delegation, as far as I can read the press. A note consistently running through the press is the cool, deliberate manner in which the delegation has gone about ascertaining what was wise before they offered proposals.

COTTON

75. . . . It is our conviction that the objections which have so far become articulate in Congress to your plans as announced, come from Hale and Britten³³ and that they voice positions which we believe to be untenable. Some regret still exists that the totals in the cruiser category are still so high and we hark back to the negotiations which took place by cable before MacDonald's visit and to the conversations when he was here at which time he hoped to do something further in the direction of cruiser reduction. It is our hope that at some appropriate time and in the delegation's discretion, you will propose to the British that they consider the old suggestion of police cruisers, at least between you and them. At that time there was in our minds a tentative suggestion that there be substituted a special category of police cruisers of limited speed and armament or alternately of 6-inch gun cruisers over age, but kept in service for police purposes, in lieu of a certain tonnage allocated to the 6-inch gun cruiser category. Of course, you will understand the reasons for this suggestion, how it is made, and that we are not attempting to press an instruction on the delegation. Nevertheless, we cannot abandon the hope that MacDonald will be sympathetic toward this proposal. Perhaps it is the sort of suggestion which should be relegated to a later stage in the discussions.

COTTON

500.A15a3/684c: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1930—2 p. m.

84. There was one other matter, in discussing your offer further with the President before his departure for Florida, concerning which you probably understand his wishes; at the risk, however, of repetition we again explain that 200,000 tons for destroyers seems to be a very high figure. Presumably it is now being placed that high by you so that negotiations between Great Britain and France may be left in

³³ Fred A. Britten, chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives.

a better position; the President hopes, however, that 150,000 tons will be the limit for the final figure.

In regard to your offer, the above is the last comment. It appears to us here that your general strategy is correct; only those who will oppose whatever you do are opposed to your plan.

COTTON

500.A15a3/688 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, February 12, 1930—7 p. m.

[Received February 12—5:05 p. m.]

60. A conference, in which all pending propositions between the two countries were discussed, was held yesterday afternoon, those present being the Prime Minister, Henderson, Alexander³⁴ and Craigie for Great Britain, and Adams, Reed, Marriner and myself for the American delegation. It was shown, as a net result of the conference, that an agreement will probably be easy between Great Britain and ourselves, provided France or Japan does not interpose difficulties. With regard to the cruiser proposition, we are standing firm, while it is understood by Great Britain that, unless serious changes should be made in our proposal in other directions which would make it necessary as a counterpoise, the *Rodney* option³⁵ will probably not be insisted on.

I have, in the private meetings of the chiefs of delegations, sharply, and thus far successfully, prevented any battleship discussion on the ground that, until we are assured that a general agreement in all the auxiliary categories is possible, the United States will discuss no changes in the Washington Treaty. I am, therefore, refusing to discuss battleship questions in the press and trust that, regardless of criticisms either in the press or in the Senate, the same policy will be followed by you in Washington. It is not my desire that I should be forced into a position where a battleship agreement will seem so easy that, even if in the auxiliary categories Japan or France remains obdurate, it will be difficult to avoid pressure for a separate agreement on the subject of battleships.

Tardieu's first figures were received by the Prime Minister yester-

day immediately after the interview with us, and later in the evening he stated that the high levels which they had suggested had somewhat discouraged him. Judging, however, from a private talk with Tardieu, it remains my own feeling that our cruiser figures will be left unchanged by eventual concessions from Tardieu. Japanese counter figures are expected today; we believe, however, that not until after their elections on February 20, will the Japanese come down to earth.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/688c: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Castle)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1930—5 p. m.

36. The situation at the London Conference is difficult to appraise. With regard to Japan, our delegation appears to be standing firm until after the forthcoming Japanese elections; they seem pretty obdurate against any concession to the Japanese point of view. I think it probable that that position contributed to the unanimity in our delegation. We should like to have your comments.

COTTON

500.A15a3/680: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

Tokyo, February 14, 1930—9 p. m.

[Received February 14—11:55 a. m.]

27. Your telegram No. 36, February 13, 5 p. m. Please repeat to London.⁸⁰

I think that certain thoughtful Japanese regret that demand for 10-7 ratio in auxiliary ships was made practically a *sine qua non* of the Japanese program. They must now face the fact, however, that a large proportion of their people have been taught to look upon this ratio as essential to national safety; that being so, they feel that they cannot surrender. The ratio has become a political doctrine of major importance. The fact that the United States refused to consider this ratio is taken as an indication that we foresee the possibility of war. I have pointed out repeatedly that Japan having accepted the 10-6 ratio in Washington, the belief is general in the United States that Japan's demands for a higher ratio may equally be taken by the

⁸⁰ Transmitted to the American delegation as Department's telegram No. 103, February 14, noon.

American people as proof of belligerent intentions on the part of Japan. Baron Shidehara⁸⁷ told me this afternoon that the press has just been asking him urgently whether America could possibly think that Japan could attack either the mainland or the Philippine Islands because of this larger ratio. He told them that whatever America might think, an attack was impossible since even if it were immediately successful with regard to the Philippines it would be only the beginning of a war in which Japan would in the long run be completely ruined. I reminded him that it was nevertheless true that the man in the street in America, believing Japan to be already fully protected, would inevitably think some such thing, all the more so as no precise or technical reasons had ever, as far as I knew, been advanced as to why Japan needed this 10-7 ratio for defense. Shidehara said that it would be as difficult to give technical reasons as to give convincing technical reasons why the United States must have parity with Great Britain; that all the Navy would say was that Japan might have a sporting chance with this ratio against the United States, whereas with the 10-6 ratio it would have no chance at all. Shidehara added that even with this chance the final result for Japan must be disastrous.

It is also said in Tokyo that no attempt is being made in the London Conference to maintain the Washington ratio with France or Italy, that this proves that the Washington Conference ratios were not intended to cover smaller craft, and that the American attempt to hold Japan to them is unfair. That we have no particular interest in France and Italy is admitted, but this very fact is noted to prove England's greater generosity, in view of her keen interest in European armament.

I have tried to give you in my cables the exact Japanese point of view in the belief that knowledge of it may assist our delegates to suggest compromises if any are possible along the lines of least resistance. I was told yesterday by the French Chargé that he believed no compromise possible on submarines either with France or with Japan. My thought that he might be urging the Japanese Government to stand firm on this point was confirmed by Shidehara who said that the Chargé had told him that Japan and France should stand unwaveringly together on this issue as their interests with regard to it were identical. Shidehara told him that Japan would not make agreements of this sort with anyone, as it would not do to divide the Conference into opposing groups, that each nation must stand on its

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, February 16, 1930—5 p. m.

[Received February 16—4:20 p. m.³⁸]

67. For the President and the Acting Secretary of State. Your telegrams No. 103, February 14, noon,^{38a} and No. 106, February 14, 7 p. m.^{38b} At present we are in the center of discussions, and three of us by invitation have been sitting in on the negotiations between France and Great Britain for two days. It is our belief that they intend to agree eventually, although on the cruiser question they are still somewhat apart, have not yet reached submarines, and are making counter declarations as to the impossible positions occupied by each other. Great optimism is felt by Morrow, who is familiar with French methods.

We shall meet the Japanese delegation on Monday to make clear our position (1) against any change of the big cruiser ratio, and (2) that, unless a successful treaty covering all auxiliary vessels is negotiated, the Washington battleship treaty should not be modified. We have reason to believe that it is time to communicate these positions directly, even though it has already been done indirectly. An interlude for the above to sink in over the Japanese election day will then probably occur. The Japanese, we feel, have no case for the modification of the Washington ratio in regard to cruisers and no existing construction or program on which to base it, as opposed to the French who have a pretty good case for modification of the Washington ratio. The situation in regard to Japanese submarines is different, and we would desire a compromise which would reduce both sides by 1936. Negotiations, however, are rendered delicate and difficult by the Japanese political situation.

The position of Italy is one of sitting silent on the sidelines; and keeping on friendly personal terms with her delegation is all that we are doing. My new form of treaty with a speech in support of it is being held in reserve; if the time comes when it seems that it will bridge a final gap it is to be used.

It is not believed by any of us that the Conference will fail. Three causes are delaying its progress: first, the inability of MacDonald to delegate and organize his work; second, the enforced absences every week of Tardieu in Paris; and third, the elections in Japan referred

³⁸ Telegram in two sections.

^{38a} See footnote 36, p. 24.

^{38b} Not printed.

to above. The American delegation is well organized and, whenever it did not seem to cost too much on account of apparent eagerness, has taken the initiative. We are as cordial and united as ever, and more helpful and loyal support has never been given a chairman.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/691 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1930—7 p. m.

121. Your telegram No. 67, February 16, 5 p. m., has been considered. We have no particular suggestions to offer. We do not expect the Japanese position to be changed substantially by the elections on the 20th. If before reaching a final result, and to reach it you decide that concessions are to be made by you in the cruiser class although you do not yourselves believe such concessions to be justified, it seems here to be of importance that the right to build such additional unjustified tonnage should arise only toward the very end of the treaty period for the following reasons: (1) that not until that time will the United States have built up its cruiser category anywhere near to where it should be, and the same is not true with regard to Great Britain or Japan; (2) that right to build additional unjustified tonnage should not arise until after or until time of the conference which will be called toward end of the treaty period; (3) that such right to build shall arise at so late a date that any other nation which feels that it is threatened thereby will very shortly be in a position to be free of the treaty and to build as it chooses; and (4) because if this course is followed it will tend to place a financial burden in certain years which would be likely to be a handicap to actual building.

The foregoing are suggestions only.

COTTON

500.A15a3/697 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, February 19, 1930—5 p. m.

[Received February 19—12:57 p. m.]

by this recess. The adjournment was recommended by me to the Prime Minister because I felt that otherwise the Conference would have an appearance of futility; it is also our hope that the return of the French delegation will tend to be hastened by the knowledge of the fact that the adjournment was made necessary by their situation. It is also our hope that the pressure for news on correspondents will be lessened by the fact of adjournment.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/704a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, February 22, 1930—11 a. m.

131. Being somewhat disturbed, we desire that your feeling about the Conference be made known to us more fully. There is undoubtedly a waning of public interest here. While this may be inevitable and perhaps should not bother us, there is a strong feeling here that nothing is being done to keep down the levels which in every category being considered by the Conference are terribly high. I regret to have to bother you, but more frequent reports are needed.

COTTON

500.A15a3/702 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, February 23, 1930—3 p. m.

[Received February 23—12 noon.³⁹]

80. For the President and the Acting Secretary of State. Your No. 131, February 22. Following adjournment I pushed forward informal negotiations with the British which resulted in situation where agreement could be reached at once unless it were upset by the French figures. The only issue remaining is whether the total American cruiser tonnage shall be 320,000 or 327,000. The remainder follows substantially the lines of the offer sent you, with elimination of the new *Rodney*; modernization of old battleships is legalized, an arrangement supported by both Jones and Pratt as parity. We have hopes of limiting the Japanese to their present fleet, but we have agreed with the British to delay pressing for final conclusions until after the elections in Japan, as it is believed that a showdown before elections would mean increase in Japanese demands.

The presentation of the high French figures and the fall of the French Government which came immediately afterward caused a wave of pessimism here which is evidently echoed in the press. The French figures were not surprising, however, after the French note of December 20 last,⁴⁰ and Tardieu intimated to me privately that these would be reduced. The serious feature of the situation is the intense popular feeling among the British against the French, which will make it impossible for the Prime Minister to keep his figures down unless the French recede very substantially. In addition to the above, I have had personal talks with Baldwin, Lloyd George, Churchill and Grey.⁴¹ They all approve parity with us, but they are disturbed lest MacDonald may not meet the threat from France.

Our first problem is, obviously, to get the French to come down from their original figures, which are all we have at present. Then if they will not come down far enough to permit the British to make a satisfactory agreement with us, we shall have to face the second problem: Whether it will be possible to make a three-power agreement with a withdrawal clause to protect the British against the French.

There is no change in the pact situation. The British have suggested a consultative pact to the French, who are still holding out for a guarantee. At one time Briand suggested to me that he would like to discuss with me later a supplement to the Kellogg Pact, but I took this to mean something quite separate from the Naval Conference. I have not given anyone encouragement as to our entering a Mediterranean Pact, either consultative or of guarantee. If the President has any new ideas on this subject, I should like to be advised.

As far as a waning of public interest is concerned, before I sailed I warned everyone that that was inevitable. This work is a slow, persuasive job, consisting of picking up and binding together the fragments left unfinished from the Washington Conference of 1922. We are doing as well as I expected we should do. Indeed, I think that we can say for this administration that it has clearly accomplished one of our chief purposes, that of healing the serious friction which had arisen between America and Britain over cruisers. Everyone here is agreed on that.

MacDonald is staying with me tonight at Stanmore. If there is anything further tomorrow I shall report it.

The President will receive by the *Aquitania* a long personal letter which I sent last Tuesday.⁴²

STIMSON

⁴⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, p. 299.

⁴¹ Stanley Baldwin, leader of the Conservative Party; David Lloyd George, leader of the Liberal Party; Winston Churchill, former First Lord of the Admiralty and member of the House of Commons; Earl Grey, former

The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract]

TOKYO, February 24, 1930—3 p. m.

[Received February 24—9:30 a. m.]

32. Repeat to London.⁴³ The elections have resulted in a decisive victory for the Government. The latest figures give the Minseito 273 seats, Seiyukai 174, balance of 19 seats being scattered among various proletarian groups and independents. . . .

The Government now has unassailable position and is expected to prosecute its policies both foreign and domestic in a decisive manner.

CASTLE

500.A15a3/711 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

TOKYO, February 25, 1930—5 p. m.

[Received February 25—7:45 a. m.]

34. Please repeat to London.⁴⁴ Report in press. It is stated in *Neigo* that Stimson and MacDonald will propose that the Conference resolve itself into one of three powers should the French not agree to reduce demands. I questioned Shidehara whether Japan would, if this report is true, agree to this. Favorable consideration, he said, would certainly be given to the idea and he asked whether I believed a conference of three powers would be successful. My reply was that it seemed far more hopeful than at Geneva,⁴⁵ since the British cruiser demands were reduced, to which he was in agreement. The presence of Sarraut,⁴⁶ he believed, will make it almost impossible for the French to agree.

CASTLE

⁴³ Transmitted to the American delegation as Department's telegram No. 137, February 24, 10 a. m.

⁴⁴ Transmitted to the American delegation as Department's telegram No. 140, February 25, 9 a. m.

⁴⁵ Three-Power Conference, June 20—August 4, 1927, *Foreign Relations*, 1927, vol. 1, pp. 1 ff.

⁴⁶ Albert Sarraut, Minister of Marine in the French Ministry formed on February 21, 1930.

500.A15a3/717a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1930—8 p. m.

149. Your personal letter to the President ^{46a} containing a résumé of affairs to February 17 has been received and read. Although the following course is not being recommended to you, we assume that you are considering whether or not a wise course may not be a three-power agreement with a political clause in event of menacing building. The reasons which make a step of that sort seem wise to us are (1) because in such a compact you can establish the present building programs at lower levels than you could if more governments were involved, particularly France; (2) because of apparent political instability of the French Government.

COTTON

500.A15a3/716 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, February 27, 1930—noon.
[Received February 27—8:06 a. m.]

91. The informal conversations with the Japanese were resumed by a conversation between Senator Reed and Ambassador Matsudaira ⁴⁷ after a luncheon at the Japanese Embassy on Tuesday. A possible scheme of compromise on figures was worked out by the two of them together but as yet this delegation and as far as we know the Japanese delegation have not accepted these figures. Thus any possible figures which might appear in Tokyo either in press leaks or otherwise lack any official approval and are completely unofficial. When any definite progress has been made you will be informed.

Please repeat to Tokyo. ^{47a}

STIMSON

^{46a} Not printed.

⁴⁷ Japanese Ambassador in Great Britain and member of the Japanese delegation.

^{47a} Transmitted to the Embassy in Japan as Department's telegram No. 38, February 27, 10 a. m.

500.A15a3/718 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, February 28, 1930—2 p. m.

[Received February 28—11:55 a. m.]

95. A tentative agreement was reached with the British yesterday, the difference being split at 323,500 tons on total cruiser tonnage. The attempt to limit the size of 6-inch cruisers so far as America is concerned is withdrawn by them, while the *Rodney* option is withdrawn by us. The modernization of old ships including gun mountings is, by satisfactory exchange of notes withdrawing protests, legalized by them. Of course the tonnage proposed for destroyers and submarines depends directly on Japan and France, but Great Britain and the United States will try to reduce these tonnages as far as possible below our original offer which was sent to you in our telegram No. 35, February 4. We are encouraged by this settlement as being at least a definite step forward, although of course it may be jeopardized or modified by French or Japanese action. It is highly approved by Reed and unanimously by the whole delegation. With the Japanese active negotiations are taking place.

We have received your telegram No. 149, February 26. You will have been reassured as to our attitude on the three-power pact by my telegram No. 80, February 23; we still plan, however, to make strenuous efforts to get the French in.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/723a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, February 28, 1930—5 p. m.

154. Apparently with the sympathetic support of Briand, and starting with certain of the American correspondents, a pretty definite drive appears to have developed demanding that the President make a public announcement of policies concerning the Kellogg Pact with a view to satisfying the French of some sort of political security assurance on the part of the United States. This movement has now taken the form of statements from European correspondents to the effect that the President should come to the Conference looking for

ances, French security needs. Private advices that such action on his part would satisfy the French are also given the President.

Such steady reiteration that the future of the Conference depends on the President's courage, that he can save the Conference, and that on him rests the responsibility for failure—appears to us to be wholly French propaganda intended in the first place to see if it is possible to secure some American political assurances and in the second place to throw on the President or on the United States responsibility for failure.

These developments have been followed up here by considerable agitation from peace groups demanding that the President by such action save the Conference. Of course, the President has ignored all such activities entirely, but we thought that you ought to know what was going on, especially as there may possibly be an opportunity for this activity to be checkmated by you.

CARR

500.A15a3/721: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, February 28, 1930—7 p. m.

[Received February 28—6:29 p. m.⁴⁸]

97. The lawyers representing the several powers have been meeting during the past week with a view to agreeing upon provisions of the treaty to regulate use of submarines in warfare.

Proposal has been made by us to adopt text of the first four articles, generally known as the Root resolutions, of treaty regulating use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare which all powers at Washington Conference in 1922 signed and which was subsequently ratified by all with exception of France.⁴⁹

Being unable to obtain abolition of submarines we desired to obtain the most effective attainable restriction of their use. The best way to accomplish our object seemed to us to propose adoption of the first four articles of the 1922 submarine treaty on account of prestige they have derived from their acceptance by the Washington Conference, and from their ratification by the Senate of the United States and by the constitutional authorities of three of the other four powers.

It now seems clear, as a result of the preliminary discussions, that the French will not agree to article III of our proposal making pro-

⁴⁸ Telegram in three sections.

⁴⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. 1, p. 267.

who violate rules set forth in article I; and further that the French will not agree to article IV, which prohibits use of submarines as commerce destroyers as between the parties to the treaty.

The following clause has been proposed by the French representatives: "In operations against merchant vessels, submarines are bound to conform to the rules of international law which govern surface war vessels."

Our articles I, II, and IV might be acceptable to Italy, but objection is made to article III, which provides for punishment. The French clause quoted above is preferred by Italy to our article I.

Probably Japan would accept the four articles of the 1922 treaty as we have proposed, although the Japanese do not like article III. They may also have some suggestions in the way of verbal alterations.

Great Britain is willing to accept all four articles of the 1922 submarine treaty, but does not feel that article IV will be a real deterrent. The British think, moreover, that France cannot be induced to accept more than articles I and II.

My strong personal feeling is that the French proposal will be much less effective than articles I and II would be, in that the clause proposed would not make clear exactly what the rules of war required and, as a result, in the event of another war, it would not so strongly and promptly crystallize the public opinion of the world against possible submarine abuses. See speech by Mr. Elihu Root in support of articles I and II.⁵⁰ My personal inclination also is to favor article III, but I am keeping my mind open as to possible improvement.

If possible, I wish that you would consult Mr. Root and Mr. John Bassett Moore⁵¹ and then give me the benefit of their views, as well as of your own, on the following questions:

1. Do you agree that articles I and II of the 1922 submarine treaty are a more desirable form of statement than is the proposed French clause?

2. Is inclusion of article III essential? Some hold opinion that the prescription of punishment of an individual for act ordered by his Government would not have much preventive effect.

3. In event that the number of powers participating in the submarine treaty were reduced from five to three, would you think desirable the inclusion of article IV, which prohibits use of submarines as commerce destroyers as between the three powers while other powers

⁵⁰ *Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 268.

⁵¹ Experts in international law. Mr. Root had been Secretary of State, 1905-1909; Mr. Moore had been Counselor of the Department of State, 1913-1914.

are not bound by this prohibition unless it be by later accession to the treaty? This last question is not to be considered from the standpoint of national policy but from that of the enforceability of articles I and II.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/728 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOKYO, March 3, 1930—2 p. m.
[Received March 3—7:52 a. m.]

35. Repeat to London.⁵²

Telegram dated London, March 2, to the Tokyo *Nichi Nichi*:

"According to information gathered in various quarters, the Reed-Matsudaira conversations cover a discussion of the building of large cruisers after 1936. If the United States should increase its fleet to 18 after 1936, the United States would apparently be prepared to allow Japan to build one more large cruiser. It is believed that the United States proposes that until 1936 she should have 16 such cruisers. It is also receiving attention [that] the United States has proposed that with regard to submarines the United States should retain 60,000 tons and Japan about 50,000 tons."

Telegram dated March 1 from Dentsu Press Agency:

"The following is one of the important features of the proposal submitted by Mr. Reed to Mr. Matsudaira during the meetings which have been held since the 27th ultimo between these two delegates:

'Assuming that the United States were prepared to reduce the number of its 10,000 ton 8-inch cruisers and built instead a certain number of 9,000 ton cruisers armed with 6-inch guns, would Japan be satisfied with its present strength in 8-inch cruisers?'

It cannot be determined whether or not the foregoing is a definitive proposal; but the American naval authorities have been conducting investigations into the efficiency of 6-inch guns and are of the opinion that cruisers mounted with guns of this caliber could be profitably employed; in the light of which fact it is highly probable the report of Mr. Reed having made the foregoing proposal is correct."

For my confidential information I should be glad to know something of the nature of Reed's tentative proposals.

CASTLE

500.A15a3/728 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Castle)

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1930—1 p. m.

41. I have repeated your 35 to London as I do not know the answer.
COTTON

500.A15a3/731 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 3, 1930—6 p. m.
[Received March 3—5:36 p. m.⁵⁸]

103. For the President and the Acting Secretary of State. Your telegram No. 154, February 28, 5 p. m. The possibility of making any treaty may ultimately depend upon the question of political security and it may well become pivotal. I am sending this estimate of the situation on to you so that you may be fully prepared in case the necessity for quick decisions occurs. The French, we hear, will return to London next Thursday and the events will then undoubtedly move quickly. This is merely to prepare you for all eventualities and in laying the possibility of last measures before you, I do not mean to paint too dark a picture.

The French, at their last meeting before Tardieu left, demanded ten new and two old, 8-inch cruisers. MacDonald was not willing to concede any old ones and only seven new ones, which was one more than the British Admiralty advised. They had not reached the difficulties regarding the submarine program. Thus far no argument has made any impression upon the Italians, who are unyielding in their insistence upon parity with France. If Great Britain would offer them some kind of security in the Mediterranean, they could make concessions, they have privately indicated to us. The public anxiety and feeling against France suddenly aroused here by her demands is the serious factor in the situation and I am of the opinion that if France persists in her program MacDonald may find himself eventually unable to carry through even a three-power treaty on the basis of our present tentative agreement with a clause similar to article 21 of the Washington Treaty. MacDonald has stated that if necessary he is in favor of such a three-power treaty but it is

now agreed upon between us or to remain entirely free. The following is the situation as to security proposals: The British originally declined to give a guaranty pact for the Mediterranean. Informally the British suggested a consultative Mediterranean Pact, but the French were of the opinion that it added nothing to the Covenant of the League of Nations. An alternative form of agreement along the lines of the Locarno Covenant⁵⁴ has been informally submitted by the French, and this alternative form of agreement is still under discussion between France and Great Britain. I have informed both Great Britain and France that, whether consultative or guaranty, America would not join in such a pact.

Briand has suggested on two occasions that eventually he would wish to discuss with me an amendment to the Kellogg Pact, a matter which had been broached last summer in conversations between Claudel and me.^{54a} I told him that I should be glad to talk the whole matter over with him after these naval negotiations have ended. It is my surmise, though Briand has said nothing, that they will propose something in the nature of a *quid pro quo* for reductions in naval armament in the shape of an amendment to the Kellogg Pact. These are reasons why France might readily believe such a proposition on her part reasonable: (1) Because the need of additional machinery in the pact was brought up by me last summer, although what I had in mind was an investigative rather than a consultative clause; and (2) because the same suggestion for a consultative clause such as Briand now has in mind was made by Chief Justice Hughes last April.⁵⁵

As you know, it is suggested by your cable that the proposal is being urged by the French indirectly through the press and otherwise. Our information is that the Locarno proposal is still under discussion and this proposal is much more according to France's wish. The danger to the naval treaty in the Senate, should any political agreement be presented as a condition, is recognized.

It does not seem to me, however, that the Kellogg Pact suggestion is inherently objectionable and if France should bring it forward its presentation to the Senate would almost necessarily have to be at a different time and as a different matter from the naval treaty, since much time for its negotiation with the other signatories would be required. I think, therefore, it should be given most careful consid-

⁵⁴ Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, signed at Locarno on October 16, 1925, by Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. LIV, p. 289.

^{54a} See "Informal Suggestions for Further Implementing the Treaty for the Renunciation of War," *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, pp. 59 ff.

⁵⁵ Speech delivered by Charles Evans Hughes, President of the American Society of International Law, at the twenty-third annual meeting of the Society, Washington, April 24, 1929.

eration before rejection, should the point be reached where it offered the only solution to a complete failure of the Conference. The relations of the French with us make it easily possible to bring forward any such proposition directly and they should not be forced to use propaganda, and I am quite in harmony with the President's refusal to give attention to attempts made indirectly to get from him a pronouncement on the subject.

If the question of security arises when the French return, I plan, first, to encourage the making by the Mediterranean powers of a satisfactory pact among themselves; and, second, to urge the consultative features of article 21 of the Washington Treaty upon the French. These would probably have to be introduced into any new treaty in order to assure them of consultation with America as to naval problems which may in the future arise. The British will not consent to a three-power treaty if none of these steps are sufficient to save the treaty from failure. May I have the President's views as to how far a Conference resolution calling upon all the signatories of the Kellogg Pact for a consultative amendment to that pact can be supported by us? I append, in order that a full background of the matter may be before the President, a draft of the proposed treaty drawn up by us but which has been withheld awaiting a favorable opportunity to bring it forth at a time when final differences may be bridged by it. It has been shown to both MacDonald and Tardieu, but they have not been given copies. They are inclined to favor it. The consultative feature of article III has already been approved by the Senate, having been copied exactly from article 21 of the Washington Treaty. Here follows the present draft:⁵⁶

"Article I. The contracting powers recognize the sovereign right of each power to determine for itself the amount and kind of naval armament necessary for its defense. They also recognize that in order to prevent competition in armaments and the international suspicion inseparable therefrom it is essential that each power in exercising its right should endeavor to adopt such a program of naval armament as will not alarm the other powers or be regarded by any of them as a menace, and such as to effect reduction of its naval armament to the lowest point consistent with national safety.

Article II. The programs of naval armament for the period ending December 31, 1936, herein below set forth have been adopted in accordance with the principles stated above. They are not intended to define the relative maritime interests of the several contracting powers.

Program of the United States of America:
Program of the British Empire:
Program of France:
Program of Italy:
Program of Japan:

⁵⁶ Quoted draft treaty not parenthesized.

Article III. The contracting powers agree not to exceed the programs herein set forth during the period ending December 31, 1936; provided, however, that if during the term of the present treaty the requirements of the national security of any contracting power in respect of naval defense are, in the opinion of that power, materially affected by any change of circumstances, the contracting powers will, at the request of such power, meet in conference with a view to the reconsideration of the provisions of the treaty and its amendment by mutual agreement.

Article IV. If at such conference a mutual agreement of the five contracting powers is not reached as to the amendment of the provisions of this treaty, then the power which has requested such conference may give six months' notice to the other contracting powers of its intention to alter its program and will inform the other powers of the exact nature of such alterations. Upon the expiration of said six months said power shall be free to alter its program accordingly. Upon receipt of such notice each of the other contracting powers, absolves itself from the obligations of this treaty and in such case may alter its program as it may determine for itself."

STIMSON

500.A15a3/731a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1930—7 p. m.

167. [From the President.] Of course we are most anxious over the situation of the Conference. Due to French propaganda, the support of the American public is rapidly dividing. We could not hope to have the support of the war groups and we are rapidly losing support of the peace groups.

It appears to me that some vigorous leadership by the American group is needed. Unless France is prepared to take a real cooperative part we must prepare the way for three-power action, for it appears here that she has no intention of cooperating; and we must prepare for her isolation and assessment with responsibility.

Would you not consider making a definite proposal to the Conference, as a start, that parity should exist among all naval powers on destroyers and submarines, the latter at a maximum of 40,000 tons with an appropriate reduction, say 100,000 tons in destroyer fleets, both of these to be brought about prior to 1936 by obsolescence.

The following are the reasons:

1. Theory that the weaker naval powers do not need a large number of submarines unless they wish them for offensive purposes, because the submarine is the coast defense weapon for the weaker powers.

2. The American and British theory that we would be better off if submarines were abolished surely leads to the logic that we are proceeding to our objective if we can hold down the number of them.

3. Accomplishment of tonnage reduction is of great importance, economically.

4. It is important morally and the Conference would be saved from the present prospect of increasing world tonnage by attempts to limit instead of decreasing tonnage.

5. Parity should flatter Japan, France, and Italy. The responsibility will be placed squarely upon the shoulders of France for undermining the Conference should she oppose it. Japan and Italy should not oppose full parity and France would be isolated. It would restore confidence in this country back to the plane of our initial high purposes if such a position of the American delegation is made known and it would not seem necessary to await the return of the French delegation. The President submits the above.

COTTON

500.A15a3/731b : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1930—8 p. m.

168. [From the President.] Referring to the Department's telegram No. 154, February 28, 5 p. m., it is asserted here repeatedly and with assurance that you are personally in favor of expanding the Kellogg Pact by a Presidential declaration.

With regard to this question it is also asserted that the delegation is divided, and that Senator Robinson disapproves.

We do not believe either of these reports, but the agitation is assuming dangerous proportions, as witness the petition sent you this morning by the Foreign Policy Association. Such agitation will undoubtedly result in placing upon our shoulders the blame for the failure in relation to France.

From the beginning our assumption was that the Kellogg Peace Treaty marked a new era in international relations and that the provisions of this treaty warranted a reduction in strength by the naval powers of the world. Upon this thesis the whole Conference was launched and not upon the theory that before such a reduction could take place it would be necessary to have further political agreements. The Kellogg Pact would be repudiated if the Conference were

We are of the opinion that the American public in the end will resent French cooperation at the expense of expanding the Kellogg Pact and we are not disposed to expand it as the price of French cooperation. The objectives of such extension will be interpreted by our public as involving us directly in the politics of France for the purpose of giving them guarantees. The entanglement of political guarantees in these negotiations, though they may be indirect, is more dangerous than anything else to the whole American acceptance of results. We could expect only the most embarrassing and dangerous consequences if we were to make a declaration of what we believe to be the logical procedure under the Kellogg Pact in case of international controversy, under the present situation. If it were made at any other time than in connection with this Conference it might have no dangerous results.

The French, for instance, are bound to use it as a tangible justification for some action and this would in turn be proof to the people of this country of a dangerous involvement on our part with the Republic of France.

If any such political appendix is entered into by the Conference, Senator Robinson is being accepted by the Democratic Party to lead the opposition. Such a point of opposition would also be welcome to certain independent Republicans. I am of the opinion that even if the President were to make any coincidental declaration that could be interpreted as such a policy there would not be the remotest possibility of ratifying a naval agreement. Such a declaration independent of any naval agreement which might be entered into might have the effect of an acceptance of the naval agreement by the Senate, but it would certainly result in a reservation or a resolution denying the authority or binding character of any such declaration in order to humiliate the President or to serve political purposes. In order that you might fully understand our next telegram, the President has sent you the foregoing.

COTTON

500.A15a3/731: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1930—7 p. m.

171. Your telegram No. 103, March 3.

1. Your position that the United States should join in no Mediterranean Pact but would not object to an agreement of this sort among other powers, is in accordance with our views.

2. In principle we accept articles 3 and 4 of the form of treaty

proposed by you, and we agree that they follow article 21 of the Washington Treaty fairly closely. We are confident, however, that it would be an improvement if you could amend the concluding phrase of your article 3 to read "meet in conference with a view to agreement on alteration of the programs of naval armament." We also suggest omitting the words "the amendment of the provisions" in the first sentence of your article 4, and substituting "alteration of programs" in their place. It is our purpose by these changes to emphasize that the Conference is not to be on political matters or to cover joint naval action, but merely to deal with programs of construction or scrapping armament. We want, in other words, such a clause to be definitely different from the one in the Four-Power Pacific Treaty, thus making it impossible to misunderstand the clause as one under which there might creep into being a new Holy Alliance of the Allied and Associated naval powers.

3. With regard to amending the Kellogg Pact, it is our feeling that it is due to the pact that the state of the world has been so far changed as to permit this Conference to bring about a reduction in arms now. The United States feels proud of its share in initiating the pact with France and does not desire to be mixed up in efforts to amend it which may not be understood by some of its signatories and which may seem to go too far to some of them. We would, nevertheless, if France so desires, agree to take up and explore, entirely separately from the naval treaty, the possibility of a general agreement by all nations to initiate investigation of controversies which have not otherwise been settled, thus making public opinion more effective. On the other hand, we cannot agree to consult as to other coercive sanctions or to consult only with the allied naval powers. An agreement of this sort would be so diluted and attenuated as to be of no real value to the French even for temporary political purposes unless there were an exaggeration of its meaning. It cannot, moreover, be doubted that opponents of naval reduction would exaggerate it as an excuse for belaboring the results of the London Conference if the naval treaty included any agreement for consultation or conference.

Mowrer's ⁶⁷ press reports and those of other correspondents close to Briand indicate that an all-round 25 percent cut in programs is likely to be proposed by the French. Such proposals are obviously put forward solely with a view to causing embarrassment and reinforcing in our mind the desirability of your taking some such action as indicated in our telegram of yesterday, No. 167.

We are not, as we see it, particularly interested in the size of the French fleet inherently, except in so far as it reflects on us through

boosting the British fleet, but it does seem to us that the Conference has reached a stage where our delegation is bound to be embarrassed by the French taking the offensive and raising serious disturbances in the United States, as they have already in various directions begun to do.

It seems to us from this distance improbable that there is any indication on the part of France of actually building a 725,000 ton fleet and that the British would be amply safe up to 1936 in proceeding with a program like the one we have outlined possibly even with such reduction in destroyers and submarines, and that a general provision that the British shall be free to take such steps as will give them protection in the event that the combined fleets of any two other powers, excepting the United States and Japan, shall exceed or threaten to exceed the British fleet.

Less even than France is Italy likely to build such a fleet and Britain would certainly be amply protected until 1936 under such an arrangement. It is not necessary to formulate in those terms the two-power condition.

The time has come, we strongly feel, for the American delegation to take the offensive against the French proposals by demanding a reduction in certain categories such as submarines and destroyers before the American public shall have become completely prejudiced against us through the French. The support of the American public would tend to be restored through any indicated demand on our part for limiting the tonnages now under discussion.

COTTON

500.A15a3/733 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 4, 1930—8 p. m.

[Received 9:11 p. m.⁵⁸]

107. Department's No. 163, March 3, 9 a. m.^{58a} Please transmit the following to Castle from Reed as the delegation's No. 27:⁵⁹

The present situation in its bearing upon Japan is substantially as follows. The American naval proposal⁶⁰ and the subsequent Japanese proposal,⁶¹ both made early in February, are the only formal proposals which have been submitted. There has been no recession on the part of either delegation from the positions outlined

⁵⁸ Telegram in two sections.

^{58a} See footnote 52, p. 35.

⁵⁹ Transmitted to the Embassy in Japan as Department's telegram No. 43,

in these proposals, which you have received and which have also been published.

In the effort to devise suggestions to get around the deadlock, I have held frequent and informal meetings with Matsudaira. It has been suggested, but the suggestion has not yet been approved by either delegation, that the construction of our eighteen 8-inch-gun ships should be so planned that the last three should be laid down in the years 1933, 1934, and 1935, respectively. By this procedure Japan would be assured that we shall not have actually in service more than fifteen ships to her twelve when the next Conference will convene. We have worked out this schedule in connection with the general naval study of the possibilities of completing the construction called for under the proposals now being discussed between the Japanese, the British and our delegation. This suggestion is not inconsistent with the Japanese position and appears to preserve the American position. There seems to be no substantial dispute in regard to cruisers carrying 6-inch guns, as the Japanese demands are not in excess of what we are prepared to allow. They ask 105,000 tons in destroyers as against 150,000 tons for the British and Americans. Ninety thousand for Japan is our maximum. In view of the great preponderance in destroyers which we now have this appears fair.

The British apparently acquiesce in the suggestion concerning submarines which has been made to the effect that Britain and America should scrap down to 60,000 while all submarines becoming 13 years old between now and 1936 should be scrapped by Japan, thus giving the Japanese on that date 52,000 tons. The Japanese appear willing to accept the proposal on capital ships which was outlined in our original proposition for immediate scrapping and a construction holiday, it being understood that no new battleships to match the *Rodney* would be built by America or Japan. The fact that unless an agreement is reached on auxiliaries there can be no battleship holiday has been impressed upon them. Unless we can get a comprehensive treaty now, the Washington schedule must be adhered to as our delegation and the Washington administration will not yield at this point nor do I believe the British will do so. This fact should be strongly impressed on the Tokyo authorities.

A minimum of new construction outlay by Japan and the least possible scrapping of ships, which she now has, are called for by the suggestions now under consideration. Japan would be given by these suggestions in the two classes, which are its principal concern, 72 percent in 8-inch cruisers and 87 percent in submarines in actual commissioned tonnage at the time of the 1935 Conference. Naturally, however, at the completion of construction then under way if no change were made in the 1935 Conference Japan would be at approximately 60 percent in 8-inch-gun tonnage. If the Japanese insist on a flat 70 percent it can lead only to a disruption of the Conference and will necessarily arouse alarm in America and the demand that the treaty forbidding fortification of Manila be terminated. Our argument to the Japanese here is that our generous offer to scrap capital ships and half our destroyer fleet clearly shows our pacific intentions. It developed last night in conversation with the British that they are willing to go as far as, but no further than, the suggestions which have been made, especially with regard to the

building of two additional 8-inch cruisers of 8,800 tons each by the Japanese. This proposal would clearly be cause for great alarm to Australia and New Zealand. It has been our effort to impress upon the Japanese that a large part of our cruiser, destroyer, and submarine fleet must remain in the Atlantic and at Hawaii and Panama. The Japanese would be given a clear supremacy over us in the Western Pacific by the suggestions we are now discussing. It is realized, I believe, by Ambassador Matsudaira that we have gone as far as it is possible to go in these suggestions and that even for this it will be difficult to get the unanimous approval of our delegation. Possibly Japan's naval officials think they can secure better terms by holding out, but you will be absolutely correct in assuring Tokyo officials that this is not the case, should the question be broached.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/734: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 4, 1930—9 p. m.

[Received March 4—8:20 p. m.]

108. For the President and the Acting Secretary of State. Your telegrams No. 167, March 3, 7 p. m., and No. 168, March 3, 8 p. m. Some of your inquiries have been answered in my telegram No. 103.^{61a} I am glad to learn from your telegram No. 167 that you are willing to have parity in destroyers and submarines. Provided it can be done without precipitating a break with France, which we are still hopeful of avoiding, I agree with you that the present situation needs a new expression of the high purposes with which you initiated this movement toward naval limitation. Ambassador Edge,⁶² who arrived today, is very confident that Tardieu and Briand will return to the Conference most anxious to reach an agreement. To reach any agreement, however, they regard some political pact as an essential condition. Morrow has been in continuous contact with Aubert,⁶³ who is the right-hand man of Tardieu during the interregnum, and Massigli,⁶⁴ who is the right-hand man of Briand. They are both hopeful that a satisfactory Mediterranean agreement can be reached with Great Britain and they assure him that the French desire to reach an agreement.

I am told that on Thursday Briand will be here to stay permanently and that MacDonald on Friday morning proposes to call the

^{61a} *Ante*, p. 36.

⁶² Walter E. Edge, American Ambassador in France.

end and possibly subsequent week ends.

In view of the fact that MacDonald is Chairman and host of the Conference I believe he is entitled to be consulted before a step is taken which may vitally affect its outcome, therefore your proposition could hardly be put forward publicly by us without full previous conference with him for we already have different tentative agreement. Furthermore, we are not in the position to be sure that a three-power agreement is possible, although I have for 10 days been pressing him on the subject.

We think the Japanese attitude as to cruisers less defensible than that of the French; they have been adhering very stubbornly to position which we cannot accept. I think you will see, for all these reasons, that before your suggestion can be carried out it will require time and opportunity. I have not had an opportunity to confer with the delegation today for I have a cold and am confined to my house at Stanmore. I shall, however, confer with them and also MacDonald as soon as possible. I am glad to have your suggestions.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/738a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1930—10 p. m.

178. Reference is made to your telegram No. 107, March 4, 8 p. m., and to our telegram No. 167, March 3, 7 p. m., regarding cuts in destroyer and submarine strength.

We would like to put the following before you merely for your consideration and without any final views on the subject:

(1) From our point of view a compromise with Japan giving her larger cruiser strength and reducing her strength in submarines and destroyers below present suggestions is a much less important concession than if the French were given any kind of direct or indirect political commitment.

(2) The Japanese fleet, assuming that it finally included 52,000 tons of submarines, 90,000 tons of destroyers, 6-inch cruisers in an amount which in your No. 107 is indicated as satisfactory to you, and with 8-inch cruisers in the amount even to that which in No. 107 you say is desired, would still be greatly inferior to the American fleet and no national anxiety as to our dominance in the Pacific in case of controversy need be caused by it.

COTTON

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 5, 1930—7 p. m.

[Received March 5—4:20 p. m.⁶⁵]

111. For the President and the Acting Secretary of State. Answering further your cables No. 167, and No. 171 to American delegation on March 3, 7 p. m., and March 4, 7 p. m., respectively. Both telegrams were carefully considered this morning by the delegation.

1. Your attitude regarding any proposal to amend the Kellogg Pact is clearly understood by us; it coincides entirely with our view. I have had a personal talk with MacDonald, since the arrival of your telegram; have explained to him our position on this matter; and have received his cordial agreement. We need not fear, therefore, that the British will add any pressure in support of such a proposal by France.

2. With regard to your submarine and destroyer-reduction proposal, contained in your telegram No. 167, the delegation is of the opinion that your suggestion with regard to an offer of parity at a very low figure in submarines may offer a valuable opportunity to improve our tactical situation. The whole delegation feels, however, that it cannot be done, without endangering the success of the Conference, before the French return to London. We will use it later after the Conference is under way and I have already begun to take such steps for its use.

I cannot explain at length at present but the delegation also felt that there were differences in the situation of the destroyer fleet which militated against taking a precisely similar situation as to destroyers.

3. MacDonald assured me today that he would go forward with the other powers in case the French would not join in an agreement. MacDonald is very anxious to make a four-power agreement, if possible, which would include Italy. We feel certain that Japan would not dare to remain out but in case they all prove obdurate he is willing to make a two-power agreement with us.

4. I am giving out tonight the following press statement in an attempt to relieve somewhat the pressure which is being brought upon you by peace supporters who are ignorant of the true situation: ⁶⁶

"There seems to be an impression that the work of the American delegation at this Conference is likely to result in an increase instead of a reduction in the tonnage of the navies of the world. The surest way to answer that is to give such results as seem to be within reach

⁶⁵ Telegram in two sections

up to date. The plan which in its essentials appears to be acceptable to America and Great Britain provides for a net reduction in the tonnage of the American fleet, in capital ships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines, built, building or appropriated for, of over 200,000 tons and an even larger reduction on the part of the British fleet. If vessels authorized but not commenced were included in existing fleets the amount of the reductions would be much greater.

Of course these reductions are contingent upon some reductions being made in the fleets of other powers."

STIMSON

500.A15a3/739a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1930—8 p. m.

175. For Senator Reed from Huntley.⁸⁷ Senator Moses told me today he does not share the view that a consultative treaty cannot be put through the Senate, and says that he does not see why anyone who subscribed to the Knox formula⁸⁸ in the League of Nations fight cannot support such a treaty if one should be signed as a by-product of the London Conference. Considering Moses' prominence in anti-League fight, this statement is very significant. Senator Watson says Fess sounded Senate key-note on Conference yesterday when, in the course of speech, he summarized administration achievements and reviewed Conference background.⁸⁹

The principal features relating to this Conference of this speech are:
[Here follows a summary of the speech.]

COTTON

500.A15a3/741a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1930—4 p. m.

181. I had a talk with Swanson and Borah, separately, today and I gave them a fair picture of my idea of the present situation of the Conference without showing them any of your cables. They both

⁸⁷ T. A. Huntley, secretary to Senator Reed.

⁸⁸ The form of reservation proposed by Senator Knox of Pennsylvania on November 6, 1919, for consent to the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles (*Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other-Powers, 1910-1923* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. III, p. 3329) in such terms as would make the United States a consulting member of the League of Nations; *Congressional Record*, vol. 58, pt. 8, p. 8000, pt. 9, p. 8742.

⁸⁹ Speech delivered by Simeon D. Fess, Senator from Ohio, on March 4, 1930; *Congressional Record*, vol. 72, pt. 5, p. 4666.

talked freely, although I told them I was not trying to commit them as to their views. Senator Borah stated that the best agreement would be with the five powers but a three-power agreement would be good. He also stated that a five-power agreement with any kind of a political pact would not be as good as a three-power agreement without a political pact. Borah stated that it is not so much the political pacts that he objects to but that the tonnage demands of France are impossible and France is behaving like a spoiled child. However, he is of the opinion that international trouble would more likely be created by a political pact than by giving Japan a couple of additional cruisers and France a great many more cruisers and submarines. Since he does not think they will build he does not care how many they have the right to build. Owing to the present conditions of the fleets and also the present trade conditions he cannot bring himself to fear Japan as an immediate potential enemy.

Swanson on the other hand dislikes political pacts and he fears the Senate's reactions and reservations on them. He would not consider a three-power agreement as bad. He does not like Japan and consequently does not want to give them much. On the whole, rather than political assurances and agreements, he would prefer to make concessions to France and Japan in cruisers.

COTTON

500.A15a3/741 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

TOKYO, March 7, 1930—9 p. m.

[Received March 7—12:40 p. m.⁷⁰]

39. To be repeated to Reed in London.⁷¹ I am grateful for your message, which was clear and interesting. I have been told by Shidehara that, with regard to your conversations, he had just received a personal message from Matsudaira. The figures were exactly those sent by you. This seemed extremely generous, I said, and if accepted by the delegations it surely was a basis for agreement. The several points were discussed and I made it very plain that the suggested revision of the capital ship program depended absolutely upon agreement on auxiliaries. He said, in regard to large cruisers, that since we were definitely allowed eighteen such an arrangement was a denial of the 10-7 ratio demanded by Japan. I told him that it seemed to leave the question open for the next Conference, and the fact that the requested ratio was more than maintained could be

⁷⁰ Telegram in two sections.

⁷¹ Transmitted to the American delegation as Department's telegram No. 184, March 7, 11 a. m.

established in public opinion prior to that time by the Japanese Government. If our last three cruisers could be postponed until 1935, he said that agreement would be simple, that then another cruiser might also be asked for by Japan. My answer was that Great Britain would certainly have something to say in this regard and that American public opinion was of equal importance with Japanese; that if these demands which seemed excessive were insisted upon by Japan very bad feeling in America would certainly be caused, something far more to be feared than an extra cruiser or two; also that he was mistaken in saying that eighteen cruisers was what we wanted, for actually our minimum had been twenty-one, and furthermore in reducing to eighteen we had made a great sacrifice, and that the only compromise could not certainly be limited to ourselves. Shidehara is, I believe, personally willing to accept American suggestions in regard to the cruiser question but fears the opposition of the Navy. The telegram has been shown to no Navy men by him.

The submarine question Shidehara considered the most difficult and asked the reason for our great opposition to submarines. Our belief, I said, was that submarines were bound to be used in the way they had been used by the Germans. Denying that Japan would ever so use them, he stated that they were wanted by the Japanese Navy only for coast defense, that ratio was not a matter of concern inasmuch as Japan could never be attacked by American submarines, but that a certain number for coast defense was estimated as necessary. Japan, he said, not only would be ready to sign the Washington submarine treaty but, since France would not agree that submarines could not even be used for visit and search of merchant vessels, would gladly sign a new treaty with the United States alone. The London arrangement, I pointed out, involved more than Japan and the United States, and France would be encouraged in its demands by the large submarine tonnage for Japan. We were not discussing ratio, I pointed out, but only whether Japanese submarines should be scrapped down to 52,000 tons when they reached 13 years of age. The United States was offering to scrap at once a large part of its submarine fleet.

He heartily concurred when I told him that it would be a tragedy if the Conference should be disrupted by Japanese insistence on 70 percent. There was a clear understanding that our talk was as informal as yours and Matsudaira's. The suggestion made as to the submarine treaty was the only new one. Any discussion of fortifications was avoided because anything in the nature of a threat is not only ineffective but dangerous when dealing with the Japanese . . .

Mr. Elihu Root to the Acting Secretary of State

NEW YORK CITY, March 7, 1930.

DEAR MR. COTTON: I have your letter of March 3rd⁷² enclosing the paraphrase of a cable despatch from Secretary Stimson saying that he would like my views upon three questions regarding the Washington treaty in relation to the use of submarines concluded February 6, 1922.

The first question is whether the first and second Articles of the Washington submarine treaty constitute a more desirable form of statement than the clause now proposed by the French in London, as follows:

"In operation against merchant vessels submarines are bound to conform to the rules of international law which govern surface war vessels."

My answer is a clear affirmative. The proposed French alternative is not merely a weaker statement but it is an abandonment of the chief and avowed purpose of the Washington provisions. That purpose is stated in Article Two of the Washington treaty in these words:

"so that there may be a clear public understanding throughout the world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents."

The rules of international law are known only to experts, who can always dispute about them indefinitely. Upon such a basis no clear public understanding can be reached and therefore no public condemnation can follow. If the French are unwilling to agree to the first two Articles, it would be infinitely better to have no treaty at all than to make a treaty in the form they propose, which would virtually be a retirement on the part of the United States, Great Britain, Italy and Japan from the statement of the rule and the effect of the rule contained in the treaty of Washington. About the only thing we could be sure of then would be that the statement of rules and the effect of them in the Treaty of Washington is not correct because all

⁷² Not printed; see telegram No. 97, February 28, 7 p. m., from the chairman of the American delegation, p. 33.

the nations which joined in making that statement have given it up.

As to Articles Three and Four the situation is entirely different. They propose new provisions not yet forming a part of international law, and their omission from the new treaty would merely indicate that general acceptance of those provisions had not been reached, which is, of course, true. I think, however, that if a new treaty were made on the subject there should be a clause which prevented the new treaty from impairing in any way the obligations of Articles Three and Four between the powers which have entered into them.

I should think that the French would understand that a refusal to agree to Article Four of the Treaty of Washington was notice to the world that she intends to use submarines as commerce destroyers and that her refusal to agree to Article One is notice to the world that she intends to be as free as possible from any application of the rules of international law in the use of submarines as commerce destroyers.

To be more specific, I do not think the inclusion of Article Three is essential.

I do not think it desirable to include Article Four in a treaty to be signed by only three powers. The provision limited to three powers would necessarily be futile and it would rather tend to confuse the application of Article One.

If there is anything more I can do or say let me know and I shall be glad to do what I can.

Faithfully yours,

ELIHU ROOT

500.A15a3/742 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 8, 1930—11 a. m.

[Received March 8—9:15 a. m.]

121. Your telegrams No. 177, March 5,^{72a} and No. 178, of March 5. We are making progress in our negotiations with Japan. We are close together and I believe that better results than in your telegram No. 178, March 5, can be had. Time, however, is necessary for such negotiations and no hurry is possible. There has been a basic change in the situation covered by your No. 178. Both the British Admiralty and Japan object to the 10,000-ton proposition and it is, therefore, not available. In addition serious aircraft carrier reduction is opposed by our entire delegation as well as Admiral Pratt, who has been most liberal on other matters; first, because the tonnage allotment of the Washington Treaty is probably low in proportion even to our proposed reduced fleet on account of the

development in aircraft in the last 10 years in which the American Navy has played a leading part; and second, because in the *Lewington* and *Saratoga* there is frozen a disproportionate amount of this tonnage and, since the expense of scrapping them would never be faced by Congress, there is practically no value in the theoretical suggestion of reserving a right to replace them. For a long time the matter has been carefully considered and we believe that to make a serious reduction without proportionate compensation would cripple the fleet in the feature in which it is most advanced. A slight reduction of 10,000 or 15,000 tons purely for moral purposes may eventually become possible but there is doubt even of that.

Yesterday the Kellogg Pact amendment was broached to me by Briand but my reply was that I considered such a suggestion wholly separate from the question of security in the Naval Conference and the subject was at once dropped by him.

I am informed by the British Government that they have practically abandoned the thought of giving any guarantee.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/743 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 8, 1930—2 p. m.
[Received March 8—11:40 a. m.]

122. The following to be repeated to Tokyo.⁷³ From Reed for the Ambassador.

With reference to your telegram (Department's No. 184, March 7, 11 a. m.),^{73a} we continued negotiations yesterday with Wakatsuki and today with Matsudaira. The matter of the application of 20,000 tons is now the narrow margin of difference. All possible concessions have been made by us. We have offered to allow the Japanese to retain 20,000 tons of cruisers over 20 years of age but without the right to replacement in order that we may give apparent compliance with the Japanese popular insistence on 70 percent. Spreading this 20,000 tons over various categories of modern ships is asked by the Japanese. This would be fought bitterly by our Navy people, as well as by the British Admiralty and Dominions, and I know that it

will not be acceptable to our delegation. The actual effective strength of the Japanese will always be in excess of 70 percent during the life of the treaty on account of the proposed spread of our building program over the 6-year period of contemplated treaty. It is hoped that this point will be conceded by the Japanese, for agreement seems impossible without this concession.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/782

Mr. John Bassett Moore to the Acting Secretary of State

WINTER PARK, FLORIDA, March 9, 1930.

[Received March 12.]

DEAR MR. COTTON: Your letter of the 3d inst. has just reached me.⁷⁴ I left New York on February 28th and have been traveling.

I have not read the Washington Submarine treaty since February 1923, and no copy of it is now at hand; but, speaking from memory, it is my impression that the proposed French substitute for Articles 1 and 2 may be taken to imply what those articles prescribe in detail. I therefore assume that France would not hold out against those articles, although she might desire some changes in specifications or in phraseology.

Article 3 I have never myself been able to regard as sound or as practicable. The word "piracy" has been and still is popularly and promiscuously used as an epithet to render odious things done on land as well as on the sea. Take, for instance, the phrase "literary piracy." But, to assume to classify and to punish as piracy acts done by individuals under public authority is contrary to the elementary legal conception of the pirate as a person who cruises and commits acts [not] authorized by a recognized government. The article, in my opinion, is also incapable of just and effective execution, and, if its enforcement were attempted, would inevitably lead to reprisals.

The retention of the submarine as a commerce destroyer seems logically to exclude article 4. The distinctive advantage claimed for the submarine, as a fighting machine, is, I believe, that it is the most effective means of discharging torpedoes, especially at battleships. If there has been any proposal to abolish the use of torpedoes for offensive purposes, I have overlooked it.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN B. MOORE

⁷⁴ Not printed; see telegram No. 97, February 28, 7 p. m., from the chairman of the American delegation, p. 33.

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 10, 1930—8 p. m.

[Received 8:40. p. m.]

126. For the President and the Acting Secretary of State. I took Morrow with me on Saturday morning and had a conference with Henderson. Henderson and Briand, I had learned, were about to meet and I wished Henderson to know clearly the American position in opposition to the consultative pact. A definite and clear statement of this was made to him. This precaution was a fortunate one, as it developed that he felt quite differently from MacDonald and such a pact had even been drafted by him.

That afternoon I had tea at Stanmore with Briand and Léger, with Morrow present, and had a long talk with them. I then told them that I had reached the conclusion that any blending of a successful naval treaty and the Kellogg Pact now would be disastrous to both; that I was a friend of both. I gave them a full and careful explanation of my position on the modification of the Kellogg Pact, filling in fully the background since last summer when the subject was first broached; and my reasons for the conclusion which I had reached. I told him why the papers in America relied on by him did not represent real public opinion on the subject and explained fully to him the situation as to that public opinion. The interview, which was long and friendly, terminated in his telling me that the matter was ended so far as he was concerned and that he fully understood my position.

Briand and Massigli had a long conference at Chequers on Sunday with Henderson and the Prime Minister, as I was told by the Prime Minister today. He had overruled Henderson, so he told me, on the subject of a consultative pact. The interview with Briand, he said, had been long and friendly, and any idea which Briand had had of a guarantee of military assistance was ended. The Prime Minister hoped that through some other formula an agreement with the French could still be worked out. He is thinking of inserting a preamble in the proposed naval treaty which would recite and reaffirm the Kellogg Pact as to the renunciation of war. The following sentence from the joint statement made at Rapidan⁷⁵ might possibly serve as the basis for such a preamble:⁷⁶

"After full consideration our Governments resolve to accept the peace pact not only as a declaration of good intentions but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge."

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Negotiations between the French and the British were resumed today, with Morrow, Robinson and myself present. This session later merged into a session of a subcommittee, which lasted all day and will continue tomorrow, for the purpose of analyzing the British-French figures. Morrow was present.

Morrow and I believe that a purely consultative pact would not help in reducing France's figures, unless the French people would falsely conceive such a pact to imply that we would give military assistance against an aggressor, and it seems to us that what France really wants is a security pact of mutual military assistance against an aggressor. We are convinced, in other words, that American newspapers such as the *Baltimore Sun*, the *World*, and the *New York Times*, which have been attacking the President for not favoring a purely consultative pact, are wrong in their belief that France would be satisfied with such a pact.

Reed, aided by me, has been carrying on negotiations with the Japanese contemporaneously with the foregoing negotiations. The negotiations with the Japanese are very tedious, as the Japanese, evidently in an endeavor to satisfy internal dissensions in their delegation, are bringing to us recurrent propositions which they know we will refuse; however, we believe we are slowly reaching a point of agreement with them which will be satisfactory.

The Italians remain noncooperative.

The reference to the Rapidan joint statement which the Prime Minister made last night in his broadcast was suggested to him by me in order that pressure on the President might be relieved by giving evidence that the Prime Minister did not expect America to cooperate in affairs in Europe.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/744 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American
Delegation (Stimson)*

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1930—4 p. m.

198. Just had a consultation regarding your telegram No. 126, March 10. There is no comment. The course which you are pursuing is all right; we do not well see how you could take any other.

If the information leaked out that what France wanted is a security pact of mutual military action against an aggressor and that a purely consultative pact would not help in reducing her figures, it might be helpful to public opinion here. It is impossible, of course,

to do that here. The reporters who are supposed to represent the views of Briand give just the opposite impression in American papers. However, you will have to decide whether to follow this suggestion. You will understand that it is only a suggestion.

COTTON

500.A15a3/721 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1930—5 p. m.

199. Your telegram No. 97, February 28, 7 p. m.

[Here follows the substance of Mr. Root's letter of March 7, printed on page 51.]

We have not yet heard from Mr. Moore. My feeling is that articles III and IV, to which Mr. Root refers, are of even less importance than he views them. To me, article III always seemed and still seems definitely unwise. I cannot imagine that a naval officer in command of a submarine would be affected by it in the least and I certainly do not believe in post-war trials. I should not think that it would be necessary to insert the clause he suggests preventing a new treaty from impairing in any way the obligations under articles III and IV of the powers which have entered into them. I agree with Mr. Root that inclusion of article IV in a three-power treaty is not desirable, and I do not regard it as essential in a five-power treaty.

With regard to articles I and II, I agree with Mr. Root that they are far better than the proposed French clause, but I would not agree that these articles could not be changed or modified in expression to meet the wishes of any of the powers; but because of its vagueness, the particular French expression seems to me very objectionable.

COTTON

500.A15a3/747 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 12, 1930—6 p. m.

[Received March 12—5:25 p. m.]

128. Your No. 198, March 11, 4 p. m. I had already had a conference with the press yesterday afternoon at which time I explained our position to them as to political pacts. I pointed out that America is already a party to many pacts which make consultations obligatory and that our objection to a consultative pact was not because of

its nature; that it was because the French would naturally feel, under the circumstances in which the proposed pact is presented, that it is an equivalent for their abandoned naval strength and they may claim reimbursement in kind in an emergency. All our best American reporters were present and they expressed themselves as understanding our position and as much gratified at having it explained to them.

MacDonald will not resign, though he lost an important vote in the House of Commons last night. His position has caused us some apprehension for some time for fear of a possible slip-up. It is quite possible that the Conservative leaders, though they are anxious to permit him to finish the Conference, might, by accident, lose control of their own followers.

I have come to the conclusion that both for the reason of the possible eventuality just mentioned and as a tactical maneuver against the delays which we are suffering from Japanese and French sources, we should proceed, therefore, with the drafting of a two-power treaty with Great Britain. I discussed the matter with MacDonald this morning, and he agreed with me. He also told me that he had specific information that the delays we have encountered during the past week with the Japanese were instigated by the French. Consequently, I had a conference with Wakatsuki this morning; after some further futile negotiations over figures, I told him that the adverse vote in the House of Commons last night had troubled me greatly, and that I was proceeding to close up with MacDonald. Although my statement was made under the usual pledge of secrecy, what I said will probably leak out and I advise you of it so that you may be prepared to back us up at home.

The proposed two-power treaty might cover all categories but carry a provision that the sections which relate to reductions under the Washington Treaty would not become effective unless and until a treaty with Japan is made by both Great Britain and the United States to cover all categories of fleets. An immediate treaty for a battleship equivalent or reduction between the British and ourselves would be just what the Japanese would most like, of course, as it would permit them to economize on battleship replacements and yet leave them free to proceed with their auxiliary construction.

Negotiations between Alexander for the British and Dumesnil⁷⁷ for the French with reference to the respective fleet figures are continuing, with Morrow sitting in. Alexander has been patient in handling the situation and has spoken very plainly to the French, but the latter are unyielding. Last evening he made them the offer

of 66,000 tons in submarines, that figure being the amount remaining in 1936 if they ceased all new construction. Dumesnil stated in reply that such figures were not even inside the zone of possible negotiation.

Tardieu is coming to London for the week end.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/747 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1930—2 p. m.

207. Your telegram No. 128, March 12, 6 p. m.

(1) In regard to situation which has developed at the Conference, we agree, of course, that a two-power pact is better than nothing, but that a three-power pact would be very much stronger in all its implications. A serious question arises as to whether at the right moment, no doubt later on, we would not make some intermediate concession to the Japanese to bring them into the pact.

(2) We should also like to have your view as to whether the moment has not arrived when the President should issue a public notice in the nature both of an appeal and a definition of the American position. The reasons for the disavowal of a political pact under the setting staged by the French have appeared in the press here, but it would be desirable to have them formally and extensively rammed home to the American public. The pronouncement might be in the nature of an appeal for reduction and limitation, stating that these negotiations were undertaken in consequence of the Kellogg Pact, which is already a security pact of the first order; also a strong statement might be added on necessities of the world in the matter of naval arms. Then possibly a statement might be included to the effect that upon some entirely separate occasion when there could be no connection with question of French naval armament, the Government of the United States would be prepared to take part, as occasions arise, in investigatory processes, which would be for the general purpose of establishing public opinion but for no purpose of sanctions.

If it is your belief that such a statement as sketched would be advantageous, it is highly desirable that you formulate broad lines of it and send it to us.

(3) We assume that you still expect to draft a five-power treaty on humanization of use of submarines; in that regard, it does not seem to us to be important whether or not departure from the form of the Washington Treaty be made, nor do we believe that articles III and IV of that treaty are of real importance.

*The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting
Secretary of State*

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 13, 1930—3 p. m.

[Received March 13—1:05 p. m.]

133. To be repeated to Tokyo.⁷⁸

The following is the present situation: We have stood firm against allotting more than 108,400 tons of 8-inch-gun cruisers to Japan but our offer has been to defer until 1933, 1934, and 1935, respectively, the laying down of our last three cruisers. The offer of the Japanese has been to limit their 8-inch-gun cruisers to twelve in number, but they requested the privilege before 1936 of replacing the *Furutaka* class with 10,000-ton ships. Reed was told by Matsudaira that this had been suggested by you in Tokyo and in Washington. Reed's reply was that there must have been a misunderstanding.

We have stood fast at the present Japanese tonnage of 98,415 tons of 6-inch cruisers except when we agreed, in a talk between Stimson and Wakatsuki on Wednesday, to ascertain what view regarding a possible increase of Japanese 6-inch cruisers to 108,000 tons would be held by our Navy. Having discovered the bitter opposition of the Navy and the majority of our delegates to this increase, we are informing the Japanese delegates of its impossibilities today.

The Japanese appear satisfied with 97,500 tons of destroyers and the allotment of this much is agreeable to us.

Reed has held out in talks with Matsudaira for 60,000 tons of American submarines against 52,700 tons of Japanese, but yesterday in the Stimson-Wakatsuki talk it was intimated that parity at 52,700 might be acceptable. The Japanese would be satisfied with this we believe.

Particularly with regard to the French is the Conference situation at this moment critical. If Japan cannot agree with us within a few days, MacDonald has agreed with Stimson that we will prepare a two-power treaty establishing parity with Great Britain and America in auxiliary categories of fleets by which competitive building in them would be ended. The battleship program of the Washington Treaty will not be modified by this treaty since we will not do that unless by a treaty covering all categories in which Japan joins. You can readily see how favorable, in view of French difficulties, will be the public reaction in America and Great Britain if a three-power treaty covering all categories including battleships can be joined by Japan. An unfortunate effect correspondingly would

⁷⁸ Transmitted to the Embassy in Japan as Department's telegram No. 46, March 13, 2 p. m.

be caused by a Japanese refusal to join. It is essential to have an early decision.

That we have gone to the limit to accommodate Japan should be impressed upon Shidehara. The increase in speed limit of exempt vessels from 18 to 20 knots has been reluctantly agreed to by us. Maximum submarine displacement has been raised from 1,800 to 2,000 tons. Japan has been conceded the right to build two 5,000-ton minelayers in the special class, and we have agreed to allow her to retain in the special class for use as training ships five old cruisers of 43,690 tons. Parity in submarines and particularly 70 percent in 6-inch-gun cruisers has been agreed to by us. An agreement is impossible on the 70 percent ratio 8-inch-gun cruisers, as it would not be acceptable to Great Britain and our Senate. We can go no further.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/750 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 13, 1930—6 p. m.

[Received March 13—2:25 p. m.]

134. To be repeated to Tokyo.⁷⁰ Our telegram of March 13, 3 p. m.

An agreement was reached with Wakatsuki and Matsudaira in further conversation with the Japanese this afternoon that the following limits for Japan will be recommended to their delegation and to Tokyo: 8-inch, 108,400; 6-inch, 100,450; destroyers, 105,500; submarines, 52,700. This will mean 60 percent in 8-inch, 70 in 6-inch, 70 in destroyers, and submarine parity. We have agreed to make the same recommendation to the British as well as to our delegation and to Washington. A reservation will be inserted by Japan to the effect that after the expiration of the treaty she may claim that 10,000-ton cruisers will replace the *Furutaka* class in 1943. A statement reserving the right to oppose this claim if then made will be signed by us.

STIMSON

⁷⁰ Transmitted to the Embassy in Japan as Department's telegram No. 47, March 13, 3 p. m.

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1930—3 p. m.

211. Your telegram No. 134, March 13, 6 p. m. We approve your recommendation to Japan.

COTTON

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 14, 1930—3 p. m.

[Received March 14—2:10 p. m.]

136. For the President and the Acting Secretary of State. Your No. 207, March 13, 2 p. m.

1. Probably as result of my statement to Wakatsuki on Wednesday relative to a two-power pact, negotiations with the Japanese moved forward yesterday and culminated in an agreement supported by all our delegation and by the majority of Japanese delegation (see our telegram No. 134, last night). Settlement was submitted by us last evening to the British and approved by them. Wakatsuki and Matsudaira have agreed to use their earnest efforts to have it approved at Tokyo.

In view of the difficulties of negotiation we think this settlement very satisfactory. Admiral Pratt highly approves. By it the Japanese are held down to their existing construction of eight cruisers; they are allowed only about 2,000 tons additional 6-inch cruiser construction; their existing destroyer fleet is reduced by 17,000 tons and their submarine fleet is reduced to amount which it will reach in 1936 by obsolescence without any additional construction.

2. Alexander, Henderson, and Dumesnil on Wednesday afternoon reported to full committee on the negotiations as to the fleet figures of the British and the French. The committee was composed of the foregoing, with the addition of MacDonald for the British and Briand and Massigli for the French. Robinson, Morrow, and I sat in. Nothing came from the meeting but discouraging counter statements. The French adhered to their high figures and Dumesnil made unyielding statements of the absolute needs of the French. A tense atmosphere pervaded the meeting, and I said nothing as I

was afraid that the French might feel that our opposition amounted to a virtual combination with Britain. In all Conference circles on that evening there was great pessimism and Briand issued a pessimistic statement which indicated the impossibility of obtaining a substantial five-power treaty.

Morrow and I called on Briand and Dumesnil yesterday morning, at which time I stated as forcibly as possible our views on the impression which would be made on the American public by their figures. In an endeavor to maintain the friendly relations which we have had with the French and at the same time to impress them with the serious effect which would be produced upon relations with America by their attitude, I had made this statement the most carefully thought out one that I had yet made. At once Briand abandoned the assertions of absolute needs made by Dumesnil and limited himself to arguments which had as their basis relativity with Italy and the latter's stubborn position. Briand showed a much more hopeful attitude at the close of the conference and it found us joined in an effort to find means of accord with Italy.

3. Grandi,⁸⁰ in the meantime, had been worked upon by MacDonald, who reported to me that afternoon that Grandi had made some slight concessions toward giving figures for examination. At the close of the day a much more hopeful attitude prevailed than at the close of the previous day. There is much dependent on Tardieu's visit tomorrow.

During the conference Briand admitted that he had not expected me to yield to his suggestion of America's joining a consultative pact, but that he had made the application because he had been directed to do so. The possibility of securing a five-power pact which will be successful depends upon two things: (1) our ability to induce Italy to make some statement as to her needs; and (2) the possibility which still exists that Britain may give France some material assurance which would induce France to reduce her figures.

4. I think that a statement from the President along general lines suggested in our No. 128, March 12, 6 p. m., would possibly help. The delicate and critical situation may change with Tardieu's arrival. Will send suggestions as to what we think would be most likely to help situation here, after consultation with delegates, if it should be desired to make the statement.

STIMSON

⁸⁰ Dino Grandi, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and head of the Italian delegation.

The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

TOKYO, March 14, 1930—6 p. m.

[Received March 14—7:07 a. m.]

44. Please repeat to London.⁸¹ A personal suggestion made to you last February was the only reference I have ever made to the possibility of eventual replacement of the *Furutaka* class by 10,000-ton cruisers. It has never been mentioned here by me because I have never deviated from the original American program, except when conversing with Shidehara as fully reported in my telegram No. 39, March 7, 9 p. m., when I urged the generosity of Reed's attitude and stated that I was sure the limit of concession had been reached by the United States. This evening I will see Shidehara.

CASTLE

500.A15a3/760 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 17, 1930—6 p. m.

[Received March 17—4:23 p. m.]

140. (1) A five-hour conference took place at Chequers yesterday between the French and British delegations. The true results of the situation are difficult to appraise, but Dawes and Morrow, both of whom have known Tardieu in past negotiations, share my impression that he hopes eventually to make a five-power agreement.

Tardieu is very stubborn in regard to his figures and is making great efforts to persuade both the British and us to help him to bring Italy down to a sufficient margin of naval inferiority. Whether he is doing this for domestic politics only or whether it masks some international order between the two nations, I am not yet able to determine. As our work progresses, the situation may be clarified. The French have stated the amount of tonnage superiority they demand over the Italians, and by taking old tonnage into consideration it is not impossible that such a tonnage superiority may be worked out from the *status quo*. Aside from this, however, Italy is trying to force France to concede formal naval parity, while

⁸¹ Transmitted to the American delegation as Department's telegram No. 209, March 14, 10 a. m.

France is trying to force Italy to concede formal naval inferiority. Neither can hope to win this issue, yet neither one will yield.

MacDonald and I are trying to suggest some formula of mutual reservations and agreement upon a *modus vivendi* which is not to represent real maritime interests. I believe that if any solution is reached, it will be along some such line as this. I am assuming in all of this, however, that there is no secret military issue involved, and as to that I am not yet sure.

(2) In further answer to your No. 207, March 13, 2 p. m., I have consulted the delegation, and we are clearly of the opinion that the situation would not be helped on this side by any Presidential statement. We are strongly opposed to any appeal, either here or at home, for reduction. Assuming that Japan ratifies the Japanese agreement, we shall have accomplished a three-power settlement which should receive, we believe, the hearty approval of the President and of the American public. When it was submitted to the President in February (our telegram No. 35, February 4), its adoption received his hearty approval. For him now to appeal for reduction would give, almost inevitably, the impression that he is in sympathy with the recent criticism of the pacifist press, which has of necessity been ignorant of the details of the settlement and of the difficulties against which we have labored. A result of that sort would be most unfair to the delegation.

As far as a statement regarding the consultative pact is concerned, my decision has been expressly accepted by both Briand and Tardieu, and accordingly there is no reason for such a statement here. The matter is no longer an issue in the Conference. The press summaries received from you seem to indicate that my statement has been accepted fairly well by the American press, even papers like the *Times* and the *World*, their former attitude being taken into consideration; but if the President wishes to ram home the subject still further, I perceive no great objection, from this end of the line, to doing so, except for the danger which always exists in stirring up a dead issue. It is our general impression that it would be better to withhold all Presidential statements until our negotiations are concluded, when a statement from him will undoubtedly be very helpful in bringing home the character of such a settlement as we may accomplish and the reasons for it.

STIMSON

The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

Tokyo, March 18, 1930—3 p. m.

[Received March 18—9:05 a. m.]

48. Please repeat to London.⁸² There was published last night a statement alleged to have been made by the Japanese Navy Department which has undoubtedly been repeated to London. The statement gives fairly accurately the figures of the tentative agreement but it interprets them most unfairly and would appear to be intended to make difficult Japanese official consent. The final paragraph reads as follows:⁸³

"The latest American proposal constitutes a concession in appearance but in contents it still adheres to its own contentions. Due to ignorance of this fact or due to propaganda for some ulterior purpose, reports are being circulated to the effect that the United States has recognized Japan's demand. This gives the people of Japan exceedingly erroneous information. The Japanese Navy by no means accepts such a proposal."

The Vice Minister of the Foreign Office, Yoshida, said that Shidehara immediately telephoned the Vice Minister of the Navy, who, it is stated, knows nothing of the statement and will issue a denial that it was of an official nature. The Vice Minister believes that some person in the "big navy" group gave out the statement. The papers are absolutely incorrect in alleging that the Premier passed on the statement. As the denials never have the effect of the original statement, the Foreign Office is very angry, for this makes its task more difficult. I told him that it utterly discouraged me when I saw it because it looked like a failure in London by which relations for years would be embittered. Without an agreement in London, I reminded Yoshida, the cruiser law presumably would be carried out as it stood. They knew this, he said, and Baron Shidehara was preparing a strong statement to be presented at the Friday meeting of the Cabinet. The necessity for prompt and favorable decision was again urged by me since the limit of concession has been reached by the United States. Anything further, I reminded him, would probably not in any case be acceptable to Great Britain since the question is by no means solely between the United States and Japan. Then he desired to know whether I believed England would sign a three-power treaty with the figures which the delegations have agreed to recommend to their Governments, if France persisted in the stand which it has taken. He was informed that I naturally

⁸² Transmitted to the American delegation as Department's telegram No. 225, March 18, 9:20 a. m.

could not interpret British views but that it appeared probable to me that Great Britain would accept either of them if a political clause calling for further discussion in case the French construction program became menacing, were added. I do not believe that the situation here is as bad as has been made out by the papers.

CASTLE

500.A15a3/762 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 19, 1930—5 p. m.

[Received March 19—1:03 p. m.]

145. In an effort to bring matters to a head, we are holding conferences constantly. However, there are no further definite results that I can report at this time. I learned on Monday through Japanese delegation representative that the French were endeavoring to get the Japanese to raise their figures regarding submarines. Castle in Tokyo confirmed this later. This effort was reported to us by a representative of the Japanese delegation and we together with the British are taking steps to accelerate this tentative agreement by the Japanese Government at Tokyo. We are still hopeful that the Japanese Government will ratify our tentative agreement without any substantial alterations but our informant here thinks that there is a real controversy between Japanese civil government and the naval party there.

As to whether the French are merely protecting their position to maintain their present high tonnage figures or whether they are making an effort to break up the Conference, there is a difference of opinion here. We are doing our utmost to combine patience with energy in bringing the situation to a focus. We are inclined toward the former hypothesis but we are not neglecting to prepare ourselves against the latter.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/765 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 19, 1930—7 p. m.

[Received March 19—5 p. m.]

147. The following as substitute for subdivisions 1 and 2 of article 1 of submarine treaty was suggested by Malkin, legal adviser of British Foreign Office: ⁸⁴

vessels are subject;

2. In particular except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on summons, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink a merchant vessel without having first placed the passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this reason the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board."

Mr. Root's purpose of clearly defining for the benefit of public opinion the rules of international law preventing inhumane practices against merchant vessels are fully met, in the opinion of Malkin and my own adviser, Rublee, in the foregoing. Both Malkin and Rublee believe it an improvement in its definition of "a place of safety". In their opinion French criticism of Root's article for combining rules of visit and search with rules for protecting life is to a certain degree well founded and they feel that in that respect this proposal is superior.

The fact that it comes from the British who are chiefly interested in limiting submarine attack against commerce and the fact that it may satisfy the French who are actively opposing the Root form makes it worthy of careful consideration but I am not committed to this, however. Does Root see any serious objection to this substitute? I should like to know.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/766 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State

Tokyo, March 20, 1930—11 a. m.

[Received March 20—9:05 a. m.]

51. Repeat to London.⁵⁵ My 50, March 19, 4 p. m.⁵⁶ The *Nichi Nichi* this morning carries the following article:

"Admiral Kanji Kato, chief of the Naval Staff, and Vice Minister Admiral Kobayashi called on the Prime Minister yesterday afternoon. There was a full exchange of opinion, Admiral Kato going into the American proposal at great length and explaining the effect which it would have upon the disposition of Japanese naval forces. He pointed out that while there was virtual agreement over the demand for the global ratio in auxiliary vessels, the inferior ratio of 60

⁵⁵ Transmitted to the American delegation as Department's telegram No. 234, March 20, 9 a. m.

⁵⁶ Not printed.

percent in heavy cruisers and the inability of Japan to construct new submarines before 1936 made it impossible for Japan to accept the proposal. He then went on to say that as Japan had gone so far as to surrender parity and accept the 70 percent ratio, which is the minimum compatible with national security, as the basis of the agreement it now remained for the United States to make the next concession. After the Prime Minister had put several questions regarding the future of the Conference, Admiral Kato brought out his last and final plan. He proposed that the Government should explore the possibility of establishing a political treaty to cover the Pacific and to include Japanese-American relations with respect to China. Mr. Hamaguchi promised to give the suggestion the most careful consideration."

CASTLE

500.A15a3/786 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Castle)

[Paraphrase]

• WASHINGTON, March 20, 1930—5 p. m.

53. Last two sentences of your telegram No. 51, March 20, 11 a. m. We hope that the Japanese Government will not formulate any proposal along this line. The Department is of the opinion, in view of existing treaties already in force, that no useful purpose is likely to be served by a further political treaty with Japan relating to the Pacific. Furthermore, the Department considers, in view of the history of Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Lansing-Ishii notes, that it would be gratuitously offensive to China and a possible source of embarrassment to have relations with China determined or defined by a treaty between Japan and the United States in which China would not be included. If the matter is broached to you in any connection, you should not give any encouragement to this idea unless otherwise instructed by the Secretary of State.

Our delegation informed of the foregoing.

COTTON

500.A15a3/788a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Castle)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1930—6 p. m.

54. You may emphasize the following: After conference with leaders, we are convinced that present naval proposals to Japan are all it would be possible for us to attempt to carry. Alternative is full twenty-three cruiser program.

COTTON

The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

Tokyo, March 21, 1930—noon.

[Received March 21—4:23 a. m.]

53. Yesterday Shidehara assured me that he was exploring every possibility to bring about acceptance by Japan; he stated that he was in communication daily with Hamaguchi and the Navy but that he was not optimistic. He promised to bring the contents of your telegram, which I gave him in writing, to Hamaguchi's attention immediately. He evidently was opposed to my approaching the Prime Minister directly; if I saw Hamaguchi personally, sensational articles might do great damage for the press is watching every move.

It is Shidehara's understanding that on replacement of *Furutaka* class it was agreed that at the next conference Japan should have the right to demand replacement by one 10,000-ton cruiser when our 16th had been built, another when our 17th had been built, and another when our 18th had been built. He stated he was not sure that the United States reserved the right to oppose but that England had reserved this right. I told him that we reserved the right to oppose; that the original idea had been that Japan would claim right to replace *Furutaka* class by large cruisers in 1943 but I would consult you as to whether the situation had changed any. He was of the opinion that only the British opposed the idea at present. I told him that the United States, I felt, was firm for the 10-6 ratio in 8-inch cruisers because these were associated, in some way, with capital ships, and that because Japan agreed to this ratio the United States had agreed not to fortify its Pacific possessions. Failure to reach agreement, I impressed upon him, could only lead to a full resumption of the building program of the United States.

With regard to the Reed-Matsudaira conversations, Shidehara stated that Japan did not have a full account of them and this was one difficulty because the Navy keeps asking if this or that proposition was advanced by them. I feel that decision cannot be reached until next week for he has not asked for full information on certain points.

Shidehara's vigor of presentation or willingness to take responsibility should not be distrusted for I am sure he fully realizes that his statesmanship is at stake.

Please repeat to London.⁸⁸

CASTLE

⁸⁸ Transmitted to the American delegation as Department's telegram No. 238, March 21, 5 a. m.

500.A15a3/769 : Telegram

*The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting
Secretary of State*

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 21, 1930—5 p. m.

[Received March 21—3: 58 p. m.]

149. Repeat to Tokyo.⁸⁹ Agreement of the three delegations in regard to replacement of *Furutaka* class is that a reservation will be inserted by Japan to the effect that at the next conference she will be free to claim the right of replacement by a 10,000-ton cruiser of each vessel of that class when 20 years old. This right of replacement will not be conceded by Great Britain or America and if it is then asserted each will be free to oppose the claim. As your telegram stated, your understanding of the matter is still correct. We have been repeatedly asked by Matsudaira to surrender on this point and until it became clear that neither Great Britain nor ourselves could yield, he did not abandon his insistence.

Our agreement is here continually claimed by the newspapers as an American proposal and they say that in Japan a counter-proposal is being considered. The lack of a public statement by either the Japanese delegation or the Tokyo authorities that this is not an American proposal but is in fact an agreement reached by the three delegations, is surprising to us. Should Tokyo repudiate this agreement we would have difficulty in continuing to negotiate with a delegation which is without power and which its Government does not support. If the proposal is repudiated by Tokyo or a so-called counterproposal is sent we will immediately commence preparation of a two-power agreement with Great Britain on auxiliary categories and the American delegation will return to Washington on the termination of that agreement.

Because we have been urgently requested by Wakatsuki and Matsudaira to say nothing until the Japanese Government has acted we have refrained from making any press statement.

STIMSON

⁸⁹ Transmitted to the Embassy in Japan as Department's telegram No. 55, March 21, 5 p. m.

*The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting
Secretary of State*

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 22, 1930—1 a. m.

[Received March 21—10: 30 p. m.]

152. Tyrrell⁹⁰ this evening has advised MacDonald from Paris that the following position has been decided upon by the French:

1. The French believe that their delegation cannot do anything more in London so long as France is being asked by Great Britain to lower her figures without entering into a Mediterranean agreement with her and so long as Italy's demand for parity continues.

2. Therefore, if the British have decided to refuse a Mediterranean agreement and can do nothing more with the Italians and also will agree to let the French figures stand as they are, the French will help wind up the Conference with a report to the League which would contain certain agreements with respect to the regulation of reduction, naval holiday for certain construction, methods of limiting naval armament, and so forth.

Of last two clauses the former refers evidently to a battleship holiday and the latter to certain recommendations of a minor character made by a subcommittee.

The British press is asked by Tyrrell to exercise restraint; he reports that the French press, though quiet, is well informed. He expects to have a conference with Briand tomorrow to confirm the foregoing. According to information which Tyrrell has received, Briand will not return to London for several days and Tardieu will be away until the 31st, unless given assurance of [security pacts?] along above lines. In the latter case they might return earlier.

A meeting of the heads of delegations will probably be called by MacDonald tomorrow afternoon to consider this. It is my belief, based upon my observations of the effect of the French attitude throughout the Conference on other delegations and on public opinion here, that this will end the attempt to secure a five-power agreement and that MacDonald will try for a smaller one. Owing to the restlessness of the public, there is grave doubt in my mind whether serious mutual press recriminations can be successfully prevented. In the light of MacDonald's efforts, through which some real but slight steps toward reconciling the figures of the French and Italians have been made, and also because of the setback to the cause of the desire of Europe for peace, this would be a great pity. MacDonald and Craigie think that tonight's decision will represent an effort by

⁹⁰ Sir William G. Tyrrell, British Ambassador in France.

Tardieu, under the influence of certain extremists, to force the issue in France's favor. If so, it will almost certainly not succeed and the result will probably be that the security France already has will be greatly diminished. Our refusal to enter a consultative pact, as you will notice, is not mentioned by the French as a reason for their action. The view which I formerly expressed that there was no intention on their part to rely upon such a pact from us is confirmed by this.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/771 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

TOKYO, March 22, 1930—11 a. m.

[Received March 22—4:31 a. m.]

54. Your telegram No. 53, March 20, 5 p. m. I think that there is no danger that this matter will arise unless it is mentioned in the press. The Government here has not considered it, so Shidehara tells me; one reason is that it would scarcely be possible to arrive at a formula by which China would not be irritated. We are not more sensitive than he is on this point. He was told that, despite anything the press might say, we should always consider the Kellogg Pact as effective as in any other connection so far as China was concerned and that there was no necessity of committing this to paper. Please repeat to London.⁹¹

CASTLE

500.A15a3/773a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1930—1 p. m.

244. To press for three-power agreement is the only thing we can see to do.

COTTON

⁹¹ Transmitted to the American delegation as Department's telegram No. 242, March 22, 10 a. m.

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American
Delegation (Stimson)*

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1930—2 p. m.

245. Your No. 147, March 19, 7 p. m., last paragraph. It is Mr. Root's opinion:

1. That the Washington Treaty is superior to the proposal of Malkin in that the latter does not directly state the rules as a foundation for public opinion.

2. That the substance of what is most important is included, however, and

3. That a valuable addition is made by the clause as to what is meant by safety.

4. That the change would be compensated for by French ratification. At the same time he thinks that the criticism that the Washington provision joins search and seizure regulations with rules for protection of life has no merit.

The rights of search and seizure furnish the only foundation for the right to threaten lives on a merchant vessel, and the only basis for the protection of such lives rests upon definite rules pertaining to such rights.

COTTON

500.A15a3/774 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOKYO, March 23, 1930—noon.

[Received March 23—4:33 a. m.]

55. Your 55, March 21, 5 p. m.^{91a} Repeat to London.⁹²

Wakatsuki gave out a statement that this is not an American proposal but an agreement which was reached by three delegations. His statement was published in all the Japanese newspapers yesterday morning.

CASTLE

^{91a} See footnote 89, p. 71.

⁹² Transmitted to the American delegation as Department's telegram No. 248.

LONDON, March 23, 1930—3 p. m.
[Received March 23—11:20 a. m.]

155. Castle has been sent the following telegram:

"If Shidehara is satisfied and you think it advisable to deliver to Hamaguchi a message from me, you might do so along the following lines:

'It is my feeling that the greatest naval powers of the world are presented with an opportunity to consolidate the good relations existing between them. The removal of all question of competitive building would mean progress together in the direction of the pacific growth of the future welfare of these three great peoples. The stability of the peace of the whole world would be increased as well.'

You should tell Hamaguchi that Shidehara has seen this. I hope that I have made it clear that the delivery of the message is not to be made unless thought wise to do so by both you and Shidehara. It is our desire that nothing be done which the opponents of the agreement would misconstrue."

STIMSON

500.A15a3/777 : Telegram

*The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting
Secretary of State*

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 23, 1930—9 p. m.
[Received March 23—7:32 p. m.⁹⁸]

156. The following is our survey of the situation.

(1) Negotiations as to the relative size of their fleets have been conducted by the French and the Italians and by the French and the British. On some of these negotiations, particularly those between the British and the French, we have sat in at the request of both sides. I have conferred many times with MacDonald, Briand, and Tardieu, in addition to which Morrow has kept in constant touch with Aubert and Massigli. The French, in coming to the Conference, we believe desired it to succeed; however, from the first they have insisted upon a mutual assistance security pact in which Britain would participate. France would have substantially reduced her figures, we think, had she gotten such a pact. Whether under Britain's two-power European standard such reduction would have been enough to meet the figures in the agreement we have had with Great

⁹⁸ Telegram in six sections.

Britain we cannot say, because negotiations between Great Britain and France have not gotten that far. We have never been asked directly by France to give her a consultative pact; and we are certain, on information we have gotten, that even had such a pact been offered she would not have, on that basis alone, reduced her figures.

(2) A pivotal point in preventing an agreement between the British and the French has been the unwillingness of MacDonald to satisfy the French on the subject of European security. In his former administration, you will remember, the protocol idea, so-called, with the purpose of strengthening the League of Nations sanctions even to military protection against an aggressor, was partly his doing. The subsequent Conservative Government repudiated this tentative arrangement for the protocol. Chamberlain substituted Locarno for this protocol idea. The French assert, in this regard, that the hope was held out to them by the British that the League would be strengthened not by a sweeping agreement for sanctions but by a series of regional pacts, the parties to which would be those countries having a vital interest in the particular regions to be protected.

Ten months ago when MacDonald entered office there was under way in England a decided reaction against that country entering into any further sanctions through which they might become involved in a continental struggle. With the coming of our negotiations, the French demand for security through a Mediterranean Pact, which was suggested by them in their December note, was refused by MacDonald, who has not since forsaken that position. Two weeks ago French disquiet was added to by his public statement in opposition to entangling alliances. The French claim that they cannot understand this change from Britain's former attitude toward them. It would now be difficult, and perhaps impossible, for the MacDonald Government to reverse itself completely in this position, as there seems to be an increasing volume of public opinion in Britain in support of MacDonald's attitude toward keeping free from further entanglement in continental affairs. Not all members of his own Cabinet, however, have heartily supported this position. Henderson, who was at Geneva for seven weeks negotiating the protocol in 1924, feels, and has always felt, that Britain, provided she could get in return definite naval reduction from France, should add to or at least reaffirm definitely her European obligations. He criticizes France on the ground that she does not offer great enough reduction of armament in return and not because she asks for more security. In brief, he feels that France never gave sufficient consideration in return for the Locarno Agreement, although he feels it was all right for Britain to join this agreement and even the protocol idea. The

they must continue to have France as their nearest neighbor, seem to share Henderson's feeling. Tyrrell, who is now in Paris and who has much weight with the permanent officials, we have been told, shares this view.

(3) The British effort, in place of the security pact, has principally been to endeavor to secure from Italy for France a reduction corresponding to or greater than that which she asks of France in order to force the latter's figures down. We have from time to time been invited to sit in on these negotiations by both sides as friendly impartial counselors, but have taken no part, though we have been present. No substantial success has come from these negotiations. France and Italy, both of whom have been very stubborn in their demands for parity in the one case or superiority in the other in naval strength, have toward the end shown some willingness to set aside their theoretical positions and instead to stand upon reservations thereof with the aim of adopting a *modus vivendi*. Willingness to make concessions with regard to over-age tonnage has been asserted by both, but as the matter stands neither has made any concessions in building programs or under-age tonnage.

British opinion considers France's submarine and perhaps her cruiser program a serious menace, though we do not believe she is consciously building against Great Britain. A series of unpleasant incidents, which have occurred recently, have been the basis of suspicion and fear of France and Italy toward each other. I have no evidence of any danger to peace between the countries which is specific and imminent.

(4) The outcome of the interview between Tardieu and MacDonald last Sunday, which was unfortunate, has complicated the situation during the past week. Apparently MacDonald gave the French some ground for their belief that he has appealed to Mussolini through the Ambassador to get more definite figures. It was apparently through a French source that the possibility of British influence at Rome leaked out to the press. Both the Italians and MacDonald were greatly irritated. A dispute on fact arose between the French and English as a result. There had already existed a distrust between MacDonald and Tardieu, which has been added to temporarily at least by this incident. The incident has also brought forth a strong statement from the Fascist Council giving unqualified support to insistence upon parity by Grandi. Of course we had no representative at the meeting at Chequers, and I did not know of any action which was being taken in Rome by MacDonald. I had, however, solely for his information, apprised Garrett of the situation.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ John W. Garrett, American Ambassador in Italy.

(5) Since day before yesterday when I sent my No. 152, MacDonald and I have not talked; but on Sunday Craigie told me that Massigli has tried to soften the position taken by the French as reported by Tyrrell from Paris and claims that that report is exaggerated; that there is no intention by Tardieu and Briand to end negotiations, but that the latter will be back Tuesday.

(6) It will be seen from the foregoing that two fundamental controversies exist, the first between the British and the French and the second between the French and the Italians. We can properly take no leading part in either. The parties to the controversies must themselves work out their problem with such friendly help as we can give. A mistaken idea as to the fundamental nature of the controversies is the basis, we think, for the idea of the American press that by some simple act or statement we could bring about their solution.

(7) The following is our position with reference to a consultative pact:

I have made clear to Briand and Tardieu that a consultative pact is not inherently objectionable to us, as we have already joined many of them, of which the Washington Disarmament Treaty was one. I told them that there was little doubt that a consultative provision with respect to matters of naval program in a treaty growing out of the Conference would be favored by us. I have made clear that our objection was to a pact which, because of the circumstances under which it would be given, would be considered as a *quid pro quo* for French reduction in naval armament; that we objected to any pact which might be the basis of a future demand for military assistance. Tardieu and Briand have both told me that they fully appreciated that no pact could be given by us which was subject to any construction of an implied promise of military assistance. We have been assured by the French that what they wanted and must have as a condition precedent to reduction of their program was a treaty of mutual assistance with Britain, or at least that Britain's existing obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations be amplified or clarified. They consider this especially important, because they believe that Britain apparently wishes to back away from the European commitments which she already has made. A reason or plausible excuse is thus afforded France for getting a navy of some kind with the possibility facing them of confronting a European situation with Great Britain neutral. French public opinion, from the best sources we have, is solidly behind Tardieu and Briand. What the French are asking of Great Britain is understandable if we consider the continental agreements of the past decade, though we have no sympathy with their action. Our belief is that France is seek-

ing to force participation in European sanctions by Britain through a French naval program very alarming to public opinion in England. This is particularly true with reference to France's submarine program. Due to this the future of European politics gives us serious anxiety.

(8) Should Great Britain and France resume negotiations it is possible that a situation might arise in which it would be safe and appropriate to make a promise of some consultation. This is for your consideration. It might be of moment to both France and Great Britain if they had an assurance that we could be consulted when an emergency arose with respect to our method of exerting our peaceful influence toward maintaining the world's peace, in case Britain upon consideration, should try to reach an agreement with France based upon some security pact, or amplification or interpretation of their covenants under the League as a *quid pro quo* for the reduction of the French Navy. The matter has been discussed by the delegation and we feel that a consultative arrangement of this sort would have to be safeguarded (1) by a separate security pact between France and Great Britain, and (2) by specific clauses which would clearly and expressly deny any promise of military assistance. The Rapidan joint statement of October 9th has been studied in this connection as a guide for a statement setting forth in their relation to Europe the different functions of Britain and America.

(9) With respect to our future action, we hope to confer with MacDonald on Monday. Confirmation of my views as to the effect of France's position, as stated in my No. 152, has been gotten as a result of a conference Saturday with our delegation.

A new and favorable factor in the situation may be introduced as a result of cables from Tokyo which indicate a probable approval of our agreement.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/785: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 25, 1930—5 p. m.

[Received March 25—1:35 p. m.]

161. Morrow, Robinson, and I conferred with Alexander, Henderson, and MacDonald yesterday. The conference was held at my suggestion, for I wished to be sure that there existed no misunderstanding

as to the positions of our respective delegations, especially where political pacts were concerned. The French in their December note, you will recall, called attention to the relationship existing between the questions of disarmament and security. I reviewed the French position since that note, speaking of the way in which they relied upon the Covenant of the League of Nations, and particularly of the manner of the sanctions to be used against an aggressor; also, of the desire of the French that a mutual assistance pact be made, to which all Mediterranean countries would be a party, as this would be a contributory reason toward armament reduction. I called the Prime Minister's attention to his reply to the French note and, as I understood it, to the British position that they would be unwilling to assume any continental obligations in addition to those they now had. I told him that the French had repeatedly made it clear to us that they wanted a treaty of mutual assistance as a condition of reduction of armament; that in the absence of a formal request from them asking for consultative provisions in the Pact of Paris, we had told them definitely that a consultative pact could not be given them as a substitute for the military mutual security which they desired.

I told MacDonald that we obviously could not, and had not, made any suggestion as to reconsideration of Britain's own situation with respect to France, as that was a question in which she and her neighbors on the continent were solely concerned. This situation seemed to be one of the things holding up a five-power agreement. I had previously pointed out to the Prime Minister the careful distinctions regarding the respective contributions our two countries could make toward world peace as set out in the Rapidan joint statement of October 9.

In the presence of Henderson and Alexander, MacDonald made two statements, the first of which was that Britain would be willing to make a formal statement of some sort to the French following the language in annex F to the Locarno Agreement,⁹⁸ which would make it clear that she would be bound to loyal and effective cooperation in support of the Covenant and in resistance of an act of aggression; but that France had not yet been advised of this intention. Second, that Great Britain would be willing to participate in a later conference of Mediterranean countries.

I then told the Prime Minister that if the other nations would take care of the question of mutual assistance in such a way as to secure a substantial reduction of armament, I should think it possible for us to consider with an open mind the question of a provision for

⁹⁸ Collective note to Germany, December 1, 1926, regarding art. 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. LV.

consultation among the signatories to our agreement, with explicit denial of military action. Opinion was expressed by Henderson that he thought the conference should proceed along this line, provided substantial continental reduction in naval armament could be secured thereby. Approval of what I had said was expressed to the meeting by Senator Robinson, who afterward told me that under these circumstances he did not think the treaty would be weakened in the Senate by such a consultative provision.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/787a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1930—7 p. m.

258. Peace societies yesterday received three telegrams asserting that statement was made by three American delegates in interviews that everything would be settled if the President would take action in offering a consultative pact. It is most embarrassing to have such pressure applied in a matter regarding which we have heard nothing as to wording or import.

It is asserted, they say, that if this were done Great Britain would be enabled to give guarantees of a more formal character. These reports are persistent and, obviously, annoying and the subject is being given much space in the press.

We should know exactly the terms proposed before such a subject is given consideration by you. Are you not able to reassure us as to the position of the delegates? It would be helpful under the circumstances if you could do so.

COTTON

500.A15a3/787b : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1930—8 p. m.

259. E. T. Stone, whose residence is given as 8 Park Place, St. James, London, has cabled to persons having a connection with the Foreign Policy Association that important members of your staff have given him information to the effect that dissatisfaction exists among the members of the delegation due to their not having received from the President constructive support, and that it is felt by them

fact, etc., made by the American delegation, he could save the situation with the French.

We have stopped a move of the Foreign Policy Association to call a general meeting in New York for the purpose of protesting the action of the Administration and the President.

The advices in your No. 156, March 23, strictly contradict the foregoing. We believe that the whole idea of such a pact has been originated by those New York groups who have been trying to secure its advancement at the Conference. They have used propaganda here, and we think that some of the French delegation have contacts with Stone or other agents of theirs and from them have gotten some encouragement. Through such correspondents as James⁹⁹ and Mowrer these ideas have filtered back to the United States. Would it not be advisable for you or Morrow, or some other member of your delegation, to talk with Stone, giving him the facts which you have given us, and endeavor to find out which member of your staff has been giving out information which is being used against the work of the delegation and the Administration.

We think that dangerous ground is being trodden both in the interests of our country and delegation by outside groups who take it upon themselves to put forth ideas and to establish activities with other governments.

The President today, because of this agitation, stated to the press, not for publication nor to be attributed to any authority, that no government represented at the Conference had proposed a consultative pact to the United States. He said that the terms advocated by outside groups for such a pact would not reduce tonnage at all and that other governments know fully that the United States cannot enter any pact which implied either directly or indirectly the use of naval forces; that the pacts proposed by these groups were not of this nature and the situation was not met or assisted by them; and that it was an entirely unwarranted belief on their part that the United States' offering of such a pact would secure reduction of tonnage.

COTTON

500.A15a3/787c: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1930—9 p. m.

260. Our telegrams Nos. 258 and 259, March 25, 7 p. m. and 8 p. m., respectively, were written after we had read your No. 161,

⁹⁹ Edwin Leland James, press correspondent for the *New York Times*.

over here, and the President is bothered. I am amazed at the cable advices of which Stone is the source.

COTTON

500.A15a3/787 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

LONDON, March 26, 1930—11 a. m.
[Received March 26—6:52 a. m.]

162. The following statement was issued last night by the delegation in view of the rumors current in certain of the British newspapers, particularly the *Daily Herald*, that the United States had changed its point of view on the matter of consultative pacts:

"Rumor was current last evening to the effect that the American delegation had made a change of their attitude toward consultative pacts and were willing to enter into such a pact for the purpose of saving the Conference. It was authoritatively denied at the headquarters of the American delegation that any change had taken place in the attitude of the American delegation, and its attitude remains as its spokesmen gave it out several weeks ago. At that time it was made clear [that] America had no objection to enter[ing] a consultative pact as such; on the contrary, the United States is already a party to a number of treaties involving the obligation of consulting with other powers. It will not, however, enter into any treaty, whether consultative or otherwise, where there is danger of its obligation being misunderstood as involving a promise to render military assistance or guaranteeing protection by military force to another nation. Such a misunderstanding might arise, if the United States entered into such a treaty as a *quid pro quo* for the reduction of the naval force of another power. That danger has hitherto inhered in the present situation, where France has been demanding mutual military security as a condition of naval reduction, as appears from her original statement of her case last December. If, however, this demand for security could be satisfied in some other way, then the danger of misunderstanding a consultative pact would be eliminated and in such case the question would be approached from an entirely different standpoint. In such a case the American delegation would consider the matter with an entirely open mind."

STIMSON

*The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting
Secretary of State*

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 26, 1930—5 p. m.

[Received March 26—3:10 p. m.]

163. 1. Nothing of the nature mentioned in your telegram No. 258, March 25, has been said by any American delegate. No attention should be paid to it, for it is nonsense. In my telegram No. 156, March 23, paragraphs 7 and 8, and in my telegram No. 161, March 25, I stated our position on a consultative pact and it has not changed. I can assure the President that nothing coming from this delegation is responsible for this situation and I am sorry he has been troubled.

3. Statement by President, mentioned in your telegram No. 259, March 25, is entirely in accord with our position and is accurate in every respect.

4. I learned that a story was to be published by the *London Herald* to the effect that owing to the intervention of the President our delegation had completely changed its position on a consultative pact, so I issued my press statement last evening. Today the situation changed in favor of a five-power treaty. I was told by MacDonald that my statement helped greatly. I believe Great Britain has at last changed its position with regard to security for France. Although I have discreetly refrained from inquiry I believe this to be a fact. I am informed by MacDonald that Briand will arrive tonight. He will discuss pacts with Henderson tomorrow. MacDonald also informed me that this morning the French had reduced their figures considerably; they are now within about 400,000 tons total tonnage of meeting the figures of the British. The trend for the last 24 hours has been more encouraging than anything we have experienced for a long time, but there are many difficulties still remaining in the road. I had lunch with Lloyd George. He has been pessimistic and seemingly antagonistic but he now seems to think the Conference will be successful. His statement is significant, as his coalition is a big factor in keeping MacDonald in office.

5. In view of this change and the possibility of a security agreement between Great Britain and France, it is very likely that a consultative pact of the nature suggested in my Nos. 156 and 161 will be brought to the front. I assume that if we adhere to the safeguards enumerated by me it will meet with the President's approval. Next week we shall probably have an important plenary session. There will be a review of the progress made to date, and it may

can be presented with powerful effect to the Conference. This possibility we will consider and we will let you know in time if it seems desirable.

6. Tokyo reports remain encouraging; they counsel patience on ground that Government is making progress towards a favorable conclusion. I am informed from British and American sources that French have worked hard to delay or disrupt an agreement with Japan, in submarine figures particularly.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/788a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1930—6 p. m.

265. After reading your yesterday's press statement and after conference with the President, I send you the following:

It is our wish to call the following points to your attention with respect to the whole question of a consultative pact:

1. If the provisions of the Four-Power Pacific Treaty¹ are applied to a setting which is European, even though a reservation is made against military action, they become an entanglement of the first order in European affairs, this being particularly true of paragraph 2 of the Pacific Pact. The two settings present this essential difference: With respect to Europe, if included in the present treaty, it would apply to every European political disturbance which might affect any one of the five parties; with respect to the Pacific Pact, we have possessions in the East and the Pact refers solely to those possessions.

2. The supplementary agreement of December 13, 1921 [*February 6, 1922*²], by delimiting action further under those provisions, which cannot be included in the present treaty, modified the Pacific Pact.

3. To repeat the text of the Pacific Treaty as a part of the text of the present proposed treaty would be to incur, therefore, the greatest possible dangers. We would be drawn into questions into which we could not go if the pact were so drawn as to be confined to Europe; and if such a pact were not confined to Europe, other powers would be drawn into questions affecting the Western Hemisphere, and this we cannot allow.

4. To us it would appear that the provisions of any such pact

¹ Signed December 13, 1921, *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. I, p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, p. 46.

mutual frank communication with the purpose of finding means for peaceful settling of any dispute apt to occasion war between those signing, and that such interchanges should be confined wholly to the ascertainment of peaceable methods and should leave out specifically all consideration of military or other sanctions, that no signatory shall be obliged to take part in such interchanges dealing with problems in which they say they have no concern, and it should contain an affirmation that it is this country's policy not to become involved in controversies with respect to Europe.

5. There are certain implications which some will draw if some of the Pacific Pact terms were included in this treaty. It would be interpreted as a declaration of the purpose to dominate the world by five naval powers. It is true that even the adoption of the above modified form if it employed the word "consultation" would be interpreted in all probability as leaving the implication of conference and it should not be "consultation" but rather "communication."

6. It appears to us important that, as early as possible and prior to further discussion as to a consultative pact, your Conference ascertain whether or not France will be satisfied enough with the sanctions which Great Britain is willing to offer to reduce her terms to an approved level before you discuss the terms of any arrangement which they may ask of you. As any arrangement which might be made by you would have to be so diluted as not to be particularly valuable, it would seem improbable that any consultative arrangement would be asked of you. We think the above course best because the whole matter in public discussion on this side has assumed undue importance.

7. It is our desire, in any event, to be consulted and informed as to the form in which you propose to put your commitments before you have discussion as to their terms.

COTTON

500.A15a3/790 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 27, 1930—3 p. m.
[Received March 27—11:40 a. m.]

165. Referring to your telegram No. 265, March 26. We have no idea of following the form of the Four-Power Pacific Treaty, as we are already fully aware of the dangers. We have also been considering the advisability of ascertaining the extent to which the French would be willing to reduce their building program, before we bind ourselves

to any formal pact whatever. We are of the opinion that this is an express condition of the negotiations the British and French are now carrying on. I have had in mind, in addition to the limitation proposed in paragraph 4 of our cable^a as to the discussion being limited to methods for pacific settlement, a limitation somewhat as follows:

"The United States' obligation shall extend only to an examination of the situation as it may affect the interests of her nationals and of herself".

Before consenting to the use of her fleet it is Britain's desire to ascertain the effect which such use would have upon United States trade and policy and the above would be in line with her desire to obtain this information.

This matter is being discussed by our delegation today; I shall consult you, of course, as to the form which seems most acceptable to us just as soon as we reach an agreement and I shall get your views before submitting or proposing it to other parties. I hope you will keep me promptly posted as to the President's views as they may develop, as matters are now moving rather rapidly.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/794 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 27, 1930—7 p. m.

[Received March 27—5 p. m.]

167. It was decided by the heads of delegations this afternoon to hold a plenary session on Friday, April 4, when full reports and discussions will be made of the progress of the Conference up to that date. Briand has been in conference during the day with the British and I understand that with respect to figures encouraging progress is being made. The pessimism that MacDonald had last week has changed and he is now hopeful for a treaty by the five powers.

Morrow, Robinson, Reed, and Dawes this afternoon produced a suggestion for a consultative clause to be placed in the naval treaty. This was done after a long and thorough conference. I examined it, upon my return from meeting, and I believe it the best suggestion thus far. I think it meets the limitations I had in mind.

The following is the suggestion:

"The signatories hereto shall settle all disputes between them by pacific means. As to what measures may be adopted to maintain peace among them, the high contracting parties shall consult with

one another frankly and fully but this agreement to consult or any consultation between the parties shall not imply a commitment on the part of the signatories or any of them to use military force or take any coercive action."

Senators Robinson and Reed feel sure that such a clause would be approved by the Senate; they also feel strongly that it would not be helped and might be harmed by a declaration "that the policy of the United States is not to entangle itself in European controversies."

I send the suggestion along to you for your consideration and any comment you may care to make.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/794b: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American
Delegation (Stimson)*

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1930—8 p. m.

269. For your information the situation here is as follows:

1. With regard to a consultative pact, friends of the Administration in the Senate indicate an overwhelming Senate opposition. Intimations from Senators George and Swanson also indicate this to be true. They do not know the terms of such a pact, of course, but they contemplate that it is akin to the Pacific Pact. We are positive that a consultative pact in terms of the Pacific Pact would be impossible of ratification at present but if it were of a different nature and sufficiently limited there might be a change of opinion.

2. We are of the opinion that the British and French negotiations should be settled before any discussion of the text of the consultative pact is entered upon, although we do not wish our view on tactics to override your views. To put it another way, we should not engage in this problem until the British and French have settled their guarantees on one side and their tonnage on the other; for with the obvious leaks of every text and detail of your negotiations, the pact will become the battleground here and will overshadow the entire disarmament program. It is not desirable to have it develop unnecessarily to a serious question, for if the negotiations between Great Britain and France should fail it would unnecessarily consolidate opposition to any form of agreement. We take it that no such pact will be included in a three-power treaty. Moreover, we think it very desirable that the other delegations should present the form

suggested that you might consider repeating from the Kellogg Pact the two important paragraphs as a preamble to any other undertaking.

In our view, the text of the pact ought to come from some other governments and the reason is that if we presented the text the effort of the other delegations, undoubtedly, would be to put more teeth in it and we might fail on the question of words, the import of which would be almost impossible to establish clearly in the mind of the public.

On the other hand, should they present a form of pact of as moderate a basis and we proceeded to take any teeth out, our position would be much stronger here.

We have received your telegram No. 165, March 27. The above was written before its receipt, but we do not think position is changed.

COTTON

500.A15a3/803a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1930—4 p. m.

271. I think you should understand the President's position regarding a consultative pact and I, therefore, submit the following for your own personal information. From the very beginning, his attitude, as you know, has been against inclusion of any political undertaking as a part of disarmament agreement. Both of us were of the opinion that the Kellogg Pact was the political basis for reduction of arms at the present.

At the time this situation began to loom up as a result of peace society and French propaganda, we observed from your telegrams Nos. 126, 128, 136, and 152^{3a} a continuous refusal to agree to any consultative pact or any other political pact with the exception of consultation provisions with respect to a naval program in the treaty growing out of the Conference and of the general purport of the Washington Armament Treaty. We had no intimation that there was any possible change until we received your No. 156;^{3b} then your No. 161,^{3c} regarding the offer you had made to the British, was received before we were able to reply to your No. 156.

At his press conference the same day but before the receipt of your Nos. 156 and 161, the President made a strong statement to the

^{3a} *Ante*, pp. 55, 57, 62, 72.

newspapers, not for quotation, to the effect that such a pact would be of no purpose or effect on reduction of tonnage, relying of course on your previous statements. He has continuously advised Senators, newspaper editors, and other persons who have been agitating this question that no political action could be taken by this Government. He is much pressed, therefore, on the inconsistency of the present situation. He does not intend to embarrass the negotiations, however, by explanations or other statements but he is of the opinion that any form of political pact would very likely strengthen the opposition of big navy people by including others.

We are of the opinion that this situation leads to some important considerations.

First, there should be strict limitation of our commitments within the spirit of the President's Armistice Day speech.⁴

Second, a political pact should be a separate treaty from the naval treaty as was the case of the Pacific treaties, so that if the political pact should not receive confirmation it would not put the disarmament program in danger; and at some appropriate time our colleagues in the Conference could be informed that it would be impossible for us to guarantee ratification and that two treaties must not be contingent upon each other.

Third, we should be fully advised as to any new departure in the negotiations even though it would mean delay, so we could have time to reflect on it before you indicate your position.

This is merely an explanation of the difficulties which confront us here and the things that should be safeguarded against, and the President does not wish you to think that this is in the nature of criticism.

The President and I suggest that you consider a repetition of the two vital clauses of the Kellogg Pact, instead of the formula in your No. 167^{4a} and then continue as follows:⁵

"In accordance with the spirit of this undertaking the signatories declare that in event of controversy among them they will advise with one another fully and frankly to the end that they may discover pacific means of settlement (it being the clear understanding that so far as it concerns the United States 'pacific means' shall exclude from discussion any military or other coercive action.)"

The foregoing formula does not necessarily represent our final opinion.

It is suggested further that the Bryan treaties⁶ be considered by you as to the possibility of rendering them binding upon all parties.

COTTON

LONDON, March 28, 1930—4 p. m.
[Received March 28—12:30 p. m.]

171. Have cabled following to Castle, today, 4 p. m.:

"Referring to your cable today, noon, and your question regarding actual part taken by Japanese delegation in the settlement now under consideration at Tokyo. At a meeting of the heads of delegations held on Tuesday, March 25, the following was adopted on Wakatsuki's suggestion as a correct statement of the facts: ⁷

"In regard to Japan a compromise had emerged from the negotiations between the delegations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and Japan, which the Japanese delegation had agreed to recommend to its Government. It was incorrect to say as had been said that that compromise proposal was an American proposal since, as he had stated, it had emerged from the negotiations."

STIMSON

500.A15a3/801: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract-Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 28, 1930—6 p. m.
[Received March 28—1:20 p. m.]

172. The following telegram has been received from Castle, dated March 28, noon:

I took your personal message for the Prime Minister ⁸ immediately to Shidehara, who said that it was very friendly and that he himself would give it to Hamaguchi. A message from MacDonald was delivered in the same manner by the British Ambassador. Both he and Shidehara urged me not to attempt to see Hamaguchi personally, as to do so would produce a dangerous public reaction. If you were here you would understand the need of extreme caution. It is most essential to prevent private conversations with many influential men.

Much discussion has taken place in the press over whether or not the Japanese delegation is actually back of the agreement; the Navy intransigents are still calling it "the American proposal", in spite of the fact that frequent denials have been made. The papers say that you discussed the question with Wakatsuki on March 25; I should find it very helpful to know the real attitude of the Japanese delegation."

STIMSON

⁷ Quoted passage not paraphrased.

⁸ See telegram No. 155, March 23, 3 p. m., from the chairman of the American

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1930—2 p. m.

274. It has been suggested that a new formula draft be cabled to you for your consideration, as it contains a new idea. This new formula, which follows, does not represent my personal view:*

"In accordance with the spirit of this undertaking, i. e., the Kellogg Pact, the signatories declare that in the event of a controversy among them which cannot be settled by direct negotiation, those signatories not parties to the controversy will advise and use their good offices to the end that they may discover a pacific means of settlement—it being the clear understanding that 'pacific means' shall be interpreted as excluding all coercive action."

COTTON

500.A15a3/804: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, March 29, 1930—6 p. m.

[Received 7:44 p. m.¹⁹]

177. Your telegram No. 271, March 28.

1. An analysis and summary of the various forms of political pacts which in one form or another have been given support in respect to this Conference will help you best to understand the past week's events and to secure future coordination.

(a) Ambassador Houghton on his return from London brought to my attention almost a year ago the British desire for consultative arrangements with us as a precaution against a clash between our Navies when the British Fleet was serving as an ancillary to the League of Nations and might thus interfere with our trade. This danger is well known; it has been the subject of frequent discussion and the attention of British statesmen has been preoccupied by it. The purpose of such a consultative arrangement would be to obviate friction between the United States outside the League and a Europe organized under the League. Particularly as the British Navy will be supported by the navies of the other members of the League, it is important for us to know what course will be pursued by it in case of an impending emergency. Eventually such consultations are certain to take place; it would, however, appear of great advantage to all parties if they should occur prior to the creation of an irrevoc-

cable situation fixed by the League Council's vote. It appears to me that a consultative pact of this kind is the only one having a direct connection with this Conference's problems, for the British have been embarrassed by the absence of such consultation in fulfilling their obligations under the League of Nations and the Locarno Agreement toward the French and therefore French security is impaired in the opinion of the French.

(b) At the time of the Russo-Chinese crisis last summer, Claudel, acting for Briand, suggested to me that, in order to provide machinery to meet such a situation, there be added to the Kellogg Pact a consultative clause based on the Four-Power Pacific Treaty. While I have always felt that a clause of this kind offered many difficulties to the Kellogg Pact and have had a preference for other machinery which I have had in mind, nevertheless I expressed myself as being ready to discuss the proposition.

(c) The French in their note to the British on December 20, on the subject of the Naval Conference, brought up their demand for an agreement as to mutual assistance. They suggested different forms which such assistance might take, for example, the amplification and clarification of the Locarno Agreements now existing and a Mediterranean Pact. Because of this demand and its temporary refusal by the British, as I have stated before, it was impossible for the United States to consider any political pact, even solely for consultation, as a substitute for the French demand, for fear that it would lead in the future to misunderstandings as to the scope of American obligations.

(d) Apparently the situation was further complicated and all distinction between these fundamentally different forms of political pacts was confused when the Foreign Policy Association and French propaganda entered into the discussion and it was taken up by the American press.

(e) My press conference of March 11 was prompted by this confusion of legitimate consultation with implied obligations. In that conference I made it clear that our objection was not to consultative pacts in themselves, but to the circumstances which surrounded the broaching of the question. In my many conferences with MacDonald I also made this plain, as well as to Tardieu and Briand; see my telegram No. 156, March 23, 9 p. m.

2. MacDonald's position on this matter, as stated in my telegram No. 156, has gradually shown a decided cleavage from that of his Foreign Office. Since he retained personal control over the negotiations and was decidedly in opposition to the granting of the French demand, those who thought otherwise could never discuss the ques-

3. Upon receipt of advices from Tyrrell on the evening of March 21, as I reported in No. 152, March 22, MacDonald apparently thought it impossible to bring about an agreement between the five powers. I think such a feeling on his part was justified, in view of Tyrrell's advices and MacDonald's own views with respect to the French. On Saturday, March 22, there was a strong effort made, apparently by the permanent officials of the Foreign Office, to further, even on new lines, a five-power agreement. Apparently Henderson sympathizes with their view. That the Conference was on the brink of a precipice, with the consequent disastrous result to the whole European peace situation which would follow failure on such issues, was recognized by all parties. Consequently all parties attempted to canvass entire situation prior to a break which would be final. A meeting at one o'clock on Saturday, the 22d, was held by our own delegation, at which time the situation was discussed from all angles. Craigie told me last Saturday that Massigli's view of the situation was that it was not so hopeless as Tyrrell's report indicated. Therefore, we sent you our No. 156, on Sunday, March 23, containing our complete summary of the situation.

4. I sought the conference with Alexander, Henderson, and MacDonald on Monday morning, March 24, as reported to you in my telegram No. 161, March 25, because it had become clear to us that there were decidedly different points of view in the British delegation as to the proper course to pursue with respect to France and because we were unwilling to have any possibility of misunderstanding with us prevent the saving of the situation. This was the first real opportunity we had had to discuss with the Prime Minister and Henderson the question which seemed to be holding up the Conference. Obviously the question which the French regarded as fundamental was what was the true British position with respect to the clauses in the Covenant of the League of Nations providing for mutual assistance. The British had been a party to these clauses for more than a decade, but the apprehensions of the French had been aroused by MacDonald's attitude. Especially did his radio speech on "entangling alliances" disturb them.

5. French diplomatic and journalistic methods throughout the Conference have apparently irritated MacDonald, whose great patience, tact, and industry have characterized his conduct of the negotiations. We have felt, as we viewed the general peace problem of Europe, that Henderson's view toward France was the sounder one. I believe I am accurate in saying that the spirit of that portion

of the Rapidan statement of October 9 which follows: "the part of each of our Governments in the promotion of world peace will be different, as one will never consent to become entangled in European diplomacy and the other is resolved to pursue a policy of active cooperation with its European neighbors; but each of our Governments will direct its thoughts and influence towards securing and maintaining the peace of the world" is being adhered to by the Foreign Office and Henderson.

6. The importance of my statement made on March 24th to the British, which merely repeated what I had already said to Tardieu, Briand, and MacDonald (emphasized, however, by the impending crisis), was that it gave Henderson his first opportunity to urge upon MacDonald a reconsideration of the British position toward the French; and MacDonald had evidently been won over to Henderson's view by Tuesday morning, as the latter then was given authority by the Prime Minister to telephone to Briand at Paris that they would discuss the subject of mutual security with the French. The French themselves had, at the same time, evidently experienced the beneficial effect of the threatened failure of the Conference and the invitation to return to London was accepted by Briand. In the French afternoon papers of Tuesday incorrect and sensational accounts of the changes in the situation were already appearing; and the necessity of our midnight statement was occasioned by these incorrect accounts reaching London that same evening.

7. You can see from the foregoing the rapid course of events which the impending failure of the Conference produced and during which an opportunity for the British to change their position was furnished by our statement. I need not tell the President how much I regret that my statement, contained in my telegram No. 156, failed to reach him before he had given out his press statement on Tuesday. It was sent at 9 p. m. on Sunday, and there had been inserted sections (7) and (8) expressly to warn you that the matter of a consultative pact might come up, although we were surprised with the rapidity with which matters moved. I appreciate the fine sporting spirit of the President toward us in the face of the extreme difficulty into which he had been put. Please tell him so.

8. I will discuss with the delegation promptly your suggestion, in your telegram No. 271, for a consultative clause, and you will be kept advised of any changes in the negotiations.

STIMSON

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1930—5 p. m.

280. [Paraphrase.] You may say to Briand and Tardieu, if you think it will help, that the President has sent a personal message for them. You may make any alterations or deletions you wish in the text which follows. It is our object to emphasize to the French that if American cooperation is to be secured, it should be accomplished by dealing with positive problems successfully and to build up gradually the principles and methods. The message reads: [End paraphrase.]

"At this distance from the Conference I cannot hope to know all its difficulties and problems, but I have, as well as I have been able, followed the course of argument and it is possible that my estimate of the American position may be of help to them now.

I have given a great deal of consideration to the position of our relations with Europe, especially with France, and the setting of the United States in the whole picture of international cooperation as affected by the current possibilities of the naval conference. You are well aware of my own intensely sympathetic feeling toward France and of the deep-rooted bonds which so profoundly unite the peoples of the United States and France together with my long and consistent devotion to the cause of world peace. I appreciate fully the logic of the French note of December 31st [20th?] to the British Government in which the French Government introduces questions of political agreement in connection with reduction of navies and sets out her view of the ineffectiveness of the Pact of Paris, her insistence upon more methodical procedure of pacific settlements to make it more effective, and her opinion that the absence of provisions of security against aggression makes her dependence on the League of Nations essential.

1. Following the World War we have had a period in the United States of strong reaction against any cooperation in general plans for methodical procedure in settlement of international controversies. The distance of our people from Europe, their inability to appreciate fully the difficulties of European statesmen, and the differences between European political constitutions and our own, together with deep dissensions and disappointments which have arisen here out of our participation in the great war—have all confirmed the inherited and deep instinct of our people against being involved in any international action with Europe.

Framed largely by the genius of Mr. Briand, the Pact of Paris gave a formula which found complete and ready acceptance in the American mind. The outlawry of war was a noble and simple basis for the preservation of peace in which this country was generally in agreement. There was general agreement also in the idea that there must be always sought pacific means for the settlement of international controversies and that public opinion, informed and enlight-

ened, is a most potent power to that end. But the American mind has not come to the point of accepting any general plan of methodical procedure for the pacific settlement of international disputes and particularly, it is not ready to commit itself to any plan in cases of violation of the Pact of Paris or as to action in cases of aggression.

But the American mind is, I think, ready to take up and consider, and, I believe, approve certain immediate and obviously practicable steps which will do much to obviate and to remove the source of international controversies and thus help prevent war. The American people have before them the plan to enter the World Court¹² and become a party to an impartial international tribunal for the settlement of such legal questions as we may from time to time be ready to submit to the Court for decision. That is a simple proposal consonant with our traditional principles and acceptable to the American mind.

We could, no doubt, from time to time take up other definite, limited questions which bear on world peace. One we are ready now to take up as to naval arms.

2. We believe that the outstanding controversy of the world today is competition in naval arms and the excessive size of navies in the light of the presumed reorientation of world thought to a purely defensive basis through the Pact of Paris. In our participation in a conference of the naval powers to settle this question, the United States has joined in a practical instance in a possible methodical settlement of controversies by pacific means which, if successful, would pave the way for the natural development of cooperation in settlement of other age-old controversies which imperil the peace of the world. Success in such practical steps one by one seems the way the American people are prepared to accept more systematic or automatic methods of procedure of international cooperation.

3. In the matter of general security we had conceived that by our preliminary negotiation with the British (through which we had eliminated the hitherto primary bar to any settlement of the naval question) we were in fact making a very distinct contribution toward the security of France. The result of these negotiations promised a reduction of the British fleet by some 300,000 or 400,000 tons, a reduction of the American fleet by some 200,000 tons, substantial reduction of the Japanese fleet—which very reductions add materially to the security of France and the world. It was our feeling that these measures were the very fundamentals of practical progress toward security in the world and they were even more important as establishing the principle of cooperation with the other nations in the elimination of war.

It is the view of American public men that we have an obligation to serve in the cause of peace among nations and we believe it is the desire of other nations that we should so serve. Recognizing the realities of our situation, however, this cooperation can best be developed, as I have said, by dealing with limited and positive questions as they may arise."

COTTON

¹² See *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1930—6 p. m.

281. We assume that the statement issued by the British last night ends the possibility of any five-power pact.¹³ If this is correct, it would seem to us most vital and urgent that every effort should be made by you in the direction of a three-power agreement. An agreement of this kind would accomplish the greater portion of that which we have tried to bring about in the stabilization and reduction of arms. A setting would be created by it and we believe that at a later date the other nations would have to adhere in practice, even though they never do so by signature. It is as important from a national point of view as it is to the world. Although all we wish might not be gotten under our final terms with the Japanese, at the same time our ultimate aims with respect to the world are advanced and the cause of world peace is saved from the great disaster of a break-down.

COTTON

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1930—7 p. m.

282. It would seem to us, if it is certain that there is no longer a possibility of a five-power agreement, that you might deem it advisable to convey a message to the Prime Minister from the President to the effect that the Rapidan conferences took cognizance of the possibility of a three-power treaty; that at that time such a treaty was thought feasible if the effort to induce the other powers to join was not successful; that it is the President's belief that such a step would in large measure fulfill the high purpose of both the Prime Minister and himself. A great advance in world stabilization would in itself be made by cooperation between Japan, Great Britain, and the United States.

¹³ On March 30 a statement issued to the press from No. 10 Downing St., the residence of the British Prime Minister, and printed in the morning papers on March 31 said in part that "any further military or naval commitments are impossible, for that would be tantamount to tying ourselves down to military operations without being able to control the situation from which they have arisen. No British Government could undertake such commitments, which

There can well be introduced into such a treaty provisions to protect the British in case of antagonistic naval building; the taking of such action by any nation, however, with consequent upsetting of a major plan of stability, would in all probability be brought to a halt by the feeling of world understanding. The President believes that a crisis has now been reached, when nothing should be left undone to prevent what may be a backward step in the world peace movement. It would be deplorable to have that movement checked.

COTTON

500.A15a3/806 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, April 1, 1930—1 p. m.

[Received April 1—7:15 a. m.]

181. Your telegrams Nos. 281 and 282, March 31, 6 p. m., and 7 p. m., respectively. Reports of our death are greatly exaggerated. Last evening at 5 o'clock the British submitted their proposal to the French for the clarification of the Covenant relations of the two powers, and the document was read to me at 6 o'clock. As I understand the British propositions, they so nearly approach the French demands that I doubt very much that the French will reject them. MacDonald expects a reply tomorrow; and this morning he tells me that he is very hopeful. He is of the opinion that the firmness of the British statement, to which you referred, has cleared the atmosphere and has made the French more amenable. I have been working for a three-power treaty as my second line of reserve since I arrived here. I shall continue to work for a five-power treaty as long as I deem it to be within the bounds of possibility, for I feel that the high purposes mentioned in your suggested message from the President to MacDonald will be far better served by a five-power treaty than by a three-power treaty.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/809 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, April 1, 1930—6 p. m.

[Received April 1—11:35 a. m.]

186. Following telegram dated April 1, noon, received from Castle:

"I was just told by Yoshida¹⁴ that instructions to the Japanese delegation will probably go tonight. Cabinet is meeting. From con-

versation with Count Makino¹⁵ last night I believe agreement will be practically accepted. Of course I could not get the details from Yoshida, but he said that wonderful work had been done during the past few days by Shidehara, who now only dreaded reaction of the Navy. Insistence that agreement continue only until another conference is held, at which time the right is reserved by Japan to ask 70 percent, will be the only change, I think.

This morning's *Nichi Nichi* declares that threatening note was transmitted to Hamaguchi and that the conclusion is drawn from comment thereon that this was a joint *démarche* by the United States and England. Had this been published several days ago, it might have been disastrous, and would have been deeply resented. It is fortunate that this was not done, and even more so that the action was not attributed to me."

STIMSON

500.A15a3/819 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, April 2, 1930—7 p. m.

[Received 7:35 p. m.]

195. The reply of the Japanese Government was presented by the delegation at a meeting with the American and the British delegations this afternoon. It was substantially a complete acceptance of the compromise agreement submitted to Tokyo. The reply was accompanied by a note from the Japanese Government which was very good-spirited and considerate, and the British feel, as do we, that they have acted in the finest of spirit in the entire matter. Another meeting at 11 tomorrow was asked for by Wakatsuki in order that further details, evidently of minor character, might be discussed. After that meeting a full report of the settlement with the Japanese will be sent you.

Both the British and the French seem hopeful and encouraged, and negotiations between them are proceeding actively. Since last week there has been a change in the entire spirit of the Conference, and it now seems that even though the French and the Italians cannot be included in a five-power agreement at the present time, matters in which they are concerned could be left so that there would be a very good prospect of their prompt inclusion; it looks at present, however, as though they will be included in the settlement now.

Adjournment of the plenary meeting was made owing to the feel-

simultaneously with the Japanese result.

Tomorrow morning Briand is coming to see me, and I shall then give the President's message to him.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/821 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, April 3, 1930—5 p. m.

[Received April 3—1:40 p. m.]

199. Our meeting with the British and the Japanese took place this morning without bringing forth any serious obstacles to the prompt settlement of the agreement with Japan. The serious problem of unemployment in the Japanese shipyards might make it necessary for the Government to ask the privilege of premature replacement of a portion of their cruiser, destroyer, and submarine tonnage in order to give employment, without altering, however, the total tonnages. Neither the British nor we see any objection to this. The matter is now referred to an experts committee to outline a schedule. The Japanese have also asked us for permission to make a limited transfer between certain categories, but it is our impression that this request was made as a matter of form in order to satisfy their Navy party, and that it is not expected to be accepted by either the British or us.

This morning Briand called on me for an hour and a half. Morrow was present also. I read the President's message to Briand, and he expressed appreciation, saying that he quite understood the limitations of American action. He expressed his gratitude to us for our having given the push that broke the jam between the British and the French last week, and told us about his negotiations since that date with the British. These have been confined wholly to question of the redefinition and affirmation of British responsibilities under the League of Nations; Briand stated that he considered the two nations were very close together. Tonnage figures had not yet been discussed, however, and no further progress has been made with the Italians; but if the British and the French get together, the pressure upon the Italians will become very heavy.

Since our March 26 press statement²⁶ and our conference with the British on March 24,²⁷ no allusion has been made to consultative pacts with us.

STIMSON

²⁶ See telegram No. 162, March 26, 11 a. m., from the chairman of the American delegation, p. 83.

²⁷ See telegram No. 161, March 25, 5 p. m., from the chairman of the American

500.A15a3/825a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American
Delegation (Stimson)*

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1930—3 p. m.

300. The press despatches lead us to believe that a three-power pact is the inevitable conclusion, in view of the improbability of finding a basis between the French and Italians or even the French and British. If the British are prepared to come along on the Rapidan figures and your subsequent battleship arrangements, we think that a three-power pact will be regarded as a distinct victory, and a reasonable political clause protecting the signatories in case of menacing construction will not be regarded as out of line.

A five-power pact, of course, is what we would all prefer but we are of the opinion that we run some danger in extending negotiations, for the failure of the five-power treaty is at present clearly upon the French and Italians but they might turn the tables by making such demands on the United States as would appear to place upon us the responsibility. Moreover the five-power treaty with consultative provision stronger than that which we telegraphed might cause breakdown of the Conference if demands were made for more teeth in the consultative pact than we could secure agreement for. I am sure it would create great opposition here if it were made stronger than that which we telegraphed.¹⁸

COTTON

500.A15a3/825 : Telegram

*The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting
Secretary of State*

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, April 4, 1930—6 p. m.

[Received April 4—5:12 p. m.]

200. The negotiations between the French and the British, which have been going ahead steadily on question of security, culminated today in a four-hour session. The following propositions are under discussion:

1. Restatement of annex F of the Locarno Pact; this has been practically agreed upon;
2. Amendment of the League of Nations Covenant so as to prohibit

before the French Government and will return on Monday.

The decision of the British Government is contingent upon a meeting of the Cabinet to be called on Monday.

We have taken no part in the conference, of course, but I have strongly urged upon MacDonald the necessity of expeditious settlement of the pivotal questions of the Conference in order that we may bring things to a close as soon as possible.

Conferences with the Japanese on details of settlement with them are progressing before the committee of experts.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/827 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, April 5, 1930—4 p. m.

[Received 4:28 p. m.¹⁹]

202. Your telegram No. 300, April 4. After conference with Briand this morning, MacDonald and Craigie informed Morrow and myself of the situation at luncheon. Briand is taking with him to Paris this afternoon security plan for the consideration of the French Government, as mentioned in my telegram No. 200, yesterday. Conferences will be resumed Tuesday afternoon upon his return from Paris. He refused to discuss tonnage figures, stating that the French Government would have to decide first how much the proposed security plan was worth in tonnage. After consultation with his Government he is to transmit figures by telegraph. The security plan will be considered by the British Cabinet when it meets Monday. Therefore, there is still hope of a five-power agreement, but MacDonald's mind, I can see, is influenced very much by the evident reaction in British opinion against further political commitments of whatever nature in the European situation. Therefore, we discussed at our luncheon a three-power agreement coupled with efforts to secure inclusion of France and Italy. I impressed upon MacDonald importance of at least beginning with Rapidan figures in the three-power agreement even though the British Government would soon be compelled to increase its tonnage, particularly in destroyers, in order to meet French submarine construction in the future. MacDonald stated emphatically that he would begin with the Rapidan figures although the French program, he feared, would compel a

¹⁹ Telegram in two sections.

4, and he fully appreciated their force. I am of the opinion that the probable outcome will be a three-power treaty. You must remember, however, that although the present French-British and French-American atmosphere and relations are good and infinitely better now than 10 days ago, yet it will be rather difficult to preserve the atmosphere from deteriorating unless an agreement is decided upon by the five powers; therefore all of us feel that a much greater stability will be given to our work and the European situation in general if the French and Italians can be brought into the settlement. To secure that end, we are therefore continuing our efforts.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/832: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, April 9, 1930—11 a. m.

[Received April 9—9:50 a. m.]

207. MacDonald told me that on Monday the Cabinet had trimmed down his security proposal, and that the leaders of the Conservative and the Liberal Parties had also objected to parts of it. Consequently, he had slightly modified its language. I expected, therefore, that on Briand's return there would be a prompt decision against a five-power treaty. MacDonald told me, however, after his meeting with Briand last evening, that the security negotiations were not rejected, that the French were very conciliatory and were evidently anxious for an agreement. Negotiations are still on, and at last tonnage figures are to be taken up this morning by the British and the French, Alexander acting for the former and Dumesnil for the latter. The French-Italian deadlock still remains. The Prime Minister intimated that by this evening he would know the fate of the five-power treaty.

Nearly all of the questions raised by the Japanese have been settled, and today we hope to settle what remains. Yesterday all five powers in the First Committee adopted unanimously the form of the proposed declaration of international law as to protecting lives of the crew and passengers from submarine attack. The form is that which was last submitted to Root.²¹ The First Committee is

²¹ See telegram No. 147, March 19, 7 p. m., from the chairman of the American delegation, p. 67.

also finishing up other technical and procedural questions on which the other committees have been at work.

Morrow and I together with Gordon and Rublee are working on form of a five-power treaty to be used even should the five-power agreement on auxiliary tonnage fail. If that happens, there are still several important subjects for a five-power treaty and it is our purpose to provide a framework for keeping the five powers together for future interpellations.

I insert here a possible skeleton outline for such a five-power treaty:

Part I. Five-power agreement amending the Treaty of Washington construction schedule so as to provide for a capital ship holiday and for the scrapping of capital ships. Also broadening the definition of an aircraft carrier.

Part II. Three-power agreement dealing with auxiliary categories.

Part III. Five-power agreement regarding use of submarines.

Part IV. Five-power agreement as to certain future methods of procedure recommended by the First Committee.

Part V. (Or probably special resolution.) France and Italy to undertake to continue with their efforts to reach agreement on auxiliary category limitations; meanwhile, Conference adjourns.

Parts I, II, and III to take effect on ratification of the treaty by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan.

If the progress we are making seems to be distressingly slow, please remember that the British leaders, as result of their parliamentary and other work, are able to give only fraction of their time to the Conference itself, and that MacDonald is very despondent and very tired. I have made the President's suggestions regarding the advantages of a three-power treaty quite clear to the Prime Minister, but the decision, of course, as to when to cease efforts for a five-power agreement necessarily rests with him.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/833: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, April 10, 1930—4 p. m.

[Received April 10—12:55 p. m.]

211. We settled all questions with Japanese this morning, thus entirely closing the three-power agreement. MacDonald informed me later that, after conferring with Briand, the British had practically given up hope of agreement with Italy and France on auxiliary tonnage. In order to forestall any acrimonious termination of the Conference, we took up at once the proposition for the conclusion of a composite treaty on general basis outlined in my telegram No. 207,

yesterday. The British, Japanese, French, and Italians have given their assent to that method and it now appears as though the situation of closing in a friendly spirit was well in hand. We have a rough draft of proposed treaty completed and we are informed that the British have another partially completed. As matters now stand, I believe the Conference could adjourn with a fair degree of promptness, possibly before April 22, but owing to the final delays which are inevitable I advise against making any prophecy.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/835 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

LONDON, April 10, 1930—5 p. m.

[Received April 10—2:55 p. m.]

212. This morning we reached an agreement with the British and the Japanese; we are now endeavoring to arrive at an agreement with the French and the Italians, so that the results of the work shall be embodied in single treaty. Following is the tentative program which we have accepted: ²²

“Skeleton of proposed five-power treaty.

Part I. A five-power agreement amending Washington Treaty so as to provide:

(1) For a capital ship holiday of all five powers; France and Italy to have the right to still lay down the tonnage which they were entitled to lay down in 1927 and 1929.

(2) Agreement for scrapping 3 capital ships by the United States, 5 by British Empire, and 1 by Japan.

(3) New definition of aircraft carrier.

Part II. Five-power agreement declaring the rules of international law as to the use of submarines.

Part III. Three-power agreement dealing with auxiliary vessels including therein provisions relating to exempt and special ships.

Entire treaty shall go into effect as to Great Britain, United States of America, and Japan when ratified by these three nations.”

The Japanese have abandoned their position on the transference of tonnage from destroyer category into the submarine category, and have accepted definite limitation to 52,700 tons of submarine tonnage. In order to provide certain amount of work in Japanese dockyards, we have made allowance for some premature scrapping and replacement of light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, always subject to provision that total tonnage limitations of these categories shall

not be exceeded. We have also consented to retention by each of the three nations of one demilitarized battleship for a gunnery training ship and that three demilitarized cruisers of the *Kuma* class may be retained by Japan to be used as cadet training vessels to replace five over age ships now being used for that purpose.

Please repeat to Tokyo.²³

STIMSON

500.A15a3/838b : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1930—6 p. m.

323. By instruction of the President I transmit to you his congratulations on the success of the result which you have achieved and this expression of his admiration for your patience and determination through an arduous and difficult negotiation. This instruction is being made public here.²⁴

COTTON

500.A15a3/864 : Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

LONDON, April 22, 1930.

[Received April 22—9:55 a. m.]

253. For the President. I am happy to tell you that the Naval Treaty which is the result of movement initiated by you last spring is signed. The form is satisfactory and the spirit of the occasion excellent.

STIMSON

Treaty Series No. 830

*Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, Signed at London, April 22, 1930*²⁵

The President of the United States of America, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the King of Italy, and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan,

²³ Transmitted to the Embassy in Japan as Department's telegram No. 68, April 10, 3 p. m.

²⁴ *Proceedings of the London Naval Conference*, p. 246.

²⁵ In English and French; French text not printed. Ratification advised by the Senate, July 21, 1930; ratified by the President, July 22, 1930; ratifications deposited at London, October 27, 1930, by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and all parts of the British Empire which are not separate members of the League of Nations, the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, India, and Japan; December 31, 1930, by the

Desiring to prevent the dangers and reduce the burdens inherent in competitive armaments, and

Desiring to carry forward the work begun by the Washington Naval Conference and to facilitate the progressive realization of general limitation and reduction of armaments,

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty for the limitation and reduction of naval armament, and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America:

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State;
Charles G. Dawes, Ambassador to the Court of St. James;
Charles Francis Adams, Secretary of the Navy;
Joseph T. Robinson, Senator from the State of Arkansas;
David A. Reed, Senator from the State of Pennsylvania;
Hugh Gibson, Ambassador to Belgium;
Dwight W. Morrow, Ambassador to Mexico;

The President of the French Republic:

Mr. André Tardieu, Deputy, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of the Interior;
Mr. Aristide Briand, Deputy, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Jacques-Louis Dumesnil, Deputy, Minister of Marine;
Mr. François Piétri, Deputy, Minister of the Colonies;
Mr. Aimé-Joseph de Fleuriau, Ambassador of the French Republic at the Court of St. James;

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

for Great Britain and Northern Ireland and all parts of the British Empire which are not separate Members of the League of Nations:

The Right Honourable James Ramsay MacDonald, M. P., First Lord of His Treasury and Prime Minister;
The Right Honourable Arthur Henderson, M. P., His Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
The Right Honourable Albert Victor Alexander, M. P., First Lord of His Admiralty;
The Right Honourable William Wedgwood Benn, D. S. O., D. F. C., M. P., His Principal Secretary of State for India;

for the Dominion of Canada:

Colonel The Honourable James Layton Ralston, C. M. G., D. S. O., K. C., a Member of His Privy Council for Canada, His Minister for National Defence;
The Honourable Philippe Roy, a Member of His Privy Council for Canada, His Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in France for the Dominion of Canada;

for the Commonwealth of Australia:

for the Dominion of New Zealand:

Thomas Mason Wilford, Esquire, K. C., High Commissioner for the Dominion of New Zealand in London;

for the Union of South Africa:

Charles Theodore de Water, Esquire, High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa in London;

for the Irish Free State:

Timothy Aloysius Smiddy, Esquire, High Commissioner for the Irish Free State in London;

for India:

Sir Atul Chandra Chatterjee, K. C. I. E., High Commissioner for India in London;

His Majesty the King of Italy:

The Honourable Dino Grandi, Deputy, His Minister Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

Admiral of Division The Honourable Giuseppe Sirianni, Senator of the Kingdom, His Minister Secretary of State for Marine;

Mr. Antonio Chiaramonte-Bordonaro, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of St. James;

Admiral The Honourable Baron Alfredo Acton, Senator of the Kingdom;

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

Mr. Reijiro Wakatsuki, Member of the House of Peers;

Admiral Takeshi Takarabe, Minister for the Navy;

Mr. Tsuneo Matsudaira, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of St. James;

Mr. Matsuzo Nagai, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of the Belgians;

Who, having communicated to one another their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

PART I

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties agree not to exercise their rights to lay down the keels of capital ship replacement tonnage during the years 1931-1936 inclusive as provided in Chapter II, Part 3 of the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament signed between them at Washington on the 6th February, 1922, and referred to in the present Treaty as the Washington Treaty.

This provision is without prejudice to the disposition relating to

the replacement of ships accidentally lost or destroyed contained in Chapter II, Part 3, Section I, paragraph (c) of the said Treaty.

France and Italy may, however, build the replacement tonnage which they were entitled to lay down in 1927 and 1929 in accordance with the provisions of the said Treaty.

ARTICLE 2

1. The United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Japan shall dispose of the following capital ships as provided in this Article:

United States:

“Florida”.

“Utah”.

“Arkansas” or “Wyoming”.

United Kingdom:

“Benbow”.

“Iron Duke”.

“Marlborough”.

“Emperor of India”.

“Tiger”.

Japan:

“Hiyei”.

(a) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (b), the above ships, unless converted to target use exclusively in accordance with Chapter II, Part 2, paragraph II (c) of the Washington Treaty, shall be scrapped in the following manner:

One of the ships to be scrapped by the United States, and two of those to be scrapped by the United Kingdom shall be rendered unfit for warlike service, in accordance with Chapter II, Part 2, paragraph III (b) of the Washington Treaty, within twelve months from the coming into force of the present Treaty. These ships shall be finally scrapped, in accordance with paragraph II (a) or (b) of the said Part 2, within twenty-four months from the said coming into force. In the case of the second of the ships to be scrapped by the United States, and of the third and fourth of the ships to be scrapped by the United Kingdom, the said periods shall be eighteen and thirty months respectively from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

(b) Of the ships to be disposed of under this Article, the following may be retained for training purposes:

by the United States: “Arkansas” or “Wyoming”.

by the United Kingdom: “Iron Duke”.

by Japan: “Hiyei”.

These ships shall be reduced to the condition prescribed in Section

ing these vessels to the required condition shall begin, in the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, within twelve months, and in the case of Japan within eighteen months from the coming into force of the present Treaty; the work shall be completed within six months of the expiration of the above-mentioned periods.

Any of these ships which are not retained for training purposes shall be rendered unfit for warlike service within eighteen months, and finally scrapped within thirty months, of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

2. Subject to any disposal of capital ships which might be necessitated, in accordance with the Washington Treaty, by the building by France or Italy of the replacement tonnage referred to in Article 1 of the present Treaty, all existing capital ships mentioned in Chapter II, Part 3, Section II of the Washington Treaty and not designated above to be disposed of may be retained during the term of the present Treaty.

3. The right of replacement is not lost by delay in laying down replacement tonnage, and the old vessel may be retained until replaced even though due for scrapping under Chapter II, Part 3, Section II, of the Washington Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

1. For the purposes of the Washington Treaty, the definition of an aircraft carrier given in Chapter II, Part 4 of the said Treaty is hereby replaced by the following definition :

The expression "aircraft carrier" includes any surface vessel of war, whatever its displacement, designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon.

2. The fitting of a landing-on or flying-off platform or deck on a capital ship, cruiser or destroyer, provided such vessel was not designed or adapted exclusively as an aircraft carrier, shall not cause any vessel so fitted to be charged against or classified in the category of aircraft carriers.

3. No capital ship in existence on the 1st April, 1930, shall be fitted with a landing-on platform or deck.

ARTICLE 4

1. No aircraft carrier of 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) or less standard displacement mounting a gun above 6.1-inch (155 mm.)

tons (10,160 metric tons) or less standard displacement mounting a gun above 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre shall be constructed within the jurisdiction of any of the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 5

An aircraft carrier must not be designed and constructed for carrying a more powerful armament than that authorised by Article IX or Article X of the Washington Treaty, or by Article 4 of the present Treaty, as the case may be.

Wherever in the said Articles IX and X the calibre of 6 inches (152 mm.) is mentioned, the calibre of 6.1 inches (155 mm.) is substituted therefor.

PART II

ARTICLE 6

1. The rules for determining standard displacement prescribed in Chapter II, Part 4 of the Washington Treaty shall apply to all surface vessels of war of each of the High Contracting Parties.

2. The standard displacement of a submarine is the surface displacement of the vessel complete (exclusive of the water in non-watertight structure) fully manned, engined, and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions for crew, miscellaneous stores, and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel, lubricating oil, fresh water or ballast water of any kind on board.

3. Each naval combatant vessel shall be rated at its displacement tonnage when in the standard condition. The word "ton", except in the expression "metric tons", shall be understood to be the ton of 2,240 pounds (10,016 kilos.).

ARTICLE 7

1. No submarine the standard displacement of which exceeds 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) or with a gun above 5.1-inch (130 mm.) calibre shall be acquired by or constructed by or for any of the High Contracting Parties.

2. Each of the High Contracting Parties may, however, retain, build or acquire a maximum number of three submarines of a standard displacement not exceeding 2,800 tons (2,845 metric tons); these

4. As from the coming into force of the present Treaty in respect of all the High Contracting Parties, no submarine the standard displacement of which exceeds 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) or with a gun above 5.1-inch (130 mm.) calibre shall be constructed within the jurisdiction of any of the High Contracting Parties, except as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article.

ARTICLE 8

Subject to any special agreements which may submit them to limitation, the following vessels are exempt from limitation:

(a) naval surface combatant vessels of 600 tons (610 metric tons) standard displacement and under;

(b) naval surface combatant vessels exceeding 600 tons (610 metric tons), but not exceeding 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) standard displacement, provided they have none of the following characteristics:

- (1) mount a gun above 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre;
- (2) mount more than four guns above 3-inch (76 mm.) calibre;
- (3) are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;
- (4) are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots.

(c) naval surface vessels not specifically built as fighting ships which are employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way than as fighting ships, provided they have none of the following characteristics:

- (1) mount a gun above 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre;
- (2) mount more than four guns above 3-inch (76 mm.) calibre;
- (3) are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;
- (4) are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots;
- (5) are protected by armour plate;
- (6) are designed or fitted to launch mines;
- (7) are fitted to receive aircraft on board from the air;
- (8) mount more than one aircraft-launching apparatus on the centre line; or two, one on each broadside;
- (9) if fitted with any means of launching aircraft into the air, are designed or adapted to operate at sea more than three aircraft.

ARTICLE 9

The rules as to replacement contained in Annex I to this Part II are applicable to vessels of war not exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, with the exception of aircraft carriers, whose replacement is governed by the provisions of the Washington Treaty.

ARTICLE 10

Within one month after the date of laying down and the date of completion respectively of each vessel of war, other than capital ships, aircraft carriers and the vessels exempt from limitation under Article 8, laid down or completed by or for them after the coming into force of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to each of the other High Contracting Parties the information detailed below:

- (a) the date of laying the keel and the following particulars:
 - classification of the vessel;
 - standard displacement in tons and metric tons;
 - principal dimensions, namely: length at water-line, extreme beam at or below water-line;
 - mean draft at standard displacement;
 - calibre of the largest gun.
- (b) the date of completion together with the foregoing particulars relating to the vessel at that date.

The information to be given in the case of capital ships and aircraft carriers is governed by the Washington Treaty.

ARTICLE 11

Subject to the provisions of Article 2 of the present Treaty, the rules for disposal contained in Annex II to this Part II shall be applied to all vessels of war to be disposed of under the said Treaty, and to aircraft carriers as defined in Article 3.

ARTICLE 12

1. Subject to any supplementary agreements which may modify, as between the High Contracting Parties concerned, the lists in Annex III to this Part II, the special vessels shown therein may be retained and their tonnage shall not be included in the tonnage subject to limitation.

2. Any other vessel constructed, adapted or acquired to serve the purposes for which these special vessels are retained shall be charged against the tonnage of the appropriate combatant category, according to the characteristics of the vessel, unless such vessel conforms to the characteristics of vessels exempt from limitation under Article 8.

3. Japan may, however, replace the minelayers "Aso" and "Tokiwa" by two new minelayers before the 31st December, 1936. The standard displacement of each of the new vessels shall not exceed 5,000 tons (5,080 metric tons); their speed shall not exceed twenty knots, and their other characteristics shall conform to the provisions of paragraph (b) of Article 8. The new vessels shall be regarded as special

vessels and their tonnage shall not be chargeable to the tonnage of any combatant category. The "Aso" and "Tokiwa" shall be disposed of in accordance with Section I or II of Annex II to this Part II, on completion of the replacement vessels.

4. The "Asama", "Yakumo", "Izumo", "Iwate" and "Kasuga" shall be disposed of in accordance with Section I or II of Annex II to this Part II when the first three vessels of the "Kuma" class have been replaced by new vessels. These three vessels of the "Kuma" class shall be reduced to the condition prescribed in Section V, subparagraph (b) 2 of Annex II to this Part II, and are to be used for training ships, and their tonnage shall not thereafter be included in the tonnage subject to limitation.

ARTICLE 13

Existing ships of various types, which, prior to the 1st April, 1930, have been used as stationary training establishments or hulks, may be retained in a non-seagoing condition.

ANNEX I

Rules for replacement

SECTION I.—Except as provided in Section III of this Annex and Part III of the present Treaty, a vessel shall not be replaced before it becomes "over-age". A vessel shall be deemed to be "over-age" when the following number of years have elapsed since the date of its completion :

(a) For a surface vessel exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) but not exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement :

- (i) if laid down before the 1st January, 1920 : 16 years ;
- (ii) if laid down after the 31st December, 1919 : 20 years.

(b) For a surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement :

- (i) if laid down before the 1st January, 1921 : 12 years ;
- (ii) if laid down after the 31st December, 1920 : 16 years.

(c) For a submarine : 13 years.

The keels of replacement tonnage shall not be laid down more than three years before the year in which the vessel to be replaced becomes "over-age"; but this period is reduced to two years in the case of any replacement surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement.

The right of replacement is not lost by delay in laying down replacement tonnage.

SECTION II.—Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the vessel or vessels, whose retention would cause the maximum tonnage permitted in the category to be exceeded, shall, on the completion or acquisition of replacement tonnage, be disposed of in accordance with Annex II to this Part II.

SECTION III.—In the event of loss or accidental destruction a vessel may be immediately replaced.

Rules for disposal of Vessels of War

The present Treaty provides for the disposal of vessels of war in the following ways:

- (i) by scrapping (sinking or breaking up);
- (ii) by converting the vessel to a hulk;
- (iii) by converting the vessel to target use exclusively;
- (iv) by retaining the vessel exclusively for experimental purposes;
- (v) by retaining the vessel exclusively for training purposes.

Any vessel of war to be disposed of, other than a capital ship, may either be scrapped or converted to a hulk at the option of the High Contracting Party concerned.

Vessels, other than capital ships, which have been retained for target, experimental or training purposes, shall finally be scrapped or converted to hulks.

SECTION I.—Vessels to be scrapped

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by scrapping, by reason of its replacement, must be rendered incapable of warlike service within six months of the date of the completion of its successor, or of the first of its successors if there are more than one. If, however, the completion of the new vessel or vessels be delayed, the work of rendering the old vessel incapable of warlike service shall, nevertheless, be completed within four and a half years from the date of laying the keel of the new vessel, or of the first of the new vessels; but should the new vessel, or any of the new vessels, be a surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement, this period is reduced to three and a half years.

(b) A vessel to be scrapped shall be considered incapable of warlike service when there shall have been removed and landed or else destroyed in the ship:

- (1) all guns and essential parts of guns, fire control tops and revolving parts of all barbettes and turrets;
- (2) all hydraulic or electric machinery for operating turrets;
- (3) all fire control instruments and rangefinders;
- (4) all ammunition, explosives, mines and mine rails;
- (5) all torpedoes, war heads, torpedo tubes and training racks;
- (6) all wireless telegraphy installations;
- (7) all main propelling machinery, or alternatively the armoured conning tower and all side armour plate;
- (8) all aircraft cranes, derricks, lifts and launching apparatus. All landing-on or flying-off platforms and decks, or alternatively all main propelling machinery;
- (9) in addition, in the case of submarines, all main storage batteries, air compressor plants and ballast pumps.

(c) Scrapping shall be finally effected in either of the following ways within twelve months of the date on which the work of rendering the vessel incapable of warlike service is due for completion:

- (1) permanent sinking of the vessel;
- (2) breaking the vessel up; this shall always include the destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers and armour, and all deck, side and bottom plating.

SECTION II.—*Vessels to be converted to hulks*

A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to a hulk shall be considered finally disposed of when the conditions prescribed in Section I, paragraph (b), have been complied with, omitting sub-paragraphs (6), (7) and (8), and when the following have been effected :

- (1) mutilation beyond repair of all propeller shafts, thrust blocks, turbine gearing or main propelling motors, and turbines or cylinders of main engines ;
- (2) removal of propeller brackets ;
- (3) removal and breaking up of all aircraft lifts, and the removal of all aircraft cranes, derricks and launching apparatus.

The vessel must be put in the above condition within the same limits of time as provided in Section I for rendering a vessel incapable of warlike service.

SECTION III.—*Vessels to be converted to target use*

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to target use exclusively shall be considered incapable of warlike service when there have been removed and landed, or rendered unserviceable on board, the following :

- (1) all guns ;
- (2) all fire control tops and instruments and main fire control communication wiring ;
- (3) all machinery for operating gun mountings or turrets ;
- (4) all ammunition, explosives, mines, torpedoes and torpedo tubes ;
- (5) all aviation facilities and accessories.

The vessel must be put into the above condition within the same limits of time as provided in Section I for rendering a vessel incapable of warlike service.

(b) In addition to the rights already possessed by each High Contracting Party under the Washington Treaty, each High Contracting Party is permitted to retain, for target use exclusively, at any one time :

- (1) not more than three vessels (cruisers or destroyers), but of these three vessels only one may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement ;
- (2) one submarine.

(c) On retaining a vessel for target use, the High Contracting Party concerned undertakes not to recondition it for warlike service.

SECTION IV.—*Vessels retained for experimental purposes*

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to experimental purposes exclusively shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Section III (a) of this Annex.

(b) Without prejudice to the general rules, and provided that due notice be given to the other High Contracting Parties, reasonable variation from the conditions prescribed in Section III (a) of this Annex, in so far as may be necessary for the purposes of a special experiment, may be permitted as a temporary measure.

Any High Contracting Party taking advantage of this provision is required to furnish full details of any such variations and the period for which they will be required.

(c) Each High Contracting Party is permitted to retain for experimental purposes exclusively at any one time:

- (1) not more than two vessels (cruisers or destroyers), but of these two vessels only one may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement;
- (2) one submarine.

(d) The United Kingdom is allowed to retain, in their present conditions, the monitor "Roberts", the main armament guns and mountings of which have been mutilated, and the seaplane carrier "Ark Royal", until no longer required for experimental purposes. The retention of these two vessels is without prejudice to the retention of vessels permitted under (c) above.

(e) On retaining a vessel for experimental purposes the High Contracting Party concerned undertakes not to recondition it for warlike service.

SECTION V.—*Vessels retained for training purposes*

(a) In addition to the rights already possessed by any High Contracting Party under the Washington Treaty, each High Contracting Party is permitted to retain for training purposes exclusively the following vessels:

United States: 1 capital ship ("Arkansas" or "Wyoming") ;
 France: 2 surface vessels, one of which may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement;
 United Kingdom: 1 capital ship ("Iron Duke") ;
 Italy: 2 surface vessels, one of which may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement;
 Japan: 1 capital ship ("Hiyei"), 3 cruisers ("Kuma" class).

(b) Vessels retained for training purposes under the provisions of paragraph (a) shall, within six months of the date on which they are required to be disposed of, be dealt with as follows:

1. *Capital Ships.*

The following is to be carried out:

- (1) removal of main armament guns, revolving parts of all barbettes and turrets; machinery for operating turrets; but three turrets with their armament may be retained in each ship;
- (2) removal of all ammunition and explosives in excess of the quantity required for target practice training for the guns remaining on board;
- (3) removal of conning tower and the side armour belt between the foremost and aftermost barbettes;
- (4) removal or mutilation of all torpedo tubes;
- (5) removal or mutilation on board of all boilers in excess of the number required for a maximum speed of eighteen knots.

2. *Other surface vessels retained by France, Italy and Japan.*

The following is to be carried out:

- (1) removal of one half of the guns, but four guns of main calibre may be retained on each vessel;
- (2) removal of all torpedo tubes;
- (3) removal of all aviation facilities and accessories;
- (4) removal of one half of the boilers.

(c) The High Contracting Party concerned undertakes that vessels retained

Special vessels

UNITED STATES

<i>Name and type of vessel</i>	<i>Displacement Tons</i>
Aroostook—Minelayer.....	4, 950
Oglala—Minelayer.....	4, 950
Baltimore—Minelayer.....	4, 413
San Francisco—Minelayer.....	4, 083
Cheyenne—Monitor.....	2, 800
Helena—Gunboat.....	1, 392
Isabel—Yacht.....	938
Niagara—Yacht.....	2, 600
Bridgeport—Destroyer tender.....	11, 750
Dobbin—Destroyer tender.....	12, 450
Melville—Destroyer tender.....	7, 150
Whitney—Destroyer tender.....	12, 450
Holland—Submarine tender.....	11, 570
Henderson—Naval transport.....	10, 000
	91, 496

FRANCE

<i>Name and type of vessel</i>	<i>Displacement Tons</i>
Castor—Minelayer.....	3, 150
Pollux—Minelayer.....	2, 461
Commandant-Teste—Seaplane carrier.....	10, 000
Aisne — Despatch vessel.....	600
Marne " ".....	600
Ancre " ".....	604
Scarpe " ".....	604
Suippe " ".....	604
Dunkerque " ".....	644
Laffaux " ".....	644
Bapaume " ".....	644
Nancy " ".....	644
Calais " ".....	644
Lassigny " ".....	644
Les Eparges " ".....	644
Remiremont " ".....	644
Tahure " ".....	644
Toul " ".....	644
Épinal " ".....	644
Liévin " ".....	644
(—)—Netlayer.....	2, 293
	28, 644

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

<i>Name and type of vessel</i>	<i>Displacement Tons</i>
Adventure—Minelayer.....	6, 740
(United Kingdom)	
Albatross—Seaplane carrier.....	5, 000
(Australia)	
Erebus—Monitor.....	7, 200
(United Kingdom)	
Terror—Monitor.....	7, 200
(United Kingdom)	
Marshal Soult—Monitor.....	6, 400
(United Kingdom)	
Clive—Sloop.....	2, 021
(India)	
Medway—Submarine depot ship.....	15, 000
(United Kingdom)	
	49, 561

ITALY

<i>Name and type of vessel</i>	<i>Displacement Tons</i>
Miraglia—Seaplane carrier.....	4, 880
Faà di Bruno—Monitor.....	2, 800
Monte Grappa—Monitor.....	605
Montello—Monitor.....	605
Monte Cengio—Ex-monitor.....	500
Monte Novegno—Ex-monitor.....	500
Campania—Sloop.....	2, 070
	11, 960

JAPAN

<i>Name and type of vessel</i>	<i>Displacement Tons</i>
Aso—Minelayer.....	7, 180
Tokiwa ".....	9, 240
Asama—Old cruiser.....	9, 240
Yakumo " ".....	9, 010
Izumo " ".....	9, 180
Iwate " ".....	9, 180
Kasuga " ".....	7, 080
Yodo—Gunboat.....	1, 320
	61, 430

PART III

The President of the United States of America, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, have agreed as between themselves to the provisions of this Part III:

ARTICLE 14

The naval combatant vessels of the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations and Japan, other than capital ships, aircraft carriers and all vessels exempt from limitation under Article 8, shall be limited during the term of the present Treaty as provided in this Part III, and, in the case of special vessels, as provided in Article 12.

ARTICLE 15

For the purpose of this Part III the definition of the cruiser and destroyer categories shall be as follows:

Cruisers.

Surface vessels of war, other than capital ships or aircraft carriers, the standard displacement of which exceeds 1,850 tons (1,880 metric tons), or with a gun above 5.1 inch (130 mm.) calibre.

The cruiser category is divided into two sub-categories, as follows:

- (a) cruisers carrying a gun above 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre;
- (b) cruisers carrying a gun not above 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre

not exceed 1,850 tons (1,880 metric tons), and with a gun not above 5.1-inch 130 mm.) calibre.

ARTICLE 16

1. The completed tonnage in the cruiser, destroyer and submarine categories which is not to be exceeded on the 31st December, 1936, is given in the following table:

Categories	United States	British Commonwealth of Nations	Japan
Cruisers:			
(a) with guns of more than 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre.	180,000 tons (182,880 metric tons)	146,800 tons (149,149 metric tons)	108,400 tons (110,134 metric tons)
(b) with guns of 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre or less.	143,500 tons (145,796 metric tons)	192,200 tons (195,275 metric tons)	100,450 tons (102,057 metric tons)
Destroyers.....	150,000 tons (152,400 metric tons)	150,000 tons (152,400 metric tons)	105,500 tons (107,188 metric tons)
Submarines.....	52,700 tons (53,543 metric tons)	52,700 tons (53,543 metric tons)	52,700 tons (53,543 metric tons)

2. Vessels which cause the total tonnage in any category to exceed the figures given in the foregoing table shall be disposed of gradually during the period ending on the 31st December, 1936.

3. The maximum number of cruisers of sub-category (a) shall be as follows: for the United States, eighteen; for the British Commonwealth of Nations, fifteen; for Japan, twelve.

4. In the destroyer category not more than sixteen per cent. of the allowed total tonnage shall be employed in vessels of over 1,500 tons (1,524 metric tons) standard displacement. Destroyers completed or under construction on the 1st April, 1930, in excess of this percentage may be retained, but no other destroyers exceeding 1,500 tons (1,524 metric tons) standard displacement shall be constructed or acquired until a reduction to such sixteen per cent. has been effected.

5. Not more than twenty-five per cent. of the allowed total tonnage in the cruiser category may be fitted with a landing-on platform or deck for aircraft.

6. It is understood that the submarines referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 7 will be counted as part of the total submarine tonnage of the High Contracting Party concerned.

7. The tonnage of any vessels retained under Article 13 or disposed of in accordance with Annex II to Part II of the present Treaty shall not be included in the tonnage subject to limitation.

A transfer not exceeding ten per cent. of the allowed total tonnage of the category or sub-category into which the transfer is to be made shall be permitted between cruisers of sub-category (b) and destroyers.

ARTICLE 18

The United States contemplates the completion by 1935 of fifteen cruisers of sub-category (a) of an aggregate tonnage of 150,000 tons (152,400 metric tons). For each of the three remaining cruisers of sub-category (a) which it is entitled to construct the United States may elect to substitute 15,166 tons (15,409 metric tons) of cruisers of sub-category (b). In case the United States shall construct one or more of such three remaining cruisers of sub-category (a), the sixteenth unit will not be laid down before 1933 and will not be completed before 1936; the seventeenth will not be laid down before 1934 and will not be completed before 1937; the eighteenth will not be laid down before 1935 and will not be completed before 1938.

ARTICLE 19

Except as provided in Article 20, the tonnage laid down in any category subject to limitation in accordance with Article 16 shall not exceed the amount necessary to reach the maximum allowed tonnage of the category, or to replace vessels that become "over-age" before the 31st December, 1936. Nevertheless, replacement tonnage may be laid down for cruisers and submarines that become "over-age" in 1937, 1938 and 1939, and for destroyers that become "over-age" in 1937 and 1938.

ARTICLE 20

Notwithstanding the rules for replacement contained in Annex I to Part II:

(a) The "Frobisher" and "Effingham" (United Kingdom) may be disposed of during the year 1936. Apart from the cruisers under construction on the 1st April, 1930, the total replacement tonnage of cruisers to be completed, in the case of the British Commonwealth of Nations, prior to the 31st December, 1936, shall not exceed 91,000 tons (92,456 metric tons).

(b) Japan may replace the "Tama" by new construction to be completed during the year 1936.

(c) In addition to replacing destroyers becoming "over-age" before the 31st December, 1936, Japan may lay down, in each of the years 1935 and 1936, not more than 5,200 tons (5,283 metric tons) to replace part of the vessels that become "over-age" in 1938 and 1939.

(d) Japan may anticipate replacement during the term of the

GENERAL

present Treaty by laying down not more than 19,200 tons (19 metric tons) of submarine tonnage, of which not more than 12 tons (12,192 metric tons) shall be completed by the 31st December 1936.

ARTICLE 21

If, during the term of the present Treaty, the requirements of national security of any High Contracting Party in respect of vessels of war limited by Part III of the present Treaty are in the opinion of that Party materially affected by new construction of any Power other than those who have joined in Part III of this Treaty, the High Contracting Party will notify the other Parties to Part III as to the increase required to be made in its own tonnages within one or more of the categories of such vessels of war, specifying particularly the proposed increases and the reasons therefor, and shall be entitled to make such increase. Thereupon the other Parties to Part III of this Treaty shall be entitled to make a proportionate increase in the category or categories specified; and the said other Parties shall promptly advise with each other through diplomatic channels as to the situation thus presented.

PART IV

ARTICLE 22

The following are accepted as established rules of International Law:

(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are subject.

(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For the purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing circumstances and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.

The High Contracting Parties invite all other Powers to express their assent to the above rules.

PART V

Annex II to Part II so far as they relate to aircraft carriers, shall remain in force for the same period as the Washington Treaty.

Unless the High Contracting Parties should agree otherwise by reason of a more general agreement limiting naval armaments, to which they all become parties, they shall meet in conference in 1935 to frame a new treaty to replace and to carry out the purposes of the present Treaty, it being understood that none of the provisions of the present Treaty shall prejudice the attitude of any of the High Contracting Parties at the conference agreed to.

ARTICLE 24

1. The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional methods and the ratifications shall be deposited at London as soon as possible. Certified copies of all the *procès-verbaux* of the deposit of ratifications will be transmitted to the Governments of all the High Contracting Parties.

2. As soon as the ratifications of the United States of America, of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, in respect of each and all of the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations as enumerated in the preamble of the present Treaty, and of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan have been deposited, the Treaty shall come into force in respect of the said High Contracting Parties.

3. On the date of the coming into force referred to in the preceding paragraph, Parts I, II, IV and V of the present Treaty will come into force in respect of the French Republic and the Kingdom of Italy if their ratifications have been deposited at that date; otherwise these Parts will come into force in respect of each of those Powers on the deposit of its ratification.

4. The rights and obligations resulting from Part III of the present Treaty are limited to the High Contracting Parties mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article. The High Contracting Parties will agree as to the date on which, and the conditions under which, the obligations assumed under the said Part III by the High Contracting Parties mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article will bind them in relation to France and Italy; such agreement will determine at the same time the corresponding obligations of France and Italy in relation to the other High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 25

After the deposit of the ratifications of all the High Contracting Parties, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will communicate the provisions in-

signatories of the said Treaty, inviting them to accede thereto definitely and without limit of time.

Such accession shall be effected by a declaration addressed to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

ARTICLE 26

The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted to the Governments of all the High Contracting Parties.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, the twenty-second day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty.

HENRY L. STIMSON.
CHARLES G. DAWES.
CHARLES F. ADAMS.
JOSEPH T. ROBINSON.
DAVID A. REED.
HUGH GIBSON.
DWIGHT W. MORROW.
ARISTIDE BRIAND.
J. L. DUMESNIL.
A. DE FLEURIAU.
J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.
ARTHUR HENDERSON.
A. V. ALEXANDER.
W. WEDGWOOD BENN.
PHILIPPE ROY.
JAMES E. FENTON.
T. M. WILFORD.
C. T. TE WATER.
T. A. SMIDDY.
ATUL C. CHATTERJEE.
G. SIRIANNI.
A. C. BORDONARO.
ALFREDO ACTON.
R. WAKATSUKI.

500.A15a3/905a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawson)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1930—4 p.

127. In arguments before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee it has been contended by some of the "big Navy" opponents of the treaty, who thereby seek to confuse and discredit the treaty, that the construction might be placed on article 19, second sentence, so as to permit replacements of tonnage in 6-inch cruisers with the same amount of tonnage in 8-inch cruisers or vice versa by any of the three parties. Since the word "replacement" necessarily implies substitution of the same amount of tonnage in the same kind of ships, we believe there is no basis for such contention. We consider, moreover, that this contention is directly contrary to the fair implications of the provision for transfer included in article 17, and that it directly disregards division of cruisers into two sub-categories made by articles 15 and 16. We are anxious, nevertheless, that the treaty's enemies in the Senate may be given no possible excuse. Approval should be made therefore to the appropriate British authorities to inquire whether an exchange of notes on the following terms would be consented to:²⁷

"It is the understanding of the Government of the United States that the word category in Article nineteen of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 means category or sub-category. The Government of the United States declares that it interprets the Treaty to mean that vessels becoming overage in either sub-category A or sub-category B of the cruiser categories (Article sixteen) shall be replaceable only in that sub-category.

"The American Government will be most happy to have the confirmation of this understanding from His Majesty's Government."

Use your best efforts to obtain Foreign Office consent to an exchange of notes of this nature as soon as possible. A similar note will be addressed to the Imperial Japanese Government.

STIMSON

500.A15a3/1343

*The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Shidehara) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Castle)*²⁸

[Translation]

No. 66/T1

Tokyo, May 24, 1930

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 23, 1930, regarding the proposed exchange of notes on the subject of the interpretation of the London Naval Treaty of 1930.